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Abstract
Well-intentioned decisions—even ones intended to improve aggregate security— may
inadvertently jeopardize security objectives. Adopting a stringent password compo-
sition policy ostensibly yields high-entropy passwords; however, such policies often
drive users to reuse or write down passwords. Replacing URLs in emails with “safe”
URLs that navigate through a gatekeeper service that vets them before granting user
access may reduce user exposure to malware; however, it may backfire by reducing
the user’s ability to parse the URL or by giving the user a false sense of security
if user expectations misalign with the security checks delivered by the vetting pro-
cess. A short timeout threshold may ensure the user is promptly logged out when
the system detects they are away; however, if an infuriated user copes by inserting
a USB stick in their computer to emulate mouse movements, then not only will the
detection mechanism fail but the insertion of the USB stick may present a new attack
surface. These examples highlight the disconnect between decision-maker intentions
and decision outcomes. Our focus is on bridging this gap.
This thesis explores six projects bound together by the core objective of empower-
ing people to make decisions that achieve their security and privacy objectives. First,
we use grounded theory to examine Amazon reviews of password logbooks and to ob-
tain valuable insights into users’ password management beliefs, motivations, and be-
haviors. Second, we present a discrete-event simulation we built to assess the efficacy
of password policies. Third, we explore the idea of supplementing language-theoretic
ii
security with human-computability boundaries. Fourth, we conduct an eye-tracking
study to understand users’ visual processes while parsing and classifying URLs. Fifth,
we discuss preliminary findings from a study conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk
to examine why users fall for unsafe URLs. And sixth, we develop a logic-based rep-
resentation of mismorphisms, which allows us to express the root causes of security
problems. Each project demonstrates a key technique that can help in bridging the
gap between intent and outcome.
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This thesis pursues the challenge of bridging the gap between security and privacy
intentions and outcomes. Our primary focus is on helping security practitioners make
decisions that serve their security goals. In this introductory chapter, we motivate
our work, discuss our key contributions, and present a bird’s-eye view of the thesis,
wherein we discuss the other chapters of the thesis and explain how they fit together
as a cohesive whole. Last, I explain my contributions to the published papers and
research upon which this thesis is based.
Section 1.1
Motivations & Background
Security practitioners must often make decisions, such as choosing a password compo-
sition policy for a system or service, selecting security advice to administer to users,
or choosing a mechanism to time users out of a system or a session. However, making
a well-informed decision that produces the desired security outcome is often fraught
with challenges. Well-intentioned security solutions may get in the way of workflow,
driving well-intentioned users to develop and employ circumventions to get their jobs
done—circumventions that may not only nullify envisioned security gains, but also
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produce unforeseen risks. Even if full user compliance is achieved, the security deci-
sion may introduce unanticipated workflow impediments that interfere with the user’s
primary task or other organizational objectives; in some cases, the security solution
may be detrimental to other organizational goals, leading to its rollback. Cascading
failures present another class of challenges: the lack of a feedback loop—or worse, a
feedback loop that misinforms, widening the disconnect between what the security
practitioner thinks is happening and reality—may negatively impact future decisions.
Other challenges, such as those presented by regulatory constraints and legacy con-
straints, also must be considered. Given that these and other complexities muddy the
waters, we aim to assist security practitioners in making sound decisions, specifically,
ones that produce outcomes that align with their intentions.
Before diving into our work, let us briefly take a step back to set the context for
our work by discussing related work: This thesis emerges at a time when there is
newfound awareness in the security community that desired security outcomes are
rarely realized by using textbook models that are incongruous with reality. These
revelations are illuminated by much research conducted under the banner of HCISec,
research guided by the belief that human-computer interaction lies at the heart of se-
curity, e.g., [178]. Many usability studies have pursued topics pertaining to user per-
ceptions, user behaviors, security, usability, and circumvention; they have employed
various methods such as holding focus groups, conducting usability experiments both
in-person and on platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk, and analyzing data gath-
ered via logs and browser plug-ins, e.g., [4, 50, 193]. Models and simulations have
been developed to explain, reproduce, and predict behavioral responses to security
decisions, e.g., [63, 161, 171, 45]. Lessons and guiding principles for usable security
have been developed, e.g., [16, 217]. And usable security positions have been advo-
cated, e.g., [110, 185]. This, of course, only scratches the surface of existing usable
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security research.
The work presented in this thesis complements and builds upon the existing usable
security literature. We focus on delivering knowledge, tools, and principles that can
help people make well-informed decisions that realize their security objectives. That
is, we pursue the overarching goal of bridging the gap between intent and outcome.
Section 1.2
Thesis Structure and Overview
This thesis contains six primary chapters woven together by the thread of empowering
security practitioners to make more effective security-minded decisions that meet their
objectives. Each chapter explores a single technique in pursuit of our grand objective
of bridging the gap between intent and outcome. As such, we chose to discuss related
work on a per-chapter basis, rather than having all the related work appear in one
central location. Following the six primary chapters, we tie everything together and
reflect on what we’ve learned in the concluding chapter of the thesis.
An overview of the thesis—its objectives and major chapter contributions—is
provided pictorially in Figure 1.1.
Section 1.3
Chapter Synopses
We now provide synopses for the chapters that follow.
1.3.1. Chapter 2 Synopsis: Password Logbooks: Gleaning Usable Security
Insights from Amazon Reviews
As research has shown, stringent password composition policies may backfire by frus-
trating users or driving them to circumvent recommended password practices, e.g.,
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Chapter 3: We create an agent-based simulation to study 
the impacts of adopting a collection of password policies 
across services. Such simulations may help in understanding 
user behaviors and responses to security policies, comparing 
policies, and detecting vulnerable points within systems.
Chapter 4: We explore the idea of supplementing the 
contributions provided by the field of language-theoretic 
security with an approach that captures the limits of what 
actual humans who are subject to various deficiencies---not 





This thesis aims to improve 
security by bridging the 
gap between the intentions 
that guide one's decisions 




   - provide insights into 
   users' beliefs, goals, 
   decisions, and behaviors 
   - conduct studies that 
   reveal how users behave 
   and the factors that 
   influence those behaviors
   - create models and 
   simulations that shed 
   light on the mismatch 
   between intent and
   outcome
This thesis comprises six
primary chapters, each of 
which demonstrates one 
technique that can help 
bridge the intent-outcome 
gap. We list the primary 
contributions of each 
chapter to the right. 
Following the six primary 
chapters, we reflect on our 
work and discuss common 
themes that emerge in the 
process of conducting our 
research.
Chapter 2: We analyze reviews of password logbooks, 
notebooks used to record passwords, available on Amazon.
These reviews provide insights into user goals, user beliefs,
user struggles in managing passwords, and a variety of 
coping strategies users employ.
Chapter 5: We conduct a study that uses eye tracking to 
determine how users parse and classify URLs. The eye 
measurements provide reliable data on how users visually
process information and also the underlying cognitive 
processes that drive those visual processes.
Chapter 6: We complement our eye-tracking study with 
an MTurk study where users are again tasked with parsing 
and classifying URLs. We explore how a variety of URL 
features and other factors affect URL classification.
Chapter 7: We build upon our earlier work where we used 
mismorphisms - a model based in semiotic triads - to 
capture circumvention scenarios. We present our recent 
work on developing a complementary logical model.
Figure 1.1: This thesis in a nutshell.
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by choosing weak passwords, reusing existing passwords, writing down their pass-
words, or relying on the password reset mechanism to authenticate. This expectation-
outcome mismatch has even led Bill Burr, an author of a 2004 NIST standard [41]
that advocated for stringent password composition requirements on the basis of (a
misapplication of) Shannon entropy, to denounce those very recommendations [116].
Indeed, the more recent standard has abandoned this approach altogether [71, 70].
Of course, stringent password composition polices are not the only drivers of user
circumvention; the sheer number of accounts users must maintain, the frequency of
mandatory password resets, account sharing needs, and myriad other factors encum-
ber users and drive them to circumvent. While a user’s decision to circumvent may
not be tied to a single particular security decision, catalysts for circumvention, such
as stringent password composition policies, often do stem from a security decision.1
Collectively, the security-minded decisions made by security practitioners in pursuit
of improving password security have failed to produce the desired results, in large
part because the user does not conform to the assumed textbook ideal.
An abundance of literature examines the passwords that users construct, the effi-
cacy of password policies, and how users manage passwords. However, less attention
has been given to some of the more nuanced topics, such as the extent to which users
attempt to engage in secure behaviors, their awareness of the security repercussions of
their password management strategies, and their attempts to reduce or mitigate per-
ceived repercussions. We sought to examine these understudied topics by examining
password logbooks—notebooks specially designed for end users to record passwords
1Although password managers solve many of these problems, it’s also important to note that
password managers are not a panacea, e.g., password managers are not always an obvious solution
for end users and the required time and mental energy to decide on whether to use a password
manager—and, if so, which to use—often serves as a barrier to entry. There are also problems that
many password managers simply do not address, such as sharing account credentials with family
members. This is a limitation that has been experienced by a member of our broader research group
and also one that was expressed in reviews of password logbooks.
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and potentially other relevant information for computer use—that are available on
Amazon. In addition to examining the password logbook market on Amazon, we em-
ployed grounded theory, a heavily used methodology from the social sciences for doing
qualitative analysis, to generate and analyze a corpus of Amazon Verified Purchase
reviews for password logbooks. The sheer existence and breadth of these notebooks
speak to the struggles regular users have in managing their passwords, as well as
the features they desire. Moreover, the product reviews for the password logbooks
provide valuable insights into end user beliefs, concerns, and behaviors.
1.3.2. Chapter 3 Synopsis: Measuring the Security Impacts of Password
Policies Using Cognitive Behavioral Agent-Based Modeling
Consider an employee tasked with creating password policies and other authentica-
tion policies for their organization. Or a member of a regulatory body charged with
developing security regulations or compliance protocols for keeping personally iden-
tifiable information safe in hospitals. Or a security practitioner selecting a method
to defend their service against denial-of-service attacks without blocking legitimate
users. While it may be easy to make the “right” security decision in some circum-
stances, it can be quite difficult in others due to: misperceptions regarding users and
their beliefs, goals, and limitations; system considerations; existing organizational
policies; existing regulation; and other factors. This complexity often produces a
mismatch between security projections and outcomes. However, security decisions
must be made, creating a need for tools that assist in decision-making. We demon-
strate how agent-based simulation can serve as such a tool by studying the use case
of deciding upon a password composition policy.
An agent-based simulation involves an agent—a program that aims to simulate the
behaviors of a human or other sentient being—that repeatedly takes actions accord-
ing to some decision-making process within a given simulation environment. Our goal
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is to better understand proposed security solutions in the deployment context—their
shortcomings, the concomitant workflow and usability issues, and the general effec-
tiveness of the proposed solutions. We are interested in scenarios where user behavior
is tightly linked to security outcomes; hence, it is vital to model humans as they truly
are, constrained by memory limitations, emotion, misperceptions, and other factors
that guide behavior. We therefore build our simulations atop DASH [31, 30], an
agent-based modeling framework that’s capable of capturing human factors like emo-
tion, stress, cognitive burden, and workflow considerations within subsystems, which
guide agent behavior.
The chapter discusses a password simulation we built with the goal of helping
practitioners make password-related decisions—such as selecting a password compo-
sition policy (i.e., the rules for determining what constitutes a proposed password),
selecting a password reset mechanism, and deciding whether to adopt mandatory
password resets (and, if so, the frequency of these resets)—that best serve an or-
ganization’s security objectives and other organizational objectives. Agents in this
simulation simulate users who create accounts, use services, and attempt to comply
with rules and recommendations. Moreover, we coded the agents to simulate human
deficiencies, such as memory limitations and forgetting, as well as circumvention be-
haviors, namely writing down passwords, reusing passwords, and relying on password
reset mechanisms instead of remembering them.
1.3.3. Chapter 4 Synopsis: Human-Computability Boundaries
The security of a protocol rests on its ability to operate only on expected input.
The parser is the part of the protocol that is responsible for ensuring that the input
conforms to the grammar that specifies acceptable input on which the protocol is
supposed to run. Protocols are not intended to operate on input that does not belong
to the language specified by the grammar. A key tenet of language-theoretic security
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(LangSec) [2] that directly follows this line of reasoning is that the parser should run
in full, only passing along input that has been recognized. That is, processing should
only be performed on input that has already been recognized.
Another key tenet of LangSec is the principle of least expressiveness. It states
that during protocol or parser construction one should use the least expressive gram-
mar that will suffice. More precisely, one should ensure their chosen grammar lies
within certain computability boundaries corresponding to the problems of Turing-
decidability and parser equivalence. These boundaries are fitted to an extended
version of the Chomsky hierarchy that differentiates between non-deterministic and
deterministic pushdown automata. This extended hierarchy, like the 4-class Chom-
sky hierarchy that is usually presented to computer science students2, is indeed a
proper containment hierarchy. [166]. Of course, staying within these boundaries does
not guarantee security. Rather, one should think of staying within the computability
boundaries as a single article of evidence, albeit a critical one, in support of security.
We pursue the identification of another key article of evidence.
As LangSec aims to understand and account for the limitations of machines, we
seek to understand the limitations of humans as it pertains to securing and using
protocols and parsers. Although initial conceptions of computation did involve human
computers (e.g., see [47]), those conceptualizations abstracted away many of the
limitations that many actual humans face in practice—finite and small memories,
impatience, cognitive biases, bounded rationality, the dual-process model of cognition,
and so forth. The sole focus on humans as computers also does not capture the many
roles humans play regarding code. Actual humans design code, develop code, and use
code—and there are problems lurking at every part of the code’s lifecycle. We discuss
approaches to developing a model to capture human-computability boundaries and
2Sipser [176] provides a wonderful discussion of the hierarchy from the computer-science angle.
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how such a model can be merged with LangSec.
1.3.4. Chapter 5 Synopsis: Eyes on URLs: Relating Visual Behavior to
Safety Decisions
There’s a disconnect between the heuristics that users employ when parsing URLs
and the information embedded within actual URL structure. Many phishing attacks
exploit this mismatch. Such attacks are well documented in the literature, e.g., [55,
134]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that use eye-tracking
to learn how users truly parse URLs.
Eye tracking tells us about how users visually process information. Moreover, in
the right circumstances, it also can reveal information about the underlying cognitive
processes via pupillary response; in essence, pupils dilate when the cognitive load for
a user is high and they contract when it is low. In this project, we examine how users
determine the safety of a URL and what cues they use. We create a URL corpus
comprising safe and unsafe URLs, the criteria of which we explain in the chapter.
The experimental setup consists of users classifying a series of images of URLs on
a computer screen as safe or unsafe by clicking on-screen buttons while wearing an
eye tracker. Following the URL classification portion of the experiment, participants
fill in a questionnaire. We disaggregate the URLs into components—primarily the
scheme component, the authority component, and everything following the authority
component—and study how users visually process each component.
1.3.5. Chapter 6 Synopsis: An MTurk Study Examining How Users Eval-
uate URLs
We report on preliminary findings from a study that is similar in spirit to the last one;
however, we lose the eye tracker and instead conduct the URL classification study
over Amazon Mechanical Turk. This allows us to examine more URLs, use a larger
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population of users, and explore a variety of different conditions, at the cost of losing
the data on users’ visual and cognitive processes, which would have been afforded to
us by an eye tracker. We examine user susceptibility to URL redirection attacks [203],
ASCII homograph attacks [206], combosquatting attacks, and more. We also examine
how users perceive URL shorteners [212], gatekeeper URLs [118, 148], and domain
names comprising words with negative, neutral, and positive valences, as well as the
impact of font on URL classification.
1.3.6. Chapter 7 Synopsis: A Logic for Mismorphisms
When contemplating the ramifications of a security decision, understanding how simi-
lar security decisions have played out in the past can improve the accuracy of decision-
maker projections and therefore help them to make a better-informed decision in the
present. Of course, this is by no means a silver bullet, as we’ve argued in the past [33].
Not all organizations are the same. Context matters and inappropriate reliance on
outcomes of past events can indeed lead to worse decisions. That said, used wisely,
past information can also be quite valuable so long as the relevant context is clearly
and effectively communicated. To this end, we share our work on developing a model
to capture the underlying causes of security issues. We contend that cataloging secu-
rity issues of the past by their underlying causes can help inform security decisions
of the present.
In earlier work [180] , we sought to catalog and explain the underpinnings of secu-
rity problems seen in practice, which so often stem from differential representations of
reality, e.g., user and security practitioner representations, the system representation,
the actual reality. Roughly, we call these differential representation mismorphisms.
An inquiry into earlier work in semiotics and, more specifically, the semiotic triads
presented by Ogden and Richards [133], led us to a natural model for expressing
these mismorphisms and the events they induce. Using said model, we catalogued
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and classified numerous security problems.
We expand upon our prior work by capturing mismorphisms using a logical model.
We also demonstrate how this model allows us to capture the causes of a variety
of security problems. The end goal of this work is to systematize the knowledge
(such as the case study performed by Heckle [76] or scenarios from the Risks Digest
periodical [127]) available in the academic literature and elsewhere in an effort to
inform security and privacy decisions.
1.3.7. Chapter 8 Synopsis: Conclusion
In the concluding chapter, we review the previous chapters and provide key takeaways.
We then provide a short discussion of themes that emerged during our research.
Finally, we provide directions for future work and conclude.
Section 1.4
Acknowledgments
This thesis revises and extends text from prior publications. Thus, for this section,
we temporarily drop the welcoming we in favor of the awkward I as I list these
publications, explain where they fit within the thesis, and state my contributions to
them. Each of these papers involved a collaboration among researchers. My focus in
this section is primarily on explaining my contributions. I hope that it is clear that,
in the interest of brevity, I have not exhaustively stated the many contributions my
coauthors have made to these papers.
Chapter 2 Acknowledgements
Chapter 2 is based on:
Vijay Kothari, Jim Blythe, Ross Koppel, and Sean Smith. Password Log-
books and What Their Amazon Reviews Reveal About Their Users’ Mo-
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tivations, Beliefs, and Behaviors. In 2nd European Workshop on Usable
Security (EuroUSEC 2017). IEEE, 2017
My contributions to this paper involved collecting data, doing data analysis, gen-
erating figures, and writing a significant portion of the paper. Ross Koppel helped
with applying grounded theory to qualitatively analyze the data. My coauthors pro-
vided feedback throughout the study, and they helped in writing and refining the
paper.
We note the paper’s acknowledgments:
“This material is based upon work supported by the Maryland Procurement Office
under Contract No. H98230-14-C-0141. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Maryland Procurement Office. Koppel’s work
was supported in part by NSF CNS-1505799 & the Intel-NSF Partnership for Cyber-
Physical Systems Security & Privacy.”
Chapter 3 Acknowledgements
Chapter 3 is based on:
Vijay Kothari, Jim Blythe, Sean W Smith, and Ross Koppel. Measur-
ing the Security Impacts of Password Policies Using Cognitive Behavioral
Agent-Based Modeling. In Proceedings of the 2015 Symposium and Boot-
camp on the Science of Security, page 13. ACM, 2015
My contributions to this paper involved creating the simulation, conducting tests
using the simulation, creating plots, and writing a significant portion of the paper.
Jim Blythe helped me get up to speed with the agent-based simulation framework
DASH and provided suggestions on creating the simulation. My coauthors provided
feedback throughout the whole development of the simulation, and they helped in
writing and refining the paper.
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We note the paper’s acknowledgment:
“This material is based upon work supported by the Maryland Procurement Office
under Contract No. H98230-14-C-0141.”
I should also briefly note some follow-up research based on this paper that I
have contributed to but which were led by undergraduate researchers; these papers
focused on further validating the simulation [99] and using it to compare the efficacy
of password construction and memorization techniques [128]. The reader who is
interested in this simulation may want to refer to those papers as they are more
recent. However, the two papers are beyond the scope of this thesis. We do not
discuss them beyond this point.
Chapter 4 Acknowledgements
Chapter 4 is based on:
Vijay Kothari, Prashant Anantharaman, Ira Ray Jenkins, Michael C. Mil-
lian, J. Peter Brady, Sameed Ali, Sergey Bratus, Jim Blythe, Ross Koppel,
and Sean W. Smith. Human-Computability Boundaries. In Security Pro-
tocols Workshop XXVII (To Appear). Springer International Publishing,
2020
I conceived of many ideas expressed in this paper, created the figure used in the
paper, and made significant contributions to the writing of the paper. My coauthors
helped write and refine the paper. And they provided valuable feedback.
We note the paper’s acknowledgment:
“This material is based upon work supported by the United States Air Force and
DARPA under Contract No. FA8750-16-C-0179 and Department of Energy under
Award Number DE-OE0000780.
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this ma-
terial are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
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Chapter 5 Acknowledgements
Chapter 5 is based on a paper soon to appear in ETRA 2020:
Niveta Ramkumar, Vijay Kothari, Caitlin Mills, Ross Koppel, Jim Blythe,
Sean Smith, and Andrew L. Kun. Eyes on URLs: Relating Visual Behavior
to Safety Decisions. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Symposium on Eye
Tracking Research & Applications (To Appear), Stuttgart, Germany, 2020.
Association for Computing Machinery. doi: 10.1145/3379155.3391328
My contributions to this paper primarily involved generating the URL corpus,
creating some figures and tables, doing a small amount of data analysis, working on
the questionnaire, and writing a portions of the paper. However, it’s worth stressing
that this was a highly collaborative and iterative project, and we ran each aspect
of the project by one another. Although we collaboratively decided on what the
experimental setup and the user interface for the URL classification task should be, I
had no role in the actual setup of the experiment, nor did I develop the user interface;
these were done by Niveta Ramkumar and Andrew Kun. Niveta Ramkumar and I
roughly split the work of writing most of the paper in close consultation with Andrew
Kun, with other colleagues providing critical additions and revisions. Much of the
writing was done jointly at the same time on Overleaf. That said, where greater
technical knowledge was required, notably in the writing of related work, Niveta
Ramkumar focused more on the eye-tracking and mood induction segments, whereas
I focused a bit more on the security segments. Ross Koppel helped significantly with
devising the post-task questionnaire. Caitlin Mills helped us with mood induction.
All coauthors provided valuable feedback and helped in writing and refining the paper.
We note the paper’s acknowledgment:
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Chapter 6 Acknowledgements
While Chapter 6 is not based on any published work, we expect we will soon publish a
paper based on this work. I played a major role in coming up with the ideas and con-
ditions explored in the study, creating the URL corpus, doing data analysis, adapting
the questionnaire from the eye-tracking study, and writing the content presented in
the chapter. I also helped with designing and testing the Qualtrics interface. How-
ever, I did not create the URL images, and I only minimally contributed to setting
up the task on MTurk by giving feedback to my coauthor, Prashant Anantharaman.
Ross Koppel, Sean Smith, and Jim Blythe provided lots of valuable feedback on the
method, the URL classification task, and the post-task questionnaire.
Chapter 7 Acknowledgements
In Chapter 7, we review our earlier work, though we do not borrow text from it:
Sean W Smith, Ross Koppel, Jim Blythe, and Vijay Kothari. Mismor-
phism: a Semiotic Model of Computer Security Circumvention. Technical
report, Dartmouth College, Department of Computer Science, 03 2015
I was not the driver of this work, nor do I feel my contributions were sufficiently
large that it warrants presenting this paper as a primary thesis contribution. And
I don’t. We do not borrow text from the paper without quotation marks and a
citation—and we treat this paper as prior work that is instrumental in understanding
our more recent work.
We note the paper’s acknowledgment:
“This material is based in part upon work supported by the Army Research Office
under Award No. W911NF-13-1-0086.”
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veloping the logical formalism, writing significant portions of the paper (mostly in
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5. Prashant Anantharman wrote much of Sections 4 and 5. My coauthors provided
valuable feedback; they also helped in writing and refining the paper.
We note the paper’s acknowledgment:
“This material is based upon work supported by the United States Air Force and
DARPA under Contract No. FA8750-16-C-0179 and Department of Energy under
Award Number DE-OE0000780.
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this ma-
terial are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Air Force, DARPA, United States Government or any agency thereof.”
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The final chapter, Chapter 8, does not directly borrow text from any published work.
The key takeaways mentioned in the chapter stem from my work and interactions with
my PhD advisor, Sean Smith, as well as Jim Blythe, Ross Koppel, and Sergey Bratus.
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or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
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supported in part by NSF CNS-1505799 and the Intel-NSF Partnership for Cyber-
Physical Systems Security and Privacy. Blythe’s work was supported in part by the
Science and Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland
Security under contract number HSHQDC-16-C-00024. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing
the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Department
of Homeland Security or the US Government.”
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Usable Security Insights from
Amazon Reviews
The existence of and market for password logbooks, notebooks designed primarily
for recording password information, illuminates a sharp contrast: what is often pre-
scribed as proper password behavior—e.g., never write down passwords—differs from
what many users actually do. These password logbooks and their reviews provide
valuable insights into their users’ beliefs, motivations, and behaviors. We examine
these password logbooks and analyze, using grounded theory, their reviews, to bet-
ter understand how users think and behave with respect to password authentication.
Several themes emerge including: previous password management strategies, gifting,
organizational strategies, password sharing, and dubious security advice. Some users





User behavior often conflicts with advice and policies prescribed by security practi-
tioners. To name a few examples of such behavior:
• users write down passwords on sticky notes and affix them to computers,
• users use the same password for different services, and
• users ignore certificate warnings.
Recognizing and understanding such behavior is critical to improving security solu-
tions. More generally, better understanding of user motivations, perceptions, con-
straints, and behaviors empowers security practitioners both to select more effective
security policies and mechanisms and to offer better security guidance, which in-
creases user compliance and mitigates the risks posed by circumvention, ultimately
improving both individual and aggregate security.
Security decisions based on false assumptions—assumptions stemming from dis-
connects between certain aspects of users and what security practitioners believe
about users—will almost always be ineffective. Thus, it is imperative to learn what
users do and why they do it, and then to tailor security policies, security mechanisms,
and security advice based on this understanding. Indeed, this has been a major aim
of usable security research, much of which relies on more traditional, controlled data
acquisition methods, such as surveys and behavioral experiments.
In this chapter, we build on and complement existing research by studying the
numerous password logbooks, notebooks designed for users to record passwords and
other information, that are available on Amazon.1 We also analyze their reviews.
1These are also known by other names, e.g., password notebooks, password journals
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Of the several hundred password logbooks available on Amazon, we examine 116
unique password logbooks, and we analyze 4,330 unique reviews for them. These
reviews provide remarkable insights into reviewers’ motivations, pre-purchase and
post-purchase behaviors, and perceptions and misperceptions about security, among
other findings.
We discuss related work in Section 2.2 and then provide an overview of our study
in Section 2.3. We analyze password logbooks and their reviews in Sections 2.4 and
2.5. In Section 2.6 we discuss our findings. We detail our methodology and note both
limitations and advantages of the approach in Sections 2.7 and 2.8. We conclude with
suggestions for future work in Sections 2.9 and 2.10.
Section 2.2
Related Work
Gaw and Felten [65], as well as other researchers, studied password management
strategies, such as writing down passwords on paper or sticky notes and reusing the
same password or small variations of a core password across services. Scholars have
commented negatively on the use of dedicated logbooks to record passwords and
they have also expressed the view that writing down passwords is a poor security
practice that reflects the unusability of authentication processes, e.g.,[75], [4, 82].
While conventional wisdom and many security experts deplore the practice of writing
down passwords, many experts have also advocated such practices so long as the
passwords are securely stored, e.g., [136]. Irrespective of whether these practices
are secure, researchers have shown the viability and rationality of user adoption of
such practices, e.g., Herley [78] showed that many “incorrect” password management
strategies users employ are rational.
Many researchers have used grounded theory and other methods to better un-
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derstand user password decisions and behaviors. Grounded theory is an iterative
qualitative research methodology for discovering theories that emerge directly from
the data. [205] Stobert and Briddle [183] interviewed users to learn how they manage
their account credentials. They then applied grounded theory to explain the password
lifecycle, i.e., the behaviors users employ to keep track of a password throughout its
use. Fagan and Khan [59] conducted a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk to un-
derstand why users make security-related decisions. Inglesant and Sasse [85] gave
users a diary to record their password behaviors for a week and conducted interviews
afterward, findings that users want to comply with security policies but struggle to
do so. They suggested policies should be designed using HCI principles.
Ha and Wagner [73], have used product reviews to learn more about user be-
haviors, perceptions, and attitudes. Alkadi and Renaud [7] analyzed user reviews of
password managers on the Google Play Store and the iTunes App Store, and they
conducted a survey to understand user attitudes. We also analyze user reviews, but
we do so on a larger scale with a significantly different subpopulation of users who
circumvent often recommended security practices by using password logbooks.
Our work builds on previous efforts by a focused analysis of reviews and develop-
ment of a typology of explanations (hereafter called themes). We illustrate each theme
with examples from the products, their marketing, and their reviews. Researcher have
employed automatic methods to analyze user reviews for products other than pass-
word logbooks, e.g., [96, 80]. We, however, use methods from grounded theory that





We define a password logbook as any printed book marketed for users to record pass-
words and related account information (e.g., names of services, usernames, security
hints), as well as other computer and internet-related information (e.g., network set-
tings, ISP telephone numbers).
We create a data set comprising password logbooks that have one or more Ama-
zon Verified Purchase reviews, along with their reviews.2 The final dataset comprises
116 password logbooks and 4,330 reviews for them with duplicate reviews removed.
We analyze the products and used grounded theory methods to inductively con-
struct common themes in the reviews using two coders. A complete discussion of the
methodology and limitations is provided in Sections 2.7 and 2.8.
Section 2.4
Product Findings
We reviewed 116 password logbooks. The most-reviewed book had 1,811 reviews, of
which 1,687 were Verified Purchase reviews; on the other end of the spectrum, many
password logbooks in our set had only a single Verified Purchase review. Indeed, as
seen in Figure 2.1, a few password logbooks accounted for a large fraction of reviews.
Once duplicate reviews were removed, we found that the first five products accounted
for 2,973 of the 4,330 reviews or equivalently, 68.7% of the reviews.3
Figure 2.2 is a histogram of reviews by review date. As we gathered the final
2“An ‘Amazon Verified Purchase’ review means [Amazon] verified that the person writing the
review purchased the product at Amazon and didn’t receive the product at a deep discount.” [1]
3These numbers depend on which of the duplicate reviews to remove or rather, more precisely,
which review of a collection of identical reviews for different books to keep. Still, as there were only
a few duplicate reviews, the numbers would only vary slightly (less than 1%) depending on this

























Cumulative Histogram of Reviews Covered by Books
Figure 2.1: Cumulative histogram of reviews covered by books. This histogram
shows the number of reviews covered by a subset of books, selected in
non-increasing order of number of reviews. For example, the graph shows that the
10 most reviewed password logbooks account for 3,418 (78.9%) of the reviews.
set of reviews on March 7, 2017, we collected only a fraction of the reviews from
2017. Therefore, we derived a projection for the total number of reviews in 2017 by
scaling the number of reviews we had seen in 2017 by the number of reviews posted
in the previous three years over the fraction of reviews posted before or on March
7 in the previous three years. The graph reveals that password logbooks listed on
Amazon have received more reviews in recent years. This may be due to a number of
factors, e.g., more demand for password logbooks, more password logbooks available
on Amazon, and people opting to buy books via online stores like Amazon instead of
brick and mortar stores.
Password logbooks were generally highly rated with the average rating being 4.56
out of 5. As a few popular books covered most reviews, this is expected.
Front covers of ten of the password logbooks appear in Figure 2.3. Additionally,
pictures from the interiors of four password logbooks are provided in Figure 2.4.




































number of reviews in year  projected number of reviews for rest of 2017
Number of Reviews per Year
Figure 2.2: Number of Amazon Verified Purchase reviews per year. We collected
reviews on March 7, 2017. The projected number of reviews for 2017 was obtained
by multiplying the number of reviews seen in 2017 by a scaling factor; this scaling
factor is the number of reviews in the years 2014–2016 divided by the number of
reviews before or on March 7 in 2014–2016. The project number of reviews for the
rest of 2017 was obtained by subtracting the number of reviews already observed
from the projected total.
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(a) 1441303251 (b) 0996009825 (c) 1515382265 (d) 0735344620 (e) 1505432995
(f) 1631061941 (g) 1500863548 (h) 1441319441 (i) 152372398X (j) 1515246825
Figure 2.3: Front covers of 10 of the 116 password logbooks examined in this work.




(a) 1441319077 (b) 1441319077
(c) 1441319077 (d) 1441315969
(e) 0735344620 (f) 1441319441
Figure 2.4: Images of interiors of 6 of the 116 password logbooks we examined in
this work. The first 3 images display pages from different sections of the same book.





• Inconspicuousness: Would an adversary not be able to recognize a password
logbook as such? Some password logbooks had non-removable covers that said
“password logbook” or had other indicators that enable people to easily identify
it as a password logbook when closed. Others had similar covers and labels,
but they could be easily removed and were intended to be removed. Some other
books went one step further in that they masqueraded as a novel (e.g., see
Figure 2.3g).
• Password Security Tips: Password logbooks provided various password secu-
rity and book usage tips regarding keeping the password logbook in a safe place
and not traveling with it, writing down password hints instead of passwords,
not sharing passwords with others, using a pencil so passwords can easily and
neatly be erased, and so forth. Some even gave instructions on how to create
a strong password. Some tips contradicted the design and marketing of other
password logbooks, even ones sold by the same vendor. For example, one pass-
word logbook advised the user not to travel with the book; however, the same
vendor was selling a password logbook that was marketed as pocket-sized.
• Durability: Books varied in the durability of the binding, flimsiness of the cover,
page thickness and ability to withstand ink and erasures, and other factors.
• Aesthetics: Books had a variety of different designs. A few books had unique
aesthetics to target select demographics (e.g., children, women) and state such
in their descriptions. For an example, the book seen in Figure 2.3c was marketed




• Size: Books ranged in dimensions from 2.875” x 4.75” to 6.5” x 8.5”. In general,
smaller books could easily fit in pockets, purses, and briefcases, whereas larger
books provided more space and were easier to read.
• Tabs: Some password logbooks had tabs that allowed the user to more quickly
find their passwords by service name. Many books devoted the same number of
pages to every pair of consecutive letters, corresponding to a tab, though other
tab layouts existed. Most users appreciated tabs, but some were frustrated due
to a misalignment between the number of pages dedicated to tabs and user
needs, granularity of tabs, durability of tabs, and visibility of tabs (some tabs
protruded for greater visibility).
• Elastic Band: Some logbooks had an elastic band attached to the back cover
to keep track of the owner’s place during use and to keep the book shut during
non-use. An example of such an elastic band can be found in Figure 2.3d.
• Contact Information: Some books had space for the owner to enter their name,
email address, and phone number. Of course, in the event that the password
logbook is misplaced or lost, if this information is filled in, it may pose an
additional privacy risk.
• Other Entries: Password logbooks ranged significantly in what information they
allowed users to record. All password logbooks allowed users to record basic
account credentials, i.e., site name, username, and password. However, many
also allowed for other password-related information, e.g., multiple password
entries per service with attached date fields, password question answers, notes.
Moreover, many books had space to record other information that might be
important to a computer user , e.g., home network information, software license
keys. Figure 2.4 provides a few examples of entries within these books.
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(a) 2136504160 (b) B01I94N9TC (c) B00REGSI6G
Figure 2.5: A few other password-related products.
Each image is located at https://amazon.com/dp/ASIN (ASINs specified in
subcaptions).
Numerous other password-related products are also available on Amazon, but
they fall outside the scope of our study. Nevertheless, we briefly mention them here
for completeness. These products include electronic password storage devices, books
that give tips on creating and remembering passwords (including a unique flavor of
self-help book entitled “Password Therapy”; see Figure 2.5a), books that suggest how
to organize one’s records, including passwords, and alternative password management
solutions. A few of these products are provided in Figure 2.5.
Section 2.5
Themes
Our analysis revealed numerous themes:
2.5.1. Love This Book!
Reviewers were often joyous about the password logbooks they purchased. Some
reviewers wished that they had known about password logbooks sooner. Others
used words and phrases such as “essential,” “vital,” and “can’t live without this” to
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express, often hyperbolically, their love for their password logbook.
Many reviewers considered the use of password logbooks (and similar circumven-
tions) as an inescapable risk or reasonable tradeoff. Some argued that the requirement
to track associations among services, usernames, and passwords, along with answers
to security questions and other challenges (e.g., complex password composition re-
quirements and frequent password resets) was overwhelming and that a password
logbook was the best solution available.
2.5.2. Inconspicuousness
Reviewers generally valued inconspicuous password logbooks and, conversely, dis-
paraged conspicuous ones. Some password logbooks had jackets or labels that said
“password” on them. Some of these conspicuous covers were easily removable, but
some others were not, which frustrated users. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“It would be great if it didn’t say ‘Password Log’ on the cover.”
Some password logbooks resembled novels and blended in with other books. Re-
viewers generally found this clever. In reviewing a password logbook that masquer-
aded as a novel about a cat, a reviewer wrote:
“No one thinks to look on the bookshelf or in a cat book for passwords.”
2.5.3. Gifting & Spread of Circumventive Behavior
Numerous reviewers purchased or planned to purchase additional password logbooks
for friends and family. Some purchases were gifts based on projected utility, whereas
others were made upon request. Also, some reviewers mentioned that they purchased
password logbooks after they saw friends or family use them. One reviewer wrote:




Gifting of password logbooks can be viewed as a way of spreading circumventive
password behavior. This extends previous work that finds users obtain security advice
from friends, families, and coworkers (e.g., [158, 151]). It also corroborates our earlier
findings in enterprise settings [32]. That is, it’s insufficient to only consider security
advice prescribed by the enterprise; rather, it’s just as important to consider security
advice and behaviors spread by co-workers, family, friends and other enterprises.
2.5.4. Maintaining Passwords for Family Members
Reviewers explained that they used their password logbooks to keep track of their
family members’ passwords. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“How about when your elderly parents keep having to change their pass-
word because they swear they are putting in the right one but it’s not
working... Yes, I put my [mom’s] and [dad’s] passwords in too, plus I did
buy my mom one.”
Another reviewer mentions:
“Bought this for my father. Love how it is alphabetical. He was recently in
the hospital and I found 3 sheets of ripped paper/notes with all his internet
sites and passwords...some listed 2 or 3 times with different passwords. I
had to take over bill paying while he was sick and this is working like a
charm.”
Another wrote:
“I’m trying to get everyone organized. This is for my mother so I can find
her passwords when she gets into trouble on the computer and I have to
try and fix it. Before she had a confused and garbled note pad.”
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Indeed, many reviewers were concerned about how their family would get by in
the event that they were no longer accessible. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“If I were unavailable for any reason, my husband can now get into all the
accounts for our kids activities, and not miss a beat! He can also get into
all our bill paying areas if there is ever an issue. Must be kept under lock
and key, but has given me a piece of mind!”
Another reviewer wrote:
“Even though I use a password manager, I used this book in case some-
thing happens to me, my kids can get to the accounts.”
This last quote is particularly interesting because the reviewer uses a password
manager, which is often stated to be a good password management strategy, but
keeps a password logbook as well.
Reviews also suggested that these concerns were prompted by life experiences.
One reviewer stated:
“I’m sure this will also be useful for the dreaded ‘just in case’ moment.
A friend of mine’s husband passed away a few years ago. To this day I
don’t know if she was ever able to access any of his sites on his computer
because she didn’t know any of his passwords. Always something to think
about.”
Another wrote:
“Great little logbook to have handy. My husband recently passed away
and I had a hard time finding a couple of things. This made me realize just
how much I handled of the household finances and things. If something
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happened to me, my son would be left trying to [decipher] my mess. Keeps
things organized and in one place and easy to secure where no one can
stumble across it if need be.”
2.5.5. Repeat Purchases and Multiple Logbooks
Some reviewers stated they had purchased a password logbook prior to the one for
which they were writing a review. Reasons for doing so included: the previous pass-
word logbook lacked durability, the previous one lacked sufficient entries to store
all passwords, and the reviewer wished to keep two or more password logbooks in
different locations, e.g., one at home and one at work.
2.5.6. Age
Indicators of age were prevalent in a number of reviews. Reviewers often used old
age and perceived memory loss as justification for using password logbooks, e.g., one
reviewer wrote:
“We are seniors with short term memory loss.”
In contrast, as we noted earlier, some password logbooks were designed for children
and were marketed as inculcating good security habits.
2.5.7. Size, Portability, and Storage
Many reviewers commented on the size and portability of password logbooks. Some
reviewers preferred smaller, easily transportable books. Others preferred larger books
capable of holding more passwords. Similarly, there was a tradeoff with the font size
between readability and quantity of passwords that could be stored within the book.
Some reviewers routinely carried their password logbook in a briefcase, purse, or
other carrying bag. Some left them on top of their desk or in their desk drawer.
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Others made an effort to keep them in a safer place, e.g., a lockbox. These be-
haviors pertaining to carrying and storing the password logbooks often affected user
preferences of the size of the password logbook.
2.5.8. Organization and the Centrality of Digital Life
Many reviewers stated these password logbooks helped them organize their accounts.
In addition to just website addresses and passwords, users sought books that allowed
them to store other information to access their accounts, e.g., usernames, answers to
security questions. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“There is not enough room for related information to passwords such as
secret codes and question.”
Another said:
“[This is] perfect for those of us who are either brave to risk our infor-
mation by signing up for numerous websites and we can’t remember the
password nor the website because there were so many, and for those that
are new to the internet age and can’t remember their name let alone a
password to the only website they signed up for, this is the perfect book
to use.”
Moreover, many reviewers stated they used password logbooks as major orga-
nizing tools for their lives and their families. The books became a centerpiece of




2.5.9. Alternative and Previous Password Management Strategies Inade-
quate
A number of reviews reveal that alternative password management strategies, whether
classified under the umbrella of circumvention or not, were inadequate. For example,
one reviewer wrote:
“Usually I would have just kept them in a file on a flash drive but....well...we
did that and it got [corrupted] and now there are 4 accounts I am still
trying to have shut down cause I don’t remember ANY of the info I used
to start the account.”
Reviewers eagerly shared their previous password management strategies. These
included writing down passwords on sticky notes, index cards, backs of envelopes,
scattered sheets, and scraps of paper. More organized solutions included: storing
passwords in an envelope containing paper scraps, a binder containing sheets of pa-
per, and notebooks; storing passwords in text files and Excel spreadsheets; storing
passwords on phones; and, as noted earlier, storing passwords on flash drives.
2.5.10. Risks
Many reviewers acknowledged the risk of keeping a password logbook, specifically,
that it could be lost or stolen and wind up in the hands of an unscrupulous character.
However, most, but not all, believed that password logbooks were better than other
password management strategies. A few subthemes emerged here:
Perception that Password Logbooks Improve Security. Some reviewers sug-
gested that even though password logbooks pose a risk, alternative password man-
agement aids pose an even greater risk, while not using any aid would cause them
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to struggle with remembering passwords, driving them to reuse passwords or to use
weaker passwords. One reviewer wrote:
“Not only do I have too many passwords now to remember, but I just
know reusing the same password for multiple sites is a big no-no, even if
they are really good passwords! This solves both issues.”
Another wrote:
“I use this almost every day. Having everything in one spot has made my
life much easier. Without my passwords in the computer, I feel they are
much more secure.”
Risks are Negligible or Could Be Mitigated. Some reviewers recognized that
there are risks associated with using password logbooks. However, they felt these
risks were insignificant. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“Yes, obviously, if your book gets stolen that’s a problem but it’s a prob-
lem if your password app account is compromised or someone reads your
thoughts, too, so everything is a risk and I will take a risk for convenience.”
Others believed that naive usage might be risky, but taking appropriate precau-
tions would mitigate these risks. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“Okay. I have read the objections to this means of keeping one’s passwords–
and I get it–but there need not be any problems! I would not travel with
this anyway, so that risk is eliminated. Still, there are ways to enter the
info into this book that make it impossible for anyone to sabotage you,
by stealing your info. I do not write out the full names of the websites
I frequent; I find creative ways to abbreviate the names, so that no one
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other than myself could guess what the site is. I select passwords/phrases
that I will still know, even after I substitute x’s or underscores ( ) for some
of the characters. So, again, unless someone is psychic, they will not be
able to get my pass codes. There is plenty of room to write–perhaps, too
much, as my only complaint about this book is that it is too big. I would
have preferred one no larger than a 3 x 4, but decided to go with it, given
all the other positive reviews. Size makes it easily hide-able enough in
your home. Use your common sense and this will be just fine. :)”
User Perceptions of Risks of Using Password Managers. Almost all re-
viewers valued the password logbooks they purchased, but there were a small fraction
of reviewers who were dissatisfied with their purchase, and a minuscule fraction who
disapproved of password logbooks altogether. Given the subpopulation we’re con-
sidering of reviewers who had purchased password logbooks on Amazon, this skew
makes sense. One reviewer said they purchased and sent a password logbook as a
gag gift to a friend who works in security. The reviewer then cautioned against using
password logbooks, suggesting password managers as a more secure alternative. As
stated above, this reviewer was an anomaly amongst verified purchasers.
To explore this theme further and to see how other users would respond, we
temporarily broadened the scope of our reviews to include a small set of unverified
purchase reviews, in which we saw more criticism of password logbooks. Many re-
viewers suggested password managers to be a lower-risk solution. Some justified their
statements. Some rebuked users for using password logbooks. These reviews led to
interesting and surprising dialogue that shed light on why some users choose to use
password logbooks even when they’re aware of password managers. For example, one
individual no longer trusted their password manager because the antivirus software
they were using classified it as a trojan. Another stated:
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“I purchased LastPass a year ago and was dismayed to get an alert from
them that their system had been compromised. My data wasn’t compro-
mised, but decided then and there nothing is really safe. I prefer to have
something that I have control of, like this small book, than give my infor-
mation over to a service where I have no control of where information is
stored or how it is protected.”
Curiously, one individual stated that the book was a bad idea, but then suggested
a method to generate what they deemed strong, memorable passwords; however, the
suggested method is easily susceptible to a password reuse attack by an adversary
who notices the pattern.
2.5.11. Tricks and Advice
Reviewers were very willing to share what they thought of as clever tricks and prudent
advice. This included writing down passwords in pencil so they could easily be erased,
writing in what is effectively a password hint in lieu of the actual password, storing the
password logbook securely, leaving out contact information so an adversary cannot
identify who the book belongs to (though some purchasers appreciated space for
listing contact information), etc.
For one example, a reviewer wrote:
“Write your entries in pencil! Even if it is for an account that you suspect
will always have the same information, there are plenty of reasons that
entries in pencil are beneficial. Your account could be hacked forcing you
to change a password, you could change banks or email accounts, the
website address to the business may even change. Much simpler and cost




“I sometimes consult with people who have problems remembering their
passwords. First, I teach them a ‘reminder’ method, then I gift to them
this little book, where they write their password ‘reminders.’ Using a
‘reminder’ method (where you don’t put the actual password, but instead
something that reminds you of the password), this book is invaluable.
And if it goes missing, it’s not the end of the world because nobody will
understand how to use it. And, if you’re smart, you won’t put your name
(or any other identifying info) in the book. This should not be the ONLY
place you have passwords, because that would be like not backing up at
all, and we’ve all heard those horror stories. But for quick reference at
home or in the office, it’s a great idea. Like the ‘little black address book,’
it’s indispensable.”
Yet another wrote:
“To make your passwords in your book even more secure, add an extra
special character that you never use in any password. Then ignore that
special character whenever you enter your password. For example, put @
into each password just as a ruse. Or use some variation, such as ignoring
the eighth character in each password.”
Section 2.6
Discussion
We acknowledge the irony of users writing down account credentials in password log-
books, some of which are even labeled “Password Logbook,” violating the often pre-
scribed security advice that you should never write down your passwords. Adoption
of these books is at least partially rooted in well-intentioned, but potentially counter-
productive, password policies and password authentication protocols. The cognitive
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burden of having to remember associations between service names, usernames, and
passwords, along with other challenges such as having to remember answers to security
questions or remembering a password to an old account after a mandatory password
reset, leads users to use these password logbooks. For example, one reviewer wrote:
“My memory is not bad but every website now wants passwords and
security questions. I am so tired to trying to remember every one.”
That is, we may be seeing an uncanny descent : increasing the complexity of
password policies with the expectation of improving security may actually make things
worse by driving users to engage in riskier practices, such as writing down and reusing
passwords, to alleviate the increased cognitive burden of managing their passwords
under the new password policies.
There’s also the reverse irony that these password logbooks may provide better
security than the alternative password management strategies users employ. The
knee-jerk reaction of discrediting the use of password logbooks as an unacceptable
form of circumvention that only worsens security may be premature or not sufficiently
nuanced to reflect the reality of regular users’ lives. Password logbooks often sup-
plant other, more risky forms of circumvention and alternative password management
strategies. Moreover, many users don’t believe they’re capable of memorizing many
strong, unique passwords which is why they turn to password logbooks; many view
password logbooks as a convenient tool that provides more convenience, better secu-
rity, and/or better organization than their current password management strategy.
For example, one user wrote:
“I also like that I don’t have to use the same password for every site
because it’s all I can remember.”
A number of reviewers expressed awareness of the risks associated with using
password logbooks, but used them despite the risks. The reviews suggest that many
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users employ a rational decision-making process to settle on password logbooks; they
determine alternatives provide less value in terms of convenience or security and, in
many cases, both. This is in agreement with the literature, e.g., [78].
While we make no claim that password logbooks are optimal or even good options
for password management, we are suggesting, as has been suggested by reviewers, that
in the absence of password logbooks, some users would be at greater risk. Prescrib-
ing good security behavior that users don’t adopt may be worse than giving users
suboptimal, but still beneficial, advice that they actually follow. That is, we should
not expect users to engage in the most secure behaviors, but we should instead nudge
users toward the best security solution amongst those they’re willing to put up with.
We must also acknowledge the limitations of proposed security solutions. For exam-
ple, while some password managers may be more secure than password logbooks in
general, in the event that the user is unexpectedly incapacitated, they may not pro-
vide a mechanism to transfer account credentials to family. Indeed, earlier we quoted
a reviewer who used a password manager, but still had a backup password logbook
for this very reason.
Section 2.7
Method
To conduct our analysis, we downloaded both the product pages for each password
logbook, as well as Amazon Verified Purchase reviews for them.
We searched amazon.com for the key phrase “password logbook.” We then con-
strained the search to include only those products classified under the category of
“Books.” From the results, we obtained a list of 132 password logbooks in sorted
order of reviews with at least one review, with the most reviewed book appearing
first. However, five of these did not adhere to our descriptive definition of a password
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logbook, narrowing our dataset to 127 books.4.
We downloaded both the product pages for the 127 password logbooks, as well as
all 4,778 Amazon Verified Purchase reviews for them. Next, we removed duplicate
reviews; if we found two or more reviews that had the same author, review title, and
review text, we kept only one copy of the review. Duplicate reviews appeared for
various reasons. Some password logbooks were listed as different products but were
just a different edition of another book, which had the exact same set of reviews; 7 of
the 127 password logbooks were doubly-listed, accounting for 413 duplicate reviews.
35 more duplicate reviews were found using a script. Additionally, 4 more password
logbooks were removed from our dataset: 1 logbook was removed because it only had
a single review, which was a duplicate; the 3 other logbooks were removed because
they only had non-Verified Purchase reviews. These steps and manual inspection of
reviews reveal most duplicate reviews were attributable to doubly listed logbooks and
instances of reviewers buying multiple logbooks and leaving the same review for all of
them, e.g., because the review involves a comparison of them or because the reviewer
bought multiple editions as gifts and left the same review for each edition as they
are essentially the same other than cosmetic differences. That said, we did see a few
fraudulent reviews. Please see Section 2.8 for further details.
Our final dataset comprised 116 password logbooks and 4,330 reviews for these
password logbooks, with duplicates removed. We extracted relevant data from the
reviews and two of us applied grounded theory to determine common themes from
the reviews.
4The five discarded books roughly fell under two categories: regular address books, e.g., https:
//www.amazon.com/dp/1593593899, and books that served as guides to organize one’s records with
space to record things like tax records, property records, and even passwords, e.g., https://www.
amazon.com/dp/1413323154/.
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Section 2.8
Limitations and Advantages
The study has the following limitations:
• Some Reviews May Be Fake or Biased: Any study on a corpus of Amazon
reviews may suffer from the presence of illegitimate reviews. For some examples,
the reviewer may have bought the product at a discounted rate in exchange for
leaving a review; the reviewer may have been paid to leave a positive review; the
reviewer may even have been paid to leave a negative review for a competitor
product; the reviewer may have left a review to gain credibility. To address
this problem, we restricted the data set to comprise solely Amazon Verified
Purchase reviews for products. However, we still came across some reviews
that we believe to be fake, although we believe they constitute only a small
fraction of all reviews. Moreover, the primary motivation behind this study is
to glean insights into how some users think about password authentication; the
existence of a few fake reviews has negligible impact on this pursuit.
• The Sample Set: Any study on a corpus of Amazon reviews also inherently
limits its sample set to authors of Amazon reviews. In our case, this meant
that reviewers—aside from a few reviewers, e.g., one reviewer purchased a pass-
word logbook as a gag gift for a friend—were drawn from the subpopulation
of general users who willfully circumvented recommended security practices,
bought a password logbook on Amazon, and wrote a review for said password
logbook. While this sample undoubtedly does not reflect the entire population
of computer users, we believe there’s valuable information to be had in these
reviews—and, indeed, the sample reveals the existence of a subpopulation who
engages in the practice of using password logbooks.
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Despite these limitations, our approach—and ones similar to it—have a number
of benefits:
• The Sample Set: Our approach is less susceptible to some other selection
biases common to other studies. For example, many academic studies involve
a disproportionately large fraction of college students. Some themes we saw
simply would not emerge with such a sample set. For this reason, our findings
in this study nicely complement those in the existing literature.
• Scale: Our data set of reviews comprises 4,330 reviews and has no monetary
cost. In general, approaches like this—ones that looks at user product reviews,
posts in forums, comments on articles, and so forth—provide great scale for
minimal cost.
• Reviews are Volunteered: Perhaps the strongest aspect of this approach is
that the information contained in these reviews is provided to us directly from
the user without any request for information. A number of the biases present in
face-to-face interactions, surveys, or other solicited feedback, is not present here.
Moreover, we speculate that the reviewer’s state of mind is different in writing
these reviews than it would be if their feedback were solicited, regardless of such
biases. That is, the user isn’t primed to deliberate about their motivations,
beliefs, and behaviors regarding passwords, as they likely would be in a survey.
Section 2.9
Future Work
While this work provides valuable qualitative data about certain users, due to the
limitations mentioned in Section 2.8, we cannot provide meaningful quantitative data
about users in general. Follow-up studies, such as surveys and behavioral experiments
45
2.10 Conclusion
conducted on a representative sample of a broader subpopulation of users that further
explore the themes we mentioned may provide valuable quantitative data to further
assist in suggesting security policies and mechanisms to employ and to suggest how
we should communicate with and advise users regarding security.
Similar approaches to this, that involve analyzing other reviews, forum posts, and
comments on articles, may serve useful in developing a better and understanding of
the user. Data sources like Amazon customer reviews also provide valuable metadata.
For example, review dates may enable researchers to study how user perceptions and
attitudes change over time, which is hard to attain retroactively via other means. Sim-
ilarly, comparisons between reviews on, say, amazon.com and amazon.co.uk, would
enable researchers to study regional variations in beliefs and behaviors. It would also
be enlightening to explore data sources that provide dialogue amongst users.
Section 2.10
Conclusion
We examined a subset of available password logbooks on Amazon and their reviews.
The sheer existence and diversity amongst password logbooks and the magnitude of
reviews available for them was illuminating in its own right. Moreover, a number of
interesting themes emerged in the process of analyzing reviews, some of which provide
new insights into user beliefs and behaviors. Reviewers felt the risks of using password
logbooks were negligible and could be mitigated by taking appropriate steps. A couple
of respondents had used password managers but resorted to password logbooks after a
bad experience—perhaps the most interesting finding was from a reviewer who stated
their antivirus software considered their password manager a trojan, leading them to
find a new solution—or due to a lack of a critical feature, e.g., sharing passwords with
family members. People also generally felt that the password logbooks significantly
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improved their digital security by eliminating worse password management strategies,
such as reusing passwords across services. Overall, we feel the approach of harnessing
freely available user data to gather insights about users is effective.
47
Chapter 3
Measuring the Security Impacts of
Password Policies Using Cognitive
Behavioral Agent-Based Modeling
Agent-based modeling can serve as a valuable asset to security personnel who wish
to better understand the security landscape within their organization, especially as
it relates to user behavior and circumvention. In this chapter, we argue in favor
of cognitive behavioral agent-based modeling for usable security and report on our
work on developing an agent-based model for a password management scenario. We
explain the password management simulation, conduct a sensitivity analysis, and
discuss security implications, e.g., an organization that wishes to suppress one form of
circumvention may benefit from endorsing another form of circumvention. These sorts
of simulations are particularly valuable in averting what we call uncanny descents,
instances where turning up the security dials in the hope of improving aggregate
security actually has the opposite effect. In other words, agent-based simulation is a





Agent-based models incorporating user behavior, emotion, and cognition can serve
as valuable tools that assist computer security personnel design, implement, and
maintain security systems, devise security policies, and employ security practices
that are congruent with security and other organizational objectives.
Indeed, as the current state of security practice indicates, we need these sorts of
tools. Our interviews, surveys, and observations reflect many examples where secu-
rity solutions fails to accommodate users. Such mismatches between user needs and
security policies and mechanisms often induce circumvention, thereby undermining
overall objectives. Even if one could design adequate security policies and mechanisms
a priori, the dynamic nature of software systems, user needs, and organizational and
environmental changes would necessitate frequent readjustments. Consequently, we
need tools that allow us to better understand this complex security landscape. Such
tools can help us to evaluate the costs associated with security solutions, identify
unintended side effects of said solutions, and pinpoint usability issues that drive user
circumvention, among other things.
dash [31, 30], an agent-based simulation framework that supports the dual-process
model of cognition, reactive planning, modeling of human deficiencies (e.g., fatigue,
frustration), and multi-agent interactions, enables us to create such tools. In dash,
users are represented as agents with weighted goals, plans to achieve those goals,
attributes, knowledge, and abilities. These agents use mental models and have per-
ceptions of the world that often depart from reality. Agents, in accordance with
their mental models, take actions, observe and interpret events, and communicate.
They dynamically compute and recompute goals and the plans they use to achieve
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them. dash models may better enable security personnel to (a) identify weaknesses
in security policies and mechanisms, e.g., workflow impediments that prompt user cir-
cumvention, (b) estimate the likelihood of user engagement in workarounds, (c) gauge
the number of inescapable security infractions from policy-workflow mismatches, (d)
estimate the values of security and organizational objective functions, (e) test the
accuracy of proxy security measures, and (f) measure how shifts in the environment
affect security. A cognitive and behavioral approach to modeling can provide insights
into the effectiveness of informing users of practical needs for security, implementing
a feedback loop, imposing more stringent policies or harsher penalties for circumven-
tion, and more.
Agent-based modeling is particularly useful in scenarios where security in practice
radically differs from security in the abstract, where it’s extraordinarily challenging
to anticipate how emotions, cognitive biases, and other human deficiencies may affect
user behavior. Indeed, in order to get security right it is critical that we understand
how users interact with our systems. And we must adapt our systems to our users—
not expect our users to adapt to our systems—so as to induce “good” behavior. [32, 4]
In previous work [100], we discussed the potential for agent-based models to be applied
to predict human circumvention of security, relayed an anecdote regarding timeouts
in a medical setting, explained preliminary work, and discussed our future directions
for building such models. The work presented in this chapter follows up on that work
by detailing our progress on modeling a password management scenario.
The password management scenario involves establishing password polices for an
enterprise. In theory, having a policy that requires users to use strong passwords, to
never write them down, and to never reuse them across sites would improve security.
In practice, users commonly circumvent password policies due to perceived cognitive
limitations, fatigue, frustration, and work culture. Moreover, password choices and
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password management practices for one service may affect the choices and practices
for another, making the services interdependent. By applying agent-based models, se-
curity personnel can better understand this complex environment, estimate measures
of aggregate security that incorporate circumventions, risks, and costs, and ultimately
make better decisions.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the dash
modeling framework. In Section 3.3 we investigate the password modeling scenario,
detail our dash modeling work, perform a sensitivity analysis, and discuss results and
takeaways. In Section 3.4 we discuss future work including the autologout scenario.
In Section 3.5 we conclude.
Section 3.2
The DASH agent modeling platform
The dash agent modeling platform provides a framework and a set of capabilities for
modeling human behavior [31], designed to capture observations from human-centered
security experiments, e.g., [52]. In order to model human task-oriented behavior,
which is both goal-directed and responsive to changes in the environment, dash
includes a reactive planning framework that reassesses goal weights and plans after
receiving input after an action [37]. In order to model deliberative behavior, dash
includes an implementation of mental models following the approach of Johnson-Laird
and others [89] and a simple framework for evaluating costs and benefits of alternative
worlds. This approach adopts the view that users follow essentially rational behavior
when making decisions about online actions including security, but typically have an
incomplete or incorrect model of the security landscape.
In order to model bounded attention that affects human decision-making, particu-
larly under stress or cognitive load, dash adapts psychology’s dual-process framework
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[182] in which two modules provide alternative suggestions for the agent’s next ac-
tion. The first is a deliberative system that uses the mechanisms for planning and
mental models to arrive at a decision, and the second is a stimulus-driven system
that matches surface properties of a situation to find an answer. Once an agent has
experience in a domain, the stimulus system provides good answers most of the time
while an inexperienced agent may need to fall back on deliberative reasoning more
often. Under stress, time pressure, or cognitive load, the deliberative system may
not complete, or the stimulus system may gain increased weight, leading to impulsive
behavior that may not be correct.
Other cognitive architectures such as SOAR [109] or ACT-R [13] provide many
of the same behaviors. One distinguishing factor of dash is that its stimulus system
is not related to the deliberative system by a compilation learning process and can
often produce results that differ qualitatively rather than in terms of speed. dash
also provides support for mental models and tradeoff analysis as more fundamental
components.
Section 3.3
The Password Management Scenario: Security
Dependencies Introduced by Workarounds
With an understanding of dash we now discuss our password simulation. In Section
3.3.1 we cover preliminaries including a discussion of password problems and related
work. In Section 3.3.2 we explain how our simulation works. In Section 3.3.3 we
present the parameters used in our simulation and the sensitivity analysis. In Sec-
tion 3.3.4 we discuss how we conducted the sensitivity analysis. In Section 3.3.5 we
enumerate sources of error. In Section 3.3.6 we present our results. In Section 3.3.7
we provide takeaways.
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3.3.1. Preliminaries
In terms of usability and security, many consider passwords a failure. Users are no-
torious for choosing weak passwords. In an effort to mitigate the security risks linked
to weak passwords, many services now require users to choose passwords that satisfy
complex password composition rules. Unfortunately, this brings with it a slew of
other security challenges, e.g., [32, 4, 63, 65]. Users who are unable to cope with the
increased cognitive demands of having to remember dozens of passwords resort to cir-
cumventing password policies and employing poor password management strategies;
they write passwords down on Post-it notes, reuse passwords across multiple services
with little or no variation, and leave passwords in plaintext files on their computers.
However, perceived cognitive limitations are not the only impetus for user circum-
vention of password policies. In some domains, users need to share information with
others who have different access rights than themselves, but the “proper” channel for
information sharing is slow and inefficient. So, they share passwords instead [32].
Services are culpable too. Some services effectively discourage strong passwords
by setting low ceilings on password length, disallowing special characters, using eas-
ily guessable security questions, and assigning default passwords that are often left
unchanged. Others impose excessive password complexity requirements and require
frequent password resets, which further incentivizes users to circumvent. In recent
years, many services have also been the target of massive password breaches; in some
cases, they have even exposed passwords to malicious actors in cleartext. Moreover,
due to password reuse, risks associated with poor password practices are not confined
to those services that are lax about password security. That is, even if a service
makes a legitimate effort to secure their users’ passwords, those passwords could be
compromised by vulnerabilities at other services [87].
While tremendous effort has been spent on trying to replace passwords, it has
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been met with questionable success. Bonneau et al [35] compared passwords to other
authentication schemes in three domains: usability, deployability, and security. They
showed that no alternative authentication scheme dominates passwords.
In short, passwords pose numerous memorability and usability challenges that
frequently manifest in user circumvention. They pose confidentiality, risk mitigation,
and public perception challenges for services. And they do not appear to be going
away any time soon. This motivates the need for better techniques to both assess the
costs and mitigate the risks associated with password policies.
Numerous recent studies have looked into password modeling. Shay et al. [171]
developed a simulation to examine the effectiveness of password policies. Choong [45]
proposed a user-centric cognitive behavioral framework for the password management
lifecycle, from password creation to password reset. SimPass is a highly configurable
agent-based model for measuring the efficacy of password policies [161]. Our work is
similar to SimPass in that we’ve developed a password simulation with knobs that can
be adjusted to measure aggregate security associated with password policies under
different circumstances. Whereas SimPass employs numerous parameters to better
understand password management scenarios with minimal assumptions, we adopt
the view that many of these parameters cannot be known, nor do they need to be
known, a priori to have a useful predictive model. Our simulation instead relies on a
smaller number of parameters with more underlying models, especially those related
to cognition and behavior. For example, there are underlying models for a password
belief system and cognitive burden. While this approach provides valuable insights
into the cognitive and behavioral factors that affect security, it necessitates different
kinds of modeling assumptions.
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3.3.2. Simulation Details
Our simulation models human users interacting with computer systems that employ
username and password authentication. Specifically, agents construct plans to achieve
high-level subgoals for creating accounts, signing in to accounts, and signing out of
accounts. Each subgoal is broken down by the agent into a series of steps during
action invocation as determined by the agent’s beliefs, the agent’s cognitive burden,
and other factors. To better understand how these processes work, we first explore
the underlying models for the agent’s belief system and the agent’s cognitive burden.
Let us first briefly discuss the agent’s password belief system. For this discussion,
we limit ourselves to passwords; a similar model exists for usernames. For service S
and password P , let VS,P denote the strength of the agent’s belief that password P
is the correct password for their account on service S. During the sign-in process,
these password strength values are used to determine whether the agent recalls a
password for a given service and, if so, which password the agent recalls. Agents slowly
forget passwords during periods of non-use as reflected by reductions in password
strengths. In fact, following every user action, all password strengths over all services
are decremented by service-specific password forget rates.
We now discuss the underlying model for cognitive burden. As before, we limit
our discussion to passwords. The model uses a generalization of the Levenshtein
distance to sets and makes use of an openly available Prolog implementation of Lev-
enshtein distance [46]. The Levenshtein distance between a string S1 and S2, denoted
as Lev(S1, S2), is the minimum number of character insertions, deletions, and substi-
tutions required to convert S1 into S2. For set S, define the Levenshtein measure L(S)
as the weight of a minimum spanning tree T over the vertex set S∪{ε} for which edge
weights are specified as w(v1, v2) = Lev(v1, v2). Here, ε denotes the empty string. The
cognitive burden of a set SP of passwords in our simulation is approximately L(SP ).
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There is also a small cost associated with mapping passwords to services in memory.
We very roughly approximate this by including an additive factor of 1 for each service
that has a corresponding password that is in the agent’s memory.
Equipped with an understanding of these two underlying models, we can now
look more deeply at the subgoals associated with creating an account for a service
and signing in to a service.
During account creation, the agent must first construct a username and password
combination. If the agent’s cognitive burden is under a specified threshold, the pass-
word reuse threshold, the agent chooses the weakest password they can think of that
satisfies the password composition requirements. If, however, the agent’s cognitive
burden exceeds this password reuse threshold, the agent attempts to recycle an ex-
isting password before considering a new, unique password. The particular password
chosen for reuse is determined by the password reuse priority parameter which speci-
fies whether the agent should reuse the longest or shortest viable password. Once an
account has been created, the agent may opt to either memorize their password or
write it down. This process is again determined by comparing the agent’s cognitive
burden to a specified threshold, the password write threshold. If the agent’s cognitive
burden is under the threshold, the agent will try to memorize the password; else, the
agent will write it down. If the agent opts to memorize password P for service S
then the password strength VS,P will be initialized to 1, while if the agent instead
opts to write down the password, VS,P will be initialized to 0.5. And, in both cases,
all S-specific password strengths associated with passwords different than the chosen
password are set to 0; that is, VS,P ′ will be set to 0 for P
′ 6= P . Additionally, dur-
ing account creation the service-specific password forget rate is initialized to a model
parameter entitled initial password forget rate. While we’ve discussed the process of
account creation, the same processes largely apply to the password reset process, the
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primary difference being that the agent will not create a new username.
When an agent wishes to sign in to service S, they first attempt to recall their
password for the service. This is done by choosing the password P with greatest
S-specific password strength. If VS,P exceeds a parameter called the recall threshold,
the agent attempts to sign in using P . If the agent cannot recall a password, that
is, if there is no password with S-specific password strength that exceeds the recall
threshold, the agent checks to see if they wrote down a password. If the agent did
write down a password, then the agent uses that password; else, the agent resets the
password.
As discussed earlier, after each action is performed, password strengths are decre-
mented by service-specific password forget rates. These forget rates are initialized
to an initial password forget rate during account creation and password resets, and
they are changed during sign-in attempts. Whenever the agent enters a password P
for a service S and it is accepted, the password forget rate for that service is halved,
the password strength VS,P is set to 1, and, for all S
′ 6= S, VS′,P is strengthened by
the product of the password forget rate for S ′ and the strengthen scalar, a model
parameter. When the agent enters a password P for a service S and it is rejected,
VS,P is set to 0. While this model is not faithful to reality (e.g., it does not incorporate
the time duration between successive recalls) we, again, believe it serves as a good,
simple first approximation.
To assess the risk of password compromise, we consider three attack vectors. The
first is a direct attack in which the attacker either exploits a service vulnerability or
brute forces the password. This is a function of a direct attack risk scalar and a raw
password strength function that maps passwords to strength values. The second is
an attack wherein the attacker sees the agent’s password written down and uses it
to access the agent’s account. If the password has been written down the risk for
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this attack is equal to a model parameter that specifies the stolen password attack
risk; else, it is 0. The third attack is an indirect attack in which the attacker, using
one of the previously mentioned attacks, discovers the agent’s password for another
site, and then reuses that password to sign in to the agent’s account for the target
service. The risk of this attack is equal to one minus the probability of being safe
from indirect attacks, where the probability of being safe from indirect attacks is the
product of probabilities of being safe from indirect attacks for each individual service.
The probability that a service S is safe from an indirect attack stemming from S ′ is
the product of a model parameter, the reuse attack risk, and the probability that S ′
is not compromised by one of the two aforementioned attacks. For future discussion,
we define the security measure M to be the probability that a service is safe from
attacks, averaged over all services.
Services are loosely grouped into four classes based on the complexity of their
password composition policies: weak, average, good, and strong. Complexity re-
quirements affect the minimum length, minimum number of lower-case alphabetic
characters, minimum number of upper-case alphabetic characters, minimum number
of digits, and minimum number of special characters required for a password to be
accepted. All member services of a single class use the same process to generate their
password composition policies.
We now briefly explain the code and primary processes in the simulation. The
simulation involves agent-side code that is responsible for choosing and performing
agent actions and a world hub that is responsible for carrying out all service processes,
keeping world state, and printing statistics. A target service is also passed to the world
hub. Printed statistics include the number of accounts that have been created, the
number of usernames and passwords each agent has written down, the number of
usernames and passwords each agent has memorized, the number of passwords resets
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each agent has performed, and aggregate security measures M associated with each
agent’s set of accounts. Additionally, for each agent, the hub prints similar statistics
for the target service.
3.3.3. The Parameters
For the purposes of better understanding our model and gleaning insights into the
security implications of different password policy settings, we performed a variation
of one-factor-at-a-time sensitivity analysis. Although many parameters are highly
interactive, this approach still provides valuable insights. Here, we review the pa-
rameters and state the fixed values used for analysis. In the subsections immediately
following this one, we will discuss the method, comment on sources of error, explain
our results, and state key takeaways.
Below, we specify the fixed value we use for each parameter considered in our
sensitivity analysis. We also provide a short description of the parameters.
Initial Password Forget Rate:. 0.0025
This parameter specifies the initial password forget rate that is set for a service during
account creation and password reset.
Recall Strengthen Scalar:. 4
This parameter affects the amount that a password belief is strengthened for one
service when the password under consideration is successfully used for another service.
Specifically, when an agent successfully signs in to service S with password P , for each
S ′ 6= S, the password strength value VS′,P is incremented by the product of the recall
strengthen scalar and the password forget rate for S ′.
Recall Threshold:. 0.5
This parameter specifies the threshold over which the agent can recall passwords.
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When the agent is trying to sign in to a service S, the agent will consider the password
P with highest strength value, VS,P associated with that service. If VS,P exceeds the
recall threshold, the agent will attempt to sign in with password P . Else, the agent
will be unable to recall a password and will instead resort to another action.
Password Reuse Priority:. long
This parameter can take on one of two values: short or long. When an agent attempts
to reuse an existing password during account creation or password reset for a service,
this parameter specifies whether the agent reuses the shortest or the longest password
that satisfies the password composition requirements for the service should there exist
a recallable password satisfying the password composition requirements.
Password Reuse Threshold:. 40
If an agent creates a new account for a service or resets their password for a service
and the agent’s cognitive burden exceeds the value of this parameter, the agent will
opt to reuse an existing password.
Password Write Threshold:. 60
If an agent’s cognitive burden exceeds the value of this parameter after creating an
account for a given service or resetting their password for a service, the agent will opt
to write down the password instead of attempting to memorize it.
Direct Attack Risk:. 0.25
This parameter affects the probability that an account may be compromised directly
via a service vulnerability or brute force attack, not a stolen password or reuse attack.
It effectively acts as a scalar for the password strength associated with a given service
to determine the direct attack risk.
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Stolen Password Risk:. 0.25
This parameter specifies the probability that the attacker may find the agent’s pass-
word written down and successfully use it in an attack.
Reuse Attack Risk:. 0.25
This parameter specifies the probability that an attacker successfully launches a reuse
attack on a service S by exploiting a given direct attack or stolen password attack on
another service S ′.
Distribution of Services:. (6,6,6,6)
This parameter is a vector of four integers that specifies the distribution of services
according to the strengths of their password composition policies. The shorthand (W,
A, G, S) means that W, A, G, and S services employ weak, average, good, and strong
password composition policies respectively.
3.3.4. Method
We performed a one-factor-at-a-time sensitivity analysis wherein we decided a priori
on fixed values for each of the ten parameters specified in Section 3.3.3. We varied each
parameter within a constrained, feasible parameter space and recorded the aggregate
security M (refer to Section 3.3.2 for more details on M) for six independent trials
for each parameter configuration we considered. Our sensitivity analysis is actually
a slight variation of the traditional one-factor-at-a-time approach in that, for the
distribution of password composition policies parameter, we performed a series of
trials for three different configurations of the cognitive thresholds (i.e., password write
threshold and password reuse threshold) to better understand the interplay between
the three parameters.
For all but one parameter, we stopped simulations when the agent’s minimum
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per-service password forget rate dropped below 0.0005. The exception occurred dur-
ing testing of the initial password forget rate parameter, which was performed first.
While testing the password forget rate parameter, we stopped simulations when the
minimum per-service password forget rate dropped below 0.00025.
After gathering data as described above, we generated plots with error bars cor-
responding to the standard deviation.
3.3.5. Sources of Error
Computer-based arithmetic accounts for one source of error. While not a true source
of error, we do see some peculiarities in our graphs due to the use of a finite set of
approximately thirty passwords and the use of a step function for evaluating password
strength. Though the password list and password strength evaluation function are in
some sense parameters, specifying a feasible solution parameter space for them and
varying them accordingly is beyond the scope of this work. Last, we recognize that
performing only six trials for each configuration of parameters is a limitation.
3.3.6. Results & Analysis
Here, we present the results and analysis.
Initial Password Forget Rate. In Figure 3.1 we see that increasing the initial
password forget rate reduces security. Our belief is that as we increase the initial
password forget rate users are more inclined to reset their passwords and write down
the newly reset passwords during the process.
Recall Strengthen Scalar. In Figure 3.2 there seems to be a slight increase in
security as we increase the recall strengthen scalar. While this may just be error, this
may also be in part due to a reduction in passwords being written down as the value
of this parameter increases.
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Security vs Initial Password Forget Rate
Figure 3.1: Security vs. initial password forget rate.
Recall Threshold. In Figure 3.3 we see that increasing the recall threshold de-
creases security. This indeed makes sense. A higher recall threshold means it is
more difficult for the user to recall passwords. So, the user will frequently reset their
passwords instead of remembering them. After the user has accrued a large num-
ber of accounts, these frequent resets will lead the user to circumvent as a coping
mechanism.
Password Reuse Priority. We found that having agents reuse the shortest ac-
ceptable password leads to a higher security measure than reusing the longest pass-
word. With a short password reuse priority we saw a mean security measure of
M = 0.5222 with a standard deviation of 0.0616. With a long password reuse pri-
ority we saw a mean security measure of M = 0.4528 with a standard deviation
of 0.0770. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that a tendency toward
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Security vs Recall Strengthen Scalar
Figure 3.2: Security vs. recall strengthen scalar.
reusing shorter passwords reduces the likelihood that a single password is reused
across most accounts. That is, since password composition policies vary across ser-
vices, longer passwords will be more likely to satisfy a greater fraction of password
composition policies than shorter ones. Ergo, longer passwords will be more suscep-
tible to reuse attacks.
Password Reuse Threshold. As expected, in Figure 3.4, increasing the password
reuse threshold improves security.
Password Write Threshold. At first glance, Figure 3.5 may seem a bit surprising.
When the password write threshold is very low, M is reasonably high. As we increase
the password write threshold, we see a dip in M . And, as we further increase it we
see M rise to a value slightly above its value when the password write threshold was
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Security vs Recall Threshold
Figure 3.3: Security vs. recall threshold.
very low.
Our rationale for this behavior is as follows. When the password write threshold
is low, under 40, users do indeed write down passwords, but writing these passwords
down means that the passwords contribute less to the cognitive load of password
remembrance; this leads to a larger set of unique passwords at the cost of more pass-
words being written down, which is a net win as determined by the parameter settings
of direct attack risk, reuse attack risk, and stolen password risk that determines M .
We see a dip when setting the threshold between 40 and 80 because while users are
less inclined to write passwords down during this range, they will be more inclined to
reuse passwords as passwords that are not written down contribute a larger cognitive
burden. For thresholds over 80, users may still reuse more passwords, but the gains
from not writing down passwords finally begins to outweigh gains from not reusing
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Security vs Password Reuse Threshold
Figure 3.4: Security vs. password reuse threshold.
passwords.
Direct Attack Risk. In Figure 3.6 we see that increasing the direct attack risk
value reduces security as expected.
Stolen Password Risk. In Figure 3.7 we see that increasing the stolen password
risk value reduces security roughly as expected. We do see an unusual local maximum
for a stolen password risk value of 0.5. We attribute this solely to error because we
performed too few trials.
Reuse Attack Risk. In Figure 3.8 we see that increasing the reuse attack risk value
reduces security as expected. We see a peak at 0.625, but we again attribute this to
error due to an insufficient number of trials.
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Security vs Password Write Threshold
Figure 3.5: Security vs. password write threshold.
Distribution of Services. In Figure 3.9 we look at how changing the number of
services while maintaining a fixed percentage of weak, average, good, and strong pass-
word composition rules for three pairs of cognitive threshold settings affects security.
Each curve appears to reflect a sigmoid function flipped along the y-axis and shifted
accordingly. This is what one might expect. For a small number of services users are
able to simply remember their passwords without resorting to circumvention. As the
number of services grow users circumvent.
In Figure 3.10 we use a fixed number, 24, of services and vary the distribution of
password composition policies for the same three pairs of cognitive threshold settings.
These cognitive threshold pairs correspond to the password reuse and password write
thresholds respectively. For the low cognitive threshold pairs, (20/30) and (40/60),
circumvention is rampant for most distributions; hence, simply having the most strin-
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Security vs Direct Attack Risk
Figure 3.6: Security vs. direct attack risk.
gent password composition policies tends to make sense because the primary factor
in our security measure becomes the raw password strength. For the highest cogni-
tive threshold pair considered, (60/90), there’s less circumvention; users may be able
to choose a larger set of unique passwords for less stringent distributions, thereby
reducing the likelihood of reuse attacks.
We believe further experimentation would demonstrate that even for low cogni-
tive threshold pairs we achieve better security by using weaker distributions under
different, but still viable, parameter settings (e.g, changing the password reuse attack
risk from 0.25 to 0.5). We leave this for future work.
3.3.7. Takeaways
While we cannot make specific password policy recommendations based on our model,
which requires further validation, we do believe our results provide some valuable
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Security vs Stolen Password Risk
Figure 3.7: Security vs. stolen password risk.
insights that serve as indicators of how to improve password policies:
• Always choosing the most stringent password composition policy may be disas-
trous, endangering both usability and security with no gains.
• All circumvention is not the same. To improve security at a given organization,
one must pinpoint the threat model and design policies accordingly.
• Endorsing relatively benign circumventions at an organization may reduce the
prevalence of particularly malignant circumventions. As an example, it may
very well make sense for an organization to give their employees a small card to
write their passwords on if security personnel are more worried about a password































Security vs Reuse Attack Risk
Figure 3.8: Security vs reuse attack risk.
Section 3.4
Future Work
While we feel there’s a lot to be done in this space, primary foci for future work include
adding to the password management model and building an agent-based model for
an autologout scenario.
3.4.1. Password Management Scenario
We are interested in incorporating more faithful and/or better reasoned models and
processes (e.g., [63])) for password recall, cognitive burden, and forgetfulness into our
simulation. Once we’ve done this, we’d also like to revisit the work mentioned in this
paper and explore other password management challenges. For a few examples, we’d
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Security vs Distribution of Services
Figure 3.10: Security vs. distribution of services.
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nication and password sharing between users, exploring how group dynamics affect
circumvention, (b) model how users cope with enterprise requirements requiring them
to frequently reset their passwords, or (c) test alternative password policies (e.g., what
would happen if we allowed users to write passwords on Post-It notes for a limited
duration of time, but told them to rip up the Post-It notes afterward?). The idea
of recognizing and even incorporating existing circumvention into the security model
also seems like an interesting pursuit for modeling work. Last, while we have tried to
validate our work with previous studies, this is an ongoing challenge and we would
like to pursue new avenues and perhaps devise new experiments to aid on this front.
We also note that two former Dartmouth undergraduates have spearheaded work,
in collaboration with us, that builds on the password management simulation pre-
sented in this chapter. Bruno Korbar [99] worked on validating the simulation, and
Christopher Novak et al. [128] used simulation to examine password memorization
techniques.
3.4.2. The Effect of Security Policies on Group Behavior and The Auto-
logout Scenario
Tackling even an ostensibly simple problem, such as setting a “good” timeout thresh-
old, can be a nightmare in practice. On paper, the general shape of a timeout vs.
security curve seems obvious: surely, it’s a monotonically decreasing curve! In prac-
tice, humans act according to flawed belief systems, they interact with other humans
and other systems, they work toward achieving many competing goals, and they are
plagued by deficiencies that lead to suboptimal decision-making, behaviors, and other
phenomena; thus, we find the resulting curve can often be counterintuitive. Indeed,
in a compiled corpus of circumvention scenarios we collected, we observed many ex-




Regarding the challenges of the timeout problem, consider the following anecdote.
In a large hospital, clinicians frequently left shared computers logged-in but unat-
tended [100]. Security officers, concerned about inappropriate access and inadvertent
modification of patient data, opted to attach proximity sensors to the machines in an
effort to mitigate these risks. These sensors detected when users had left terminals
logged-in but unattended for some fixed timeout threshold. When such an event was
detected, the logged-in user was automatically logged out of the machine. Clinician
reception of these proximity sensors startled security officers. Clinicians, annoyed
with the system, which was an impediment to doing actual work, placed styrofoam
cups over the proximity sensors, which effectively tricked the proximity sensors into
believing clinicians were nearby when they were not. The proximity sensors were
an absolute failure. Resources had been spent with the goal of improving security,
but doing so yielded no security gains; instead, it was utterly defeated and it prob-
ably created a greater rift between clinicians and security personnel, making future
security challenges even more difficult to address.
This anecdote highlights that it is essential to find solutions that make sense in the
context of enterprise workflow—solutions that can be successfully adopted by users
while also realizing security objectives without sabotaging other objectives.
So, how do we arrive at these solutions? It is usually impractical for security per-
sonnel to test out different security approaches within existing enterprises. Even if it
is feasible, doing so often involves, at the minimum, substantial time, implementation
costs, maintenance costs, and depletion of a finite user compliance budget [20]. We
contend that multi-agent simulations may help distinguish good solutions from bad
ones by predicting stress points of candidate implementations, thereby suggesting
things to improve upon. However, we are not suggesting that agent-based modeling
is some magical panacea that can be used to address all security problems. It has
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its limits; it is nigh impossible to predict the unprecedented. Instead of trying to
predict inventive workarounds such as the placement of styrofoam cups over prox-
imity sensors, we believe simulation is an effective tool to gauge user inclination to
circumvent.
We can estimate the risk from user circumvention in terms of motive, opportunity,
and potential harm. Consider the case of auto-logouts. First, motive stems from
the frequency of workers leaving and returning to shared workstations, where the
time taken to log in becomes a significant drain when summed over many instances.
Second, opportunity also arises from the shared environment, where workers might
remain logged in to avoid these costs, or use another’s credentials, inadvertently or
not. Third, the potential harm comes from the nature of the task, since medication
prescriptions or notes of delivery may then be ascribed to the wrong patient.
Using simulation, we can explore the relevant factors that affect security risks
associated with a clinician using a terminal to which another clinician is logged in.
The likelihood of risk is affected by the number of agents, the number of workstations,
group attitudes towards security and circumvention, and the dynamic nature of tasks;
the actual risk is affected by the kinds of tasks performed. Simulations allow us to
compare how burdensome different kinds of solutions are on users. For example,
we might compare an auto-logout solution to a solution involving authentication
challenges after a period of inactivity, which may slightly reduce the burden of having
to log back in to a service; or, we could detect tasks that are disparate from the
current task and warn the user that they may be using a terminal to which someone
else is logged in. For some tasks, it may be possible to predict whether the worker
must return to complete their session, and to apply different policies based on this
prediction.
Last, while we mentioned the timeout problem in the medical setting, there are
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numerous other scenarios where auto-logouts may be relevant. And, we believe mod-
eling approaches could be developed for them as well.
Section 3.5
Conclusion
We have discussed our work toward building an agent-based model for a password
management scenario. While validation is a challenge, we have made first steps
toward building a useful cognitive behavioral agent-based model for password cir-
cumventions; we’ve also performed trials that have generated what we believe to be
interesting and perhaps even counterintuitive results. For example, under certain as-
sumptions, making password composition requirements more stringent may actually
lead to a decrease in aggregate security. For another example, allowing users to write
down passwords may actually improve security by reducing the likelihood of password
reuse and reuse attacks. Password management is just one of many areas where we
believe cognitive behavioral agent-based models can serve as a useful tool. In Smith
et al [180], we observed that a pattern of policy choices at one site counterintuitively
affects security at other sites. Applying agent-based modeling to these sorts of sce-
narios and others, such as those mentioned in Section 3.4 may provide useful insights




Human understanding of protocols is central to protocol security. The security of a
protocol rests on its designers, its implementors, and, in some cases, its users correctly
conceptualizing how the protocol should work, how it actually works, and how others
will perceive how it works. Ensuring these conceptualizations are correct is difficult. A
complementary field, however, provides some inspiration on how to proceed: the field
of language-theoretic security (LangSec) promotes the adoption of a secure design-
and-development methodology that emphasizes the existence of certain computability
boundaries that must never be crossed during parser and protocol construction to en-
sure correctness of design and implementation. In this chapter, we discuss the idea
of supplementing this work, which is grounded in classical computability boundaries,
by taking into account human-computability boundaries. Classic computability re-
search has focused on understanding what problems can be solved by machines or
idealized human computers—that is, computational models that behave like humans
carrying out rote computational tasks in principle but that are not subject to the
natural limitations that humans face in practice. Indeed, as Kahneman and others
have show in various domains, such as economics, psychology, sociology, and usable
security, people do not always behave as we might expect. Humans are often subject
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to a variety of deficiencies, e.g., constrained working memories, short attention spans,
misperceptions, and cognitive biases. We argue that such realities must be taken into
consideration if we are serious about securing protocols. A corollary is that while the
traditional computational models and hierarchies built using them (e.g., the Chomsky
hierarchy) are critical in securing protocols and parsers, they alone are inadequate as
they neglect the human-computability boundaries that define what humans can do
in practice. In this chapter, we advocate for the discovery of human-computability
boundaries, present challenges with precisely and accurately specifying these bound-
aries, and outline future paths of inquiry.
Section 4.1
Introduction
Humans are integral to the conception and operation of protocols. They lay out
the initial vision, create the specification, implement the protocol, and wittingly or
unwittingly make use of it. Due to humans’ close and varied interactions with proto-
cols during their design, development, and operation, we must—if we want to secure
protocols—account for humans’ intrinsic limitations in understanding protocols.1
The genesis of a protocol vulnerability often lies in some human failure or defi-
ciency, e.g., the copy-and-paste blunder that produced the Apple goto fail vulnera-
bility [124]. The designer may introduce mistakes or create the specification under
incorrect assumptions. Or the implementor may fail to correctly conceptualize the
specification, e.g., due to cognitive constraints. Or perhaps the user may misunder-
stand the protocol, driving them toward behaviors that jeopardize security. (While
some may not consider the previous example to be a protocol vulnerability, it has the
same form as one; it is a predictable failure of the protocol design-and-development
1While the discussion in his chapter focuses on protocols, the notion of human-computability
boundaries is certainly applicable more broadly.
77
4.2 The Human Computer
process, which can be used as a reliable conduit for attack.)
Our thesis is that a whole class of vulnerabilities could be averted if
we better understood human limits to computability and took a princi-
pled approach to protocol design and development grounded in such an
understanding.
In the remaining sections of this chapter, we: discuss Turing’s notion of com-
putability; provide a brief primer on the field of language-theoretic security (LangSec),
which informs our work; present the idea of complementing LangSec with the incor-
poration of human-computability boundaries; discuss challenges in defining human-
computability boundaries and follow-on work; discuss related work; and conclude.
Section 4.2
The Human Computer
Today, Turing machines are often thought of as computational models for modern-
day electronic computers; however, Turing very much had humans in mind during his
conception of the Turing machine. As Jack B. Copeland points out in his discussion
on the Church-Turing thesis:
“Turing introduced his machines with the intention of providing an ideal-
ized description of a certain human activity, the tedious one of numerical
computation. Until the advent of automatic computing machines, this was
the occupation of many thousands of people in business, government, and
research establishments. These human rote-workers were in fact called
computers. Human computers used effective methods to carry out some
aspects of the work nowadays done by electronic computers. The Church-
Turing thesis is about computation as this term was used in 1936, viz.
human computation[.]” [47]
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In Turing’s seminal paper [188], in which he proved the Entscheidungsproblem is
not, in general, solvable, he also introduced the Turing machine, along with the notion
of computability. Turing wrote, in the paper, that: “Computing is normally done by
writing certain symbols on paper. We may suppose this paper is divided into squares
like a child’s arithmetic book.” In the same paper, Turing uses “the fact that the
human memory is necessarily limited” as justification for the finite state property of
Turing machines. 2
Despite Turing’s inspirations to model human computation, Turing machines are
not adequate in fully capturing all aspects of human computation in protocol and
program design, development, and use. It was never meant to do this. The Turing
machine was a computational model that dealt with an ideal—a human in principle,
not in practice. More importantly, human computation at the time was envisioned
narrowly as rote processes carried out by humans. It was never intended to cap-
ture how humans design, develop, conceptualize, and use computer programs and
protocols, in the fashion they do today. While we still have human computation in
the present day, the role of humans and the tasks they perform are fundamentally
different—and any computational models we use to capture human computation must
reflect this reality.
Section 4.3
LangSec and Computational Models
Language-theoretic security (LangSec) [2] incorporates the theoretical insights offered
by language theory, automata theory, and computability theory into a design-and-
development methodology that averts common pitfalls responsible for producing nu-
merous protocol and parser vulnerabilities. It advocates separating the parser from
2We note that not everyone held this view. For example, Shagrir provides discussion on Gödel’s
rejection of this assumption [170].
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the execution environment, modeling the intended behavior of the parser as a formal
grammar, ensuring the grammar does not exceed certain computability boundaries on
an extended version of the Chomsky hierarchy, and ensuring that the parser is a rec-
ognizer or more precisely a decider, i.e., it rejects all bad inputs and accepts all good
inputs. In essence, LangSec tells us how to design protocols and parsers based on our
understanding of the limitations of machines. That is not to say that LangSec does
not acknowledge or address human causes of protocol and parser vulnerabilities. On
the contrary, Bratus et al. in their discussion of exploit programming [38], note that
many exploits are manifestations of incorrect computability assumptions. LangSec
aims to rectify these assumptions within the design-and-development process. Fur-
thermore, successful application of LangSec principles requires reducing human error.
For example, the parser combinator toolkit Hammer [141] helps eliminate user er-
ror by assisting the implementor in creating a parser that matches the specification
grammar. We contend that, while LangSec is vital and has made great strides toward
securing protocols, it alone is insufficient. Specifically, there is a limit to what can be
achieved by considering traditional computability boundaries alone. (Of course, one
might argue this would not be a problem if we could eliminate the human from all
parts of the protocol life cycle, including design, development, and use; as far as we
can tell, we’re not quite there yet.)
We propose supplementing the field of LangSec with work that explores human-
computability boundaries. Classical computational models, such as the Turing ma-
chine are excellent for capturing what machines can do; however, they are generally
not well-suited for capturing what actual humans can do with and especially without
aids. In practice, humans have finite memories and often inadequate knowledge to
understand protocol workings in comparison to machines. They have short attention
spans. They are subject to cognitive biases and often make mistakes in reasoning
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in predictable ways. These deficiencies manifest in bugs during protocol and parser
conceptualization, coding bugs, and user error, all of which endanger security. [179]
We argue that we must acknowledge these human deficiencies, understand why
and how they occur, develop solutions to begin addressing them, and finally we must




Using an extended version of the Chomsky Hierarchy that differentiates between
non-deterministic and deterministic pushdown automata, LangSec recommends stay-
ing within either the boundary of Turing-decidability (linear-bounded automata) or
the stricter boundary of parser-equivalence decidability (deterministic pushdown au-
tomata), depending on the problem at hand. The exact class boundaries for these
decision problems are not part of the five-class extended Chomsky hierarchy, e.g.,
the Turing-decidability boundary lies at recursive languages. The extended Chomsky
hierarchy, however, is natural for humans to interpret and allows sufficient expres-
siveness to still be useful in the design and development of parsers and protocols.
Human-computability boundaries—the boundaries that specify what actual hu-
mans can do with the capabilities they possess and the deficiencies they are subject
to—are a different beast altogether. Fitting human-computability boundaries to an
extended Chomsky hierarchy is futile as there exist grammars within the class of regu-
lar grammars—i.e., grammars that can be expressed with finite state automata—that
humans, in general, fail to conceptualize correctly. We do not know exactly where
these human-computability boundaries lie, but the discovery of them may be instru-















Figure 4.1: Human-computatability and LangSec boundaries.
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The ovals correspond to classes of grammars (or languages or automata) in the five-
class extended Chomsky hierarchy. LangSec boundaries are drawn at linear-bounded
automata and deterministic pushdown automata, whereas the oddly-shaped blob cor-
responds to a single idealized human-computability boundary. If this boundary
were representative of reality, we would want to constrain ourselves to
the intersection of the blob and the appropriate LangSec computability
boundaries during protocol and parser construction.
In practice, however, things are more complex. We can imagine different human-
computability boundaries corresponding to different human roles and protocol inter-
actions. We can also imagine fuzzy boundaries where the uncertainty comes from the
variance of human attributes over a subpopulation. We might consider human defi-
ciencies of a probabilistic nature and aim to ensure most users are unsusceptible to a
given flavor of attack based on protocol misconceptions; then, we may design and de-
velop the protocol around this aim. If we know a priori what tools the various actors
have at their disposal, the model we choose and boundaries we choose should take this
into account. In short, the model used to express human-computability boundaries
should be rooted in the protocol at hand, as well as the relevant subpopulations and
their capabilities.
Section 4.5
Challenges and Future Work
In the previous section, we introduced the notion of human-computability boundaries
and motivated the need for their discovery. However, there are a wide variety of
challenges associated with accurately and precisely defining where these boundaries
lie, developing models to capture them, and utilizing them in practice. In this section,
we briefly touch on these threads and suggest directions for future research.
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4.5.1. Determinants of Human-Computability Boundaries
There are many factors that determine where human-computability boundaries lie,
e.g., memory, attention span, the dual-process model of cognition, and bounded ra-
tionality. [78, 179] However, some of these determinants will have a larger impact
than others and some information will be easier to attain and utilize in addressing
vulnerabilities that arise from human deficiencies. That is, pragmatically speaking,
the utility of exploring a determinant rests on its salience with respect to human-
computability boundaries and whether the information we can acquire about the
determinant is actionable. The effectiveness of the models that enable us to deter-
mine where human-computability boundaries follows directly from the determinants
we choose.
4.5.2. Usability Studies
Identifying the determinants of human-computability boundaries is insufficient. We
must also conduct usability studies to understand the interplay between these de-
terminants, human-computability boundaries, and security. Of course, this is not a
one-way process; usability studies also help with identifying new determinants, which
in turn guide new usability studies.
One example of a genre of usability studies we are interested in involves collecting
concrete metrics for code complexity. Two classes of metrics are based on: (a) what
the programmer can readily observe in the code and (b) what is represented in the
abstract syntax tree (AST) for the program inputs in computer memory. As we
mentioned earlier, program inputs are handled by code called parsers. Examples of
metrics of the first type include lines of parser code and complexity per line of parser
code, e.g., how many atomic structures such as combinators are used or represented
in each line of code (on average or on the worst line). Examples of metrics of the
second type include AST depth, number of branches, and tree balance.
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4.5.3. Understanding Roles
Drawing useful human-computability boundaries requires understanding which roles
are pertinent, the goals associated with the roles, the tools afforded by each role,
and the interplay between each role and the protocol. Such understanding must be
reflective of the protocol at hand and the application domain. The protocol and
application domain may warrant consideration of additional roles or subroles that we
have not discussed.
4.5.4. Developing Models
We’ve discussed the importance of defining where and how the protocol is used, deter-
mining the roles of the various human actors, identifying the determinants of human-
computability boundaries, and gathering the requisite data grounded in usability
studies to draw human-computability boundaries. The next step is then to incorpo-
rate these findings into a model that captures human-computability boundaries in a
way that enables us to reason about the security of the protocol. It may be infeasible
to draw perfect or even close-to-perfect boundaries for human computability. Under-
standing some limitations, however, can go a long way in addressing vulnerabilities.
The power of the model used to capture human-computability boundaries lies in
its utility in the design and development of safe protocols. Even if we cannot perfectly
capture human-computability boundaries, all is not lost. Indeed, it may be better
to capture a few limitations in a manner that enables us to design and develop safe
protocols than many in a way that does not. As we discussed earlier, one inspiration
for this work is to develop human-computability boundaries that complement LangSec
boundaries. In pursuit of this objective, we may wish to develop models similar to
those of the classical automata, such as Turing machines, to capture these boundaries.
While even these models will not neatly fit within the extended Chomsky containment
hierarchy used in LangSec, they would still be rooted in automata theory, which is
85
4.6 Related Work
certainly convenient. After all, understanding the commonality of two models of one
type is generally easier than understanding the commonality of two models of different
types.
We note that there has been some interesting, recent work on developing mod-
els for end users (e.g., [29, 18, 88]) that can assist in safe protocol and program
construction. Another approach might be to extend the compliance budget work of
Beautement et al. [20] to a cognitive budget for human agents.
Section 4.6
Related Work
Jeanette M. Wing expounded on computational thinking as an essential mindset
that everyone would benefit from, thereby providing a strong pedagogical basis for
incorporating computational thinking into college and pre-college curricula [213]. She
writes:
“Stating the difficulty of a problem accounts for the underlying power of
the machine—the computing device that will run the solution. We must
consider the machine’s instruction set, its resource constraints, and its
operating environment.” [213]
This mindset is crucial in efficiently solving problems on machines. We argue for
a parallel notion: Just as we must understand the computational capabilities of the
machines that humans use, we must understand computational capabilities of humans
as they interact protocols and programs, e.g., as they conceptualize and reason about
code during development.
For completeness, we note that in recent years, human computation has developed
into a field in its own right, e.g., [150, 111, 191]. The work in this field, however, is
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largely tangential to our work here. Our interests are in developing an understanding
of human-computability boundaries as they pertain to secure program and protocol
design, development, and use. That said, in the past two decades, there has been some
exciting research efforts to capture humans in protocol and parser design. Below, we
touch on a few particularly relevant ones.
In 2007, Carl Ellison[58] presented the notion of ceremony 3 as a natural exten-
sion to the network protocol. A ceremony incorporates everything conventionally
thought to be out-of-band to the protocol, e.g., UI interactions, human-human in-
teractions, provisioning tasks. This holistic view of the protocol as a ceremony en-
ables the security practitioner to better conceptualize and analyze protocol security.
Since then, researchers have expanded on the idea of ceremonies. Notably, Bella
and Coles-Kemp [21] pursued a formal model of security ceremonies with multiple
layers: information, operating system, human-computer interaction, personal, and
communal.
Johansen et al. [88] argued for the development of a new discipline, Behavioral
Computer Science, lying at the intersection of behavioral sciences, ubiquitous com-
puting and Internet of Things (IoT), and artificial intelligence. This discipline blends
the study of HCI, modeling, and the notion of computational trust. The authors
argue we must rethink the rational agent models often used for human behavior by
acknowledging that: differences exist between humans’ experienced utility, predicted
utility, and remembered utility [92]; humans employ the dual-process model of cog-
nition wherein they may invoke either a fast, knee-jerk, intuitive, and automated
response or a slower, deliberate, rational response [177, 91]; and humans are sub-
ject to all sorts of heuristics that affect their judgements [66]. The authors then
discuss approaches to building models that capture this complexity, grounded in the




Bella-Coles-Kemp model discussed earlier [21].
Basin et al. [18] studied the security of protocols in the presence of human error.
They developed a formal model that includes human agents whose behavior may
deviate from the behavior assumed by the protocol specification. They captured
human error using two approaches: (1) a skilled human approach that begins with
an infallible human agent who knows the protocol specification and modifies it to
allow for a small number of mistakes; (2) a rule-based approach that begins with an
untrained human that does not know the protocol specification and imposes a set
of rules upon human agent behavior that dictate permissible behaviors. They then
demonstrate how these two approaches can be used to formally model fallible humans
with the Tamarin verification tool [117]. They also do a case study to show how this
modeling approach can be used to discover human-based vulnerabilities in a protocol,
and they use the model to compare different authentication protocols.
The most relevant work we’ve seen is by Blum and Vempala [29]. They proposed
a model of human computation for end users in studying the security of protocols.
They argued that traditional notions of computability cannot blindly be applied to
humans and that, instead, human computational models must take into account the
reality that human processing power is inferior to that of computers. They argued
that human computation occurs in two distinct phases: a pre-processing phase and
a processing phase. Accordingly, they developed a model for human computation—
a variant of the Turing machine—and introduced the notion of a schema to be the
human analog to a computer algorithm. Finally, they applied this model to different
problems. While there is certainly some overlap with our work, we explore notions
of human-computability boundaries more generally. Additionally, we are not solely
concerned with users; we also focus on human designers and implementors. Last,






We argued that security rests, in large part, on acknowledging and accounting for
human deficiencies in the design and development of network protocols. Existing
LangSec work highlights theoretical computability boundaries along the extended
Chomsky hierarchy for which the decidability and parser equivalence decidability
problems are solvable. Staying within these theoretical computability boundaries is
important for secure protocol and parser construction. However, they alone are in-
sufficient. To realize the security properties designers and developers desire we must
also consider the human-computability boundaries that define what humans can do
in practice. In this chapter, we introduced the notion of human-computability bound-




Eyes on URLs: Relating Visual
Behavior to Safety Decisions
Individual and organizational computer security rests on how people interpret and
use the security information they are presented. A mismatch between the information
that is trying to be conveyed and what the user interprets may result in user exposure
to risks that endanger their own security and privacy, that of their organization, or
that of the people serviced by their organization. In this chapter and the next one, we
focus on one particularly challenging problem for users that has plagued both security
practitioners and researchers for over two decades—that of determining whether or
not a given URL is safe. In this chapter, we explore users’ visual behaviors as they
read URLs to gauge whether they are safe to click on. Eye tracking is not only a
window through which we can understand users’ visual processes; it also provides a
glimpse into the underlying cognitive processes driving those visual processes. We
report on a user study where 20 participants were tasked with classifying URLs as
safe or unsafe while wearing an eye tracker that recorded eye gaze (where they look)
and pupil dilation (a proxy for cognitive effort). Among other things, our findings
suggest that: users have a cap on the amount of cognitive resources they are willing
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to expend on vetting a URL; they tend to believe that the presence of www in the
domain name indicates that the URL is safe; and they do not carefully parse the URL
beyond what they perceive as the domain name. Our findings can be used to improve
security awareness training, to guide the construction of URLs that are easier for
users to interpret, and to develop better defenses.
Section 5.1
Introduction
As people surf the web, check their email, and do other computer-related tasks, they
interact with web addresses or Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) [199]. Unfortu-
nately, URLs do not only serve legitimate content; bad actors may use URLs under
their control to conduct attacks, e.g., to serve malware or steal credentials by mas-
querading as a legitimate service. Thus, users must be vigilant. Trusting an unsafe
URL could present a security threat to the individual or their organization. Yet users
don’t want to ignore safe URLs either. This problem is compounded by user misper-
ceptions of URL syntax, the sheer time required to vet URLs, and some practices of
legitimate services (e.g., use of URL redirectors). These factors make it very difficult
for users to vet URLs. Consequently, many attacks rely on the victim unwittingly
clicking on a malicious URL.
From a security standpoint, it is critical to safeguard users from malicious websites.
And so, numerous solutions have been developed. Some companies specialize in
security training for users (e.g., [94, 147]). Others focus on limiting user exposure
to unsafe URLs: Products and services like Microsoft Office 365 APT Safelinks [118]
and Proofpoint URLDefense [148] check for malicious content served by URLs before
allowing users to visit them. Some browsers similarly warn the user when they detect
unsafe URLs (e.g., [122]). There is also abundant research on why users fall for URL-
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based phishing attacks (e.g., [52, 79]), on training techniques (e.g., [106, 120, 196]),
and on defenses (e.g., [61, 114]), as well as other foci. However, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that solely focuses on understanding users’ visual
attention as they process URLs. Studying users’ visual attention while processing
URLs allows us to determine why certain attacks succeed, to measure the influence of
URL characteristics on visual processing and cognition, and to determine the efficacy
of countermeasures.
The work presented here serves as a first step toward developing a descriptive
model of the relationship between URL characteristics and user visual behavior. We
conducted a user study where users were asked to classify URLs as safe or unsafe
while wearing an eye tracker. One key finding is that participants spent more time
on processing URLs as URL length increased but only up to a point. Another is that




5.2.1. Eye Tracking and Reading
Eye tracking is considered to be a window into users’ cognitive states [159, 98]. It
has been employed to assess cognitive load [139, 140, 145, 218], reading strategies [28,
157, 83, 84], and design implications [68, 24]. We study users’ eyes as they process
URLs.
Users assess the safety of a URL by reading. The amount of visual attention given
while reading reflects moment-to-moment cognitive processing [154, 218]. Researchers
have sought to examine the relationships between reading and eye movements by using
measures like fixations, saccades, regressions, and backtracks [174, 27]. Fixations are
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pauses in eye movements during which new information is acquired. Research has
shown that users fixate longer while reading when “the processing load is greater” [90].
Reading and scanning text differs with respect to fixations and word skipping [156].
When and where someone looks next while reading is influenced by the reader’s ongo-
ing mental processing [156]. Six commonly used eye-tracking measures are: fixation
count, fixation count on various areas of interest (AOIs), proportion of time spent
on each AOI, average fixation duration, fixation rate (fixation count/second), and
gaze duration mean on each AOI [108]. We used all these measures, as well as pupil
dilation and backtrack fixation count.
5.2.2. Pupil Dilation and Cognitive Load
As users read and evaluate URLs, they use cognitive resources. A common measure
of cognitive load is pupil dilation [146, 107, 139]. When users face challenging tasks,
their pupils dilate on the order of 0.1 to 0.5 mm [142, 19]. This task-evoked pupillary
response (TEPR) indicates the cognitive load of the task. However, pupil dilation is
also influenced by other factors like the amount of light entering the pupil (pupillary
light reflex) [138, 142] and one’s emotional state [216, 181, 36]. To reduce these effects,
we conducted the experiment in a windowless light-controlled room.
5.2.3. Neutral Mood Induction
Mood can affect a person’s ability to comprehend text and their judgment [64, 34].
Mood induction is used to understand and reduce the effect of mood [119]. Watching
a film or a story is one of the most effective mood induction techniques [197]. To
reduce the effect of mood and improve replicability, we had participants watch a
video chosen to induce a neutral mood.
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5.2.4. URL Security and Phishing
The turn of the century saw phishing—the act of masquerading as a legitimate entity
to gather sensitive user information [201]—emerge as a leading attack technique. This
led to newfound recognition of the security risks posed by malformed and obfuscated
URLs. After all, phishing often involves tricking unsuspecting victims into clicking
on malicious URLs that look safe. Though phishing techniques had been discovered
and used earlier (e.g., AOHell [160]), phishing began garnering significant attention
by the early-to-mid 2000s, when the global costs of phishing attacks skyrocketed
to the hundreds of millions of dollars [201]. In response, security practitioners and
researchers alike sought to combat phishing. Yet, despite valuable efforts, phishing
remains a major security challenge. Here, we review the relevant literature and explain
where the work presented in this chapter fits in.
Much literature is centered around understanding the factors that determine what
makes a phishing attack successful, such as user knowledge of phishing and security
indicators, user behaviors, and user susceptibility to different flavors of attack. In
their seminal work, Dhamija et al. [52] conducted a user study wherein participants
classified various legitimate and phishing websites. They found that many users did
not understand or notice browser indicators (with 23% of participants relying solely
on website content to determine legitimacy) and that spoofing browser indicators
was easy to do and effective in tricking users. Wu et al. [214] found that security
indicators were not a strong defense as users rarely checked or understood them.
Downs et al. [54] presented findings from a pilot survey examining why users fall
for phishing emails. Based on their findings, they argued that more effort should be
spent on teaching users how to interpret security cues in browsers and ensuring these
cues are easy to understand. Sheng et al. [173] studied the effectiveness of phishing
training materials and the demographic determinants of phishing email susceptibility.
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They found women were more susceptible than men, the 18 to 25 year old age group
was most susceptible, and educational training could reduce phishing susceptibility
by 40% but with increased misclassification of legitimate emails. Hong et al. [79]
also conducted an email classification study; they found that gender, trust, and some
personality traits correlated with phishing susceptibility. Goel et al. [67] studied
the impact of psychological manipulation on phishing susceptibility by sending out
fake phishing emails to students and found that contextualizing emails to induce
fear of loss or anticipation of gain was effective. Benenson et al. [23] studied the
effect of communication medium on spear phishing susceptibility. They sent students
fake phishing messages via email and Facebook with a URL purporting to contain
pictures from a party; click-through rates were 42.5% for Facebook and 20% for email.
An earlier experiment that was similar by the same group [22], however, found a
click-through rate of 38% for Facebook and 56% for email; the authors hypothesized
the difference was due to addressing recipients by first name in the earlier study.
Researchers have also categorized different types of phishing and URL obfuscation
techniques, e.g., [55, 134]. That said, there are (ostensibly) legitimate reasons to
obfuscate URLs or otherwise break user expectations of where URLs will take them,
e.g., as URL redirection [203] or unobtrusively tracking users by modifying URLs on
click [48].
As phishing attacks rely on user deception, many seek to educate and train users.
Stockhardt et al. [184] compare the efficacy instructor-based, computer-based, and
text-based training. Kumaraguru et. al [105] present and evaluate an embedded
training system: participants were sent fake phishing emails; participants who were
phished were immediately presented with an intervention response as either text and
graphics or a comic strip (the latter being more effective). Games have also been
heralded as an engaging way to train users. Sheng et al. [172] presented the game
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Anti-Phishing Phil to train users to recognize and avoid phishing emails, which out-
performed more traditional training techniques. Arachchilage et al. [14] documented
the design and development of a prototype of a mobile game to train users to better
classify URLs; classification accuracy improved from 56% to 84% after playing the
game. Wen et al. [196] recently developed a role-playing email classification game,
modeled after the popular document-vetting video game Papers, Please [200], to as-
sist users in vetting emails; they found it to be more engaging and effective in teaching
users to classify emails than both Anti-Phishing Phil [172] and the anti-phishing email
training materials Barracuda PhishLine [17]. Companies also offer security awareness
training and phishing simulations as products or services [94, 144, 143, 147, 165, 164].
There even exists a “12-episode video series [with] a compelling story, an incredible
cast, and very high production values” that “makes learning how to make smarter
security decisions fun and engaging.” [95].
Many defensive measures have also been pursued. Egelman et al. [57] conducted
a lab study to compare active and passive phishing warnings to defend against spear
phishing. Active warnings were found more effective with 79% of warnings being
heeded. Maurer et al. [114] found that displaying in-context security information un-
obtrusively was both acceptable by users and effective. Some defenses have been incor-
porated into products. Email filtering is common. Applications and services, includ-
ing browsers, protect warn users when they enter malicious or risky URLs, e.g., [122].
Microsoft Office 365 ATP SafeLinks [118] and Proofpoint URLDefense [148]) are
two services that detect and vet URLs before serving them to users. However, such
techniques are not foolproof. For one example, Nathaniel presents an open redirect
vulnerability existing on Google that was also used to circumvent Office 365 Safe-
links [125].
Some may argue there is limited utility in understanding how users parse and
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classify URLs due to recent techniques that reduce or obviate the need for user in-
volvement in the URL-vetting process. For some examples, browsers, applications,
and services blacklist malicious URLs, detect malicious or risky URL constructions,
and detect and vet malicious content served via URLs (e.g., Microsoft Office 365
ATP SafeLinks [118], Proofpoint URLDefense [148]). However, such techniques are
not foolproof; for one example, Nathaniel shows how an open redirect vulnerability
existing on Google could be used to circumvent Office 365 Safelinks [125]. Addition-
ally, though these safeguards exist, they are by no means universally adopted; many
users must still regularly vet URLs. Moreover, aside from any direct practical utility
this study has for the URL-vetting problem, its findings may be instructive in devel-
oping and refining solutions to problems that involve users interpreting and utilizing
security information more broadly.
Recently, there has been growing interest in using eye trackers to examine and
improve user security behavior. Miyamoto et al. [120] developed an eye-tracking
based system that trains users to look at the status bar. Xiong et al. [215] studied
the efficacy of domain highlighting and intructing users to look at the address bar
by conducting two studies, one involving an eye tracker in which the address bar
was treated as a single area of interest. Alsharnouby et al. [8] conducted a study
wherein they asked participants to classify websites, not just URLs, as legitimate
or illegitimate while wearing an eye tracker and examined how users gauge website
legitimacy and the effectiveness of security indicators. While similar in spirit to these
studies, we focus exclusively on understanding how users process URLs. That is, we
are working at a different level of granularity and are not concerned with how people
visually process websites as a whole but specifically how they visually process URLs.
This finer level of granularity enables us to dissect URLs into different parts and
examine how people process each part. We seek to understand what parts of a URL
97
5.2 Related Work
people pay attention to, what parts they don’t, when people give up, and how their
eyes process different flavors of URLs, amongst other things.
5.2.5. A Brief Introduction to URL Structure
A uniform resource locator (URL) is a string of characters that specifies the location
of a web resource and how to access it [199]. The original URL specification details
URL structure [25]. Here, we present the bare essentials of URL structure at an
appropriate level of granularity to understand our work.1
Each URL in our corpus has the form:
<scheme>: // <authority><rest>
The scheme component [25, 26, 198] corresponds to the scheme name, which
specifies how to interpret the text following the colon. Common schemes are http, ftp,
and file. Every URL in our corpus uses the https scheme.
The authority component specifies a subset of the host, port, username, and
password [26, 198]. For URLs in our corpus,, the authority component has either
the form host or user@host where host represents the host and user represents
the username. In this study, the host is always a fully qualified domain name (e.g.,
www. wikipedia. org ), that is, “a sequence of domain labels separated by ‘.’ ” [25].
The last domain label is the top-level domain. For URLs in our corpus, the authority
component comprises everything following the leading https:// until either the next
/, if present, or the end of the line.
We call the last component rest, a catch-all term that is not borrowed from any
specification or standard. It captures everything following the authority component.
The rest component includes the path [25, 26, 198], which may be empty; it may also
1A more thorough treatment of URLs can be found in URL and URI specifications and stan-
dards [25, 26, 198].
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scheme delims. authority rest
https :// www.google.com /forms/about/
Table 5.1: Disaggregation of a URL into its three components.
include queries, fragments, and accompanying delimiters [25, 26, 198]. For every URL
in our corpus, if the rest component is non-empty, it includes a path that “[identifies]
the resource within the scope of [the] scheme and authority” [26], it begins at the first
/ character following the authority component, and it is the last part of the URL.
Table 5.1 provides an example of a URL disaggregation into these three components.
Please note the formatting style used for these components. Later, we define areas of
interest of the same names but different formatting styles.
Section 5.3
Study Outline
Our long-term goal is to understand users’ visual behaviors (and the underlying cog-
nitive processes they manifest) as they process, interpret, and operationalize security
information (including information embedded in URLs) when making security deci-
sions. Identifying which factors affect visual behavior and how they affect it is vital
in informing security solutions. Such information can be used to improve security
awareness training or to better design user interfaces that aid in decision-making.
The work presented in this chapter is one step towards this long-term goal. We
aim to capture how some URL properties affect visual behaviors. We attempt to
control for other factors, but we do not explore them in this initial study. We propose
hypotheses pertaining to how various aspects of a URL affect visual processing of the
URL, test these hypotheses, and observe trends in users’ visual behaviors.
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Figure 5.1: The left side of the figure is a processed frame from the eye tracker
video (This is not the same as what the participant sees). The red cursor indicates
gaze position and the four colored boxes represent four AOIs: the scheme AOI
(red), the authority AOI (green), the rest AOI (blue), and the response AOI
(yellow). The right side is an image of a participant performing the task wearing the
eye tracker.
5.3.1. Hypotheses
We created hypotheses to examine how users visually process URLs and how URL
features affect this processing:
H1 : Total time spent on processing a URL is longer for complex URLs than it is for
simple URLs.
H2 : Total time spent on processing a URL, normalized by the URL length, is shorter
for complex URLs than it is for simple URLs.
H3 : There exists a URL length threshold over which increasing URL length does
not result in more time being spent on processing URLs.
H4 : Total time spent on the scheme per character is less than that of the authority
and rest components.
H5 : For URLs that have an authority component of form
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user@host where user ends with “.com”, participants spend significantly more
time per character looking at the user component than the host component.
Section 5.4
Method
5.4.1. URL Corpus and Classification
We created a URL corpus comprising 64 URLs partitioned into 8 categories.2 Cate-
gories are defined by features corresponding to (1) safety, (2) complexity, (3) a leading
www in the authority component, and (4) the attack type for unsafe URLs. The cor-
pus contains 8 URLs for each of the 8 categories. To reduce variability and maintain
uniformity between categories, every URL uses https as the scheme component and
com as the top-level domain.
The categories are defined by the following 4 features:
Safety:. URLs that are safe use domain names associated with popular services
within the USA, such as Facebook. We selected the fully qualified domain names
used in these URLs primarily from the top 1,000 US websites in the Quantcast Top
One Million list3, although we consulted other lists as well. For the subset that were
complex and included rest components, we chose the rest components by searching
for legitimate content served by these domain names.
URLs that are unsafe have fully qualified domain names that, at the time of corpus
construction, were eligible for purchase, did not have a domain name server record, or
were spoofed websites. While many URLs with the unsafe feature were not actually
unsafe to visit, it is exceedingly unlikely that participants would be knowledgeable





about the status of the URLs tagged as unsafe, and, if an adversary wished to acquire
the corresponding domains, they could do so. This decision allowed for greater control
over the corpus.
Complexity:. URLs were grouped into two complexity classes: simple and complex.
We define complexity in terms of (a) URL length and (b) URL features. A URL is
simple if it is at most 36 characters long and does not contain a rest component. A
URL is complex if it is at least 48 characters long and contains a non-empty path; it
may also contain queries and fragments.
Presence of www:. URLs with the www attribute begin with https: // www .
URLs with the non-www attribute do not.
Attack Type:. We chose to explore four conditions for unsafe URLs. They are nei-
ther exhaustive nor fully representative of real-world attacks. Rather, our aim was to
explore a variety of conditions that may affect visual behaviors and/or classification:
• positive: The fully qualified domain name contains positive or feel-good words
or phrases, e.g., “happy”, “bliss”.
• negative: The fully qualified domain name contains words or phrases with
a negative, technical, or a security connotation, e.g., “malware”, “antivirus”,
“techsupport”.
• substring : The fully qualified domain name has the form https: // X. Y. com
where https: // X. com is a safe URL.
• user@host : The authority component has form www. X. com@ Y where https:
// www. X. com is a legitimate URL. Moreover, some of the last four charac-
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Category Safety Complexity www Attack Type
C1 safe simple www N/A
C2 safe simple non-www N/A
C3 safe complex www N/A
C4 safe complex non-www N/A
C5 unsafe simple www positive
C6 unsafe simple www negative
C7 unsafe complex non-www substring
C8 unsafe complex www user@host
Table 5.2: A summary of the 8 URL categories.
ters of Y are obfuscated using a hexadecimal representation, e.g., representing
“.com” as “.%63o%6D”.
The eight URL categories are presented in Table 5.2. In Section 5.4.5, we will
discuss the measures in this table.
5.4.2. Experimental Design and Task
We conducted a within-subject experiment that was approved by the University of
New Hampshire Institutional Review Board (IRB). Each of the 20 participants were
shown the 64 URLs from the corpus over two sessions. The task was to classify each
URL as safe or unsafe. Participants completed this task by viewing one URL at a
time and clicking a button on the GUI to indicate whether they believed the URL
was safe.
The URL corpus was split into two equal-sized sets presented over two sessions,
such that four URLs from each category were represented in each set. For each
session, the order in which URLs were presented was randomly determined but held
fixed for all participants. However, session order alternated between participants.
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5.4.3. Data Collection, Processing, & Analysis
We discuss the participant selection, the GUI, data collection, data processing, and
data analysis:
Participants:. We collected data from 20 participants (3 female, mean age = 22.68,
SD = 2.65). All participants were students who participated in the user study as part
of their coursework. We discarded data from 4 participants due to technical issues
with the data extraction from the eye tracker. Hence, we report on the data from 16
participants (2 female).
User interface:. The application was created using GUIs in MATLAB. It was
presented to participants on a 24” monitor with a resolution of 1920x1200. Each
URL image was created using bold monospace font [208] of size 64. The screen was
made up of two panes. The first included the URL image, which was scaled and
displayed on screen over 2-7 lines with a full line having approximate height of 20mm
and width of 280mm. The second pane included the question “Is the web address safe
to visit?”, accompanied by two response buttons that read “Safe” and “Unsafe” (see
Figure 5.1). Four markers were embedded in the application to identify the surface
plane to mark various AOIs during post-processing of the eye-tracking data. Times
of clicks and corresponding classifications/responses captured via button clicks were
also recorded.
Eye Tracking:. We used the head-mounted Dikablis eye tracker to collect gaze po-
sitions. It contains three cameras: two eye cameras sampling the eye at 60 Hz and a
scene camera sampling at 30 Hz. Gaze positions are computed from the pupil move-
ments and mapped onto the video from the scene camera. Establishing a mathemat-
ical mapping between the features of eye and the target being looked at is referred to
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as calibration. We used the four-point operator-controlled calibration method [129].
Post-task questionnaire:. Following the URL classification task, the participant
filled in a questionnaire comprising: demographics questions; questions pertaining
to security knowledge and behaviors, especially regarding URLs and phishing; and
questions to help assess experimental validity.
Data Analysis:. We used MATLAB for post-processing the eye-tracking data. We
used JMP Pro 14 and R for statistical analysis. The Shapiro-Wilk test indicated
that all of our data were non-normally distributed, thus we used non-parametric tests
(Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon test) for analysis.
5.4.4. Procedure
After signing the consent form, the participant was given a brief introduction to the
study and the user interface. They then saw a short neutral mood induction video to
control for the effects of mood. They then filled in a pre-task questionnaire to assess
their mood [167], wore the eye tracker, and completed a practice trial to familiarize
themselves with the task and the GUI.
Before calibration, we adjusted a nose pin and head band to reduce the movement
of the eye tracker during the study; we did not use a chin rest. Next, we focused the
eye and scene cameras and calibrated the eye tracker using the four-point operator-
controlled calibration method. The participant then classified URLs for the first
session and took a break. The calibration procedure was then repeated and the
participant classified URLs for the second session. Last, they filled in the post-task




scheme AOI authority AOI rest AOI
https:// www.google.com /forms/about/
Table 5.3: Disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the first three AOIs. This
differs from Table 1 in that the scheme AOI includes the “://” following the scheme.
5.4.5. Measures
Mood:. Each participant’s mood was assessed along six emotional states: awake,
pleasant, angry, fearful, happy, and sad [119]. The assessment used a 10-point scale,
where 1 indicated that the participant’s mood was not associated with the given
emotional state, and 10 indicated that it was highly associated.
Score:. The score represents the number of correctly classified URLs within a set
with no penalty for incorrect classification.
Total Time Spent:. The total time spent on classifying a URL is the time (seconds)
from the presentation of the URL to the time when the user clicks on a button to
classify it. This is a proxy for the cumulative effort and engagement in classifying the
URL.
Time Spent on Areas of Interest:. Using the UTC timestamps of each data
point recorded by the eye tracker, we computed the percentage dwell time on five
AOIs (Areas of Interest). These measures express the distribution of users’ visual
attention and help us understand which URL components users use to gauge URL
safety. We examined five AOIs. Figure 5.1 captures the first four AOIs and Table 5.3
gives a disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the AOIs that correspond to the
URL. We now present the five AOIs.
• The scheme AOI captures the scheme component and the delimiters imme-
diately following it. As every URL in our corpus uses the https as the scheme,
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this AOI always corresponds to the leading https: // in the URL.
• The authority AOI captures the authority component. For classes C1
through C7, the authority component is a fully qualified domain name, e.g.,
www. google. com is the authority component of https: // www. google.
com . For class C8, the authority component has form user@host, e.g., as in
www. google. com@ evil. com . To test H5, the authority AOI was further
split into two smaller AOIs, the user AOI and the host AOI corresponding
to the user and host components.
• The rest AOI captures the rest component.
• The response AOI captures the response portion of the screen containing the
“Safe” and “Unsafe” buttons.
• The last AOI captured visual targets other than the previous four areas of
interest.
Fixations and Backtracking Fixations:. Fixating is the act of maintaining
one’s gaze at a particular target for a certain duration of time. It represents the time
where new information is gathered [152]. We extracted fixations of 100ms or more
following prior research guidelines [163, 86, 123].
Backtracking is the process of revisiting information that was previously processed
or skipped [40]. It usually occurs to re-establish previously processed information
or it signifies a cognitive interest in an area with respect to the given task [42].
We measured the backtrack fixation count, i.e., the number of fixations involving
backtracking.
Normalized Pupil Area:. : The eye tracker records raw pupil area of both eyes
in pixels. We used the right eye pupil area. We used the Hampel identifier technique
107
5.5 Results
to remove outliers [Foroughi et al.2017; Pearson et al. 2016]. Due to the non-uniform
sampling rate, we interpolated the data to obtain a uniform sampling frequency of
60 Hz [Pfleging et al. 2016]. Then, we normalized the data to compare it between
participants.
Accounting for Length Differences in URLs:. URLs may differ in the num-
ber of characters in their scheme, authority, and rest components. Thus, for the
corresponding AOIs, we calculated the time spent per character (total time spent on
AOI divided by number of characters in AOI) and the fixation count per character
(total number of fixations occurring on AOI divided by total number of characters in
AOI). For the overall comparison, we computed overall time spent per character (to-
tal time spent/total URL length), overall fixation count per character (total fixation
count/total URL length), and backtrack fixation count as a function of URL length
(total backtrack fixations/total URL length).
Section 5.5
Results
5.5.1. Mood Induction Measures
On average participants were awake (ranking of M=7.50, SD=1.59), felt relatively
pleasant (M=7.69, SD=1.40), and were mildly happy (M=6.75, SD=1.44). They
did not feel angry (M=1.81, SD=0.83), fearful (M=1.56, SD=1.09), or sad (M=1.50,
SD=0.82).
5.5.2. Scores
The average score was 40.44 out of 64. From the post-task questionnaire, we were




C1 ( simple, www) 0.92 0.63
C2 ( simple, non-www) 0.83 0.19
C3 ( complex, www) 0.76 0.5
C4 ( complex, non-www) 0.58 0.46
Table 5.4: Probabilities of correctly classifying safe URLs given the participant
knew of the service.
Category URL Length Time Spent Score Fix. Ct. Back. Fix. Ct.
C1 25.0 (4.8) 4.1 (2.3) 7.2 (1.1) 7.9 (4.9) 1.9 (1.8)
C2 19.8 (2.0) 4.0 (1.9) 3.8 (2.3) 7.1 (4.3) 1.6 (1.5)
C3 124.0 (13.2) 7.5 (3.8) 5.8 (1.5) 15.3 (8.2) 3.7 (3.1)
C4 105.3 (13.5) 7.9 (4.2) 4.4 (1.5) 15.9 (9.0) 4.1 (3.8)
C5 28.5 (2.4) 5.4 (2.1) 4.4 (2.8) 9.5 (4.7) 2.4 (1.9)
C6 29.3 (3.6) 4.8 (1.9) 5.9 (2.2) 9.2 (4.9) 2.4 (2.0)
C7 96.0 (20.4) 7.4 (4.0) 5.5 (2.1) 14.5 (8.3) 3.7 (3.2)
C8 95.0 (17.4) 6.3 (3.4) 3.4 (2.4) 12.6 (7.4) 3.2 (3.2)
Table 5.5: Mean values and standard deviations of measurements for the eight URL
categories (not normalized by length). Measurements include URL length, time
spent, score, fixation count, and backtracking fixation count.
URLs. Table 5.4 indicates the probabilities of participants correctly classifying the
URL given that they knew the service. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed no significant
difference between the four categories of safe URLs (C1-C4) in terms of the participant
knowing the services associated with the domain names [X2(3)=6.9674, p=0.0729].
5.5.3. Overview of Eye-Tracking Results
Table 5.5 presents some key results. The overall distribution of visual attention on
the AOIs is shown in Figure 5.6. Using Kruskal-Wallis test, we found that the time
spent per character was significantly different between the three AOIs corresponding
to the URL [X2(2)=30.4152, p<0.0001]. Post hoc analysis indicated time spent per
character on the authority AOI was significantly higher than that of the scheme
AOI and that of the rest AOI. The fixation count per character was significantly
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different between the three AOIs [Kruskal-Wallis test: X2(2)=23.9356, p<0.0001].
Post hoc analysis indicated that fixation count per character on the rest AOI was
significantly lower than the other two. However, we found no evidence that fixa-
tion duration was significantly different between the three AOIs [Kruskal-Wallis test:
X2(2)=3.1692, p=0.0516].
The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a significant difference in normalized pupil area
[X2(2)=8.7532, p=0.0126]. Post hoc analysis indicated a lower pupil area for the
scheme AOI relative to other AOIs, suggesting less cognitive effort was expended
on the scheme AOI.
5.5.4. Complexity
We saw a significant difference in overall time spent (seconds) processing between
complex and simple URLs [Wilcoxon test: Z=3.4865, p=0.0005]. More time was
spent on complex URLs (M=7.26, SD=2.41) compared to simple URLs (M=4.58,
SD=1.35). This can also be seen pictorially in Figure 5.4. Wilcoxon test indicated
significant differences in overall time spent per character [Z=8.9998, p<0.0001], overall
fixation count per character [Z=6.4883, p<0.0001], and backtrack fixation count as a
function of URL length [Z=4.4399, p<0.0001].
People spent less time per character on complex URLs (M=0.06, SD=0.01) than
simple URLs (M=0.13, SD=0.04). Figure 5.2 shows the time spent per character
decreases as URL length increases. Also, the fixation count per character was smaller
for complex URLs (M=0.12, SD=0.04) than for simple URLs (M=0.22, SD=0.10).
Figure 5.3 shows a decrease in fixation count per character as URL length increases.
But the backtrack fixation count was higher on complex URLs (M=3.68, SD=2.44)
relative to simple ones (M=2.08, SD=1.18). We found no significant difference in the
score between complex (M=4.76, SD=2.10) and simple URLs (M=5.34, SD=2.51).
Examining complex URLs of different lengths tells a more nuanced story. Figure 5.5
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Figure 5.2: Time spent per character to classify URL vs. URL length with linear
regression lines. As URL length increases, participants spent less time per character
on classifying URLs overall. This suggests that the amount of effort people are
willing to invest reduces as you increase URL length.
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Figure 5.3: Fixation count per character vs. URL length with a linear regression




Figure 5.4: Time spent to classify URL vs. URL length with linear regression lines
for simple and complex URLs. As URL length increases, the time participants took
to classify the URLs also increased. However, the rate of increase is much smaller
for complex URLs in comparison to simple URLs.
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Figure 5.5: Time spent to classify URLs vs. URL length with two linear regression
lines for data points separated by the median URL length (complex URLs). This
graph suggests that there may be a peak URL length after which increasing URL
length and complexity does not lead to any more time spent on classifying the URL.
suggests a peak in time spent per character that occurs near 100 characters. We
observed similar trends with fixation count per character and backtrack fixation count
as a function of URL length for complex URLs.
5.5.5. Existence of www
We compared safe URLs that have authority components that begin with www
(C1&C3) to those that do not (C2&C4). Wilcoxon test results indicated a signifi-
cant difference in time spent per character on the authority AOI between www
URLs (M=0.16, SD=0.04) and non-www URLs (M=0.21, SD=0.04); [Z=4.2094,
p<0.0001]. Also, there was a significant difference in the fixation count per charac-
ter on the authority AOI between www URLs (M=0.24, SD=0.09) and non-www
URLs (M=0.34, SD=0.12); [Wilcoxon test: Z=3.2292, p=0.0012]. The score obtained
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of Classification Time spent on the AOIs. This figures shows
that for both simple and complex URLs, users spent the least time on the scheme
component (note the rest doesn’t exist for simple URLs) and the most time on the
authority component on average.
(maximum score: 8) was also significantly different between www URLs (M=6.50,
SD=1.48) and non-www URLs (M=4.09, SD=1.90); [Wilcoxon test: Z=4.7020, p<0.001].
5.5.6. User@Host Attack Type vs. Regular URLs
To examine user visual attention for the user@host URLs (C8), we considered two
special AOIs at a finer granularity than the authority AOI : the user AOI and
host AOI. We compared measurements on these two AOIs for the user@host URLs
(C8) to those for the authority AOI for safe URLs of similar structure (C3). Using
the Kruskal-Wallis test we found a significant difference on time spent per character
between the authority AOI of C3, the user AOI of C8, and the host AOI
of C8 [X2(2)=32.1735, p<0.0001]. A significant difference was also observed with
fixation count per character [Kruskal-Wallis test: X2(2)=11.3323, p=0.0035]. Post
hoc analysis indicated that both sets of measurements for the host AOI for C8
were lower than those of the user AOI for C8 and the authority AOI for C3;
the measurements between the user AOI for C8 were comparable to those of the




H1 : Total time spent on processing a URL is longer for complex URLs
than it is for simple URLs.
True
H2 : Total time spent on processing a URL, normalized by the URL
length, is shorter for complex URLs than it is for simple URLs.
True
H3 : There exists a URL length threshold over which increasing URL
length does not result in more time being spent on processing URLs.
True
H4 : Total time spent on the scheme component per character is less
than that of the authority and rest components.
False
H5 : For URLs that have an authority component of form user@host
where user ends with “.com”, participants spend significantly more
time per character looking at the user component than the host com-
ponent.
True
Table 5.6: Results of our hypotheses. This table explains which hypotheses we
found evidence to support.
C8 and the authority AOI of C3 similarly. Also, there was a significant difference
in the score between the user@host attack type (M=3.37, SD=2.41) and safe URLs
of similar structure (M=5.81, SD=1.51); [Wilcoxon test: Z=2.9176, p=0.0035].
Section 5.6
Discussion
Participant responses to the pre-task questionnaire following the mood induction
video [167] indicated they were awake and in a neutral mood. Responses to the post-
task questionnaire reveal that participants did not fatigue, and, on average, correctly
identified the safety of about 40 of the 64 URLs (63%).
We now turn to a detailed discussion of the results. Table 5.6 specifies which
hypotheses are supported by our results.
5.6.1. URL Processing & Classification Factors
URL Length:. The overall time spent on classifying simple (and shorter) URLs
(C1, C2, C5, C6) was less than the total time spent on classifying complex (and
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longer) URLs (C3, C4, C7, C8). This weakly supports H1, though follow-up work
must be done to disentangle length from other complexity factors.
For complex URLs, we found URL length negatively correlated with time spent
per character and fixation count per character. This supports H2.
We did not observe a correlation between URL length and score. Also, while Fig-
ure 5.4 suggests participants spent more time parsing URLs as URL length increases,
Figure 5.2 suggests time spent per character decreases as we increase URL length.
Moreover, the positive correlation between URL length and time spent seems to cease
at a point, which supports H3. Specifically, Figure 5.5 suggests that at a threshold of
approximately 100 characters, time spent stops increasing as we increase URL length.
Similar trends were observed with fixation count per character and backtrack fixation
count per character. We also observed no statistical difference between time spent
on complex URLs under 100 characters and those above. One interpretation is cap-
tured by a notion similar to that of the compliance budget proposed by Beautement
et al. [20]: the user may only expend a finite budget of resources (here, time is a
proxy for expended resources) to classify a URL, and, if the resources required to
fully process a URL exceeds this budget, the user will not expend them. While the
peculiarities of where that threshold is may depend on factors other than just URL
length, we expect this notion of a finite budget applies more generally.
AOI:. We examine the influence of the AOIs:
• Scheme AOI: The decrease in the pupil area for the scheme AOI indicates
reduced cognitive attention. Previous work found the frequency with which
a user encounters a word affects the fixation duration and processing of that
word [155]. Users usually spend less time on frequently encountered words.
Most legitimate websites use https nowadays, which is also used in each of
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the 64 URLs in our corpus. This explains the decrease in cognitive load for
the scheme AOI. We observed a statistically significant difference in time
spent per character between the scheme AOI and the authority AOI (with
the latter being higher); however, we did not observe such a difference for the
scheme AOI and the rest AOI. Therefore, we do not have evidence to sup-
port H4.
• Authority AOI: The results indicate the time spent per character on the
authority AOI is significantly higher than that of other AOIs. Time spent
and fixation count per character on the authority AOI suggests users find
www at the beginning of the domain name to be a strong indicator of URL
safety.
• Rest AOI: Reduced fixation count while reading is characteristic of scanning
text [156]. The fixation count per character for the rest AOI is significantly
lower than it is for other AOIs, which suggests participants scanned the rest
AOI.
Attack Types:. Participants classified positive, unsafe URLs (C5) correctly 55% of
the time and they classified negative, unsafe URLs (C6) correctly 74% of the time.
This suggests people are more inclined to trust URLs that use positive words or
phrases, even if they have no familiarity with the domain name. Table 5.4 shows that
participants, on average, correctly classified the URLs 77% of the time, given that
they had heard of the associated services.
Results suggest users visually process the user component of URLs with the
user@host attack type (C8) similar to how they process the authority of URLs
without a user component. In general, the fixation count per character was low for
the rest component relative to both the scheme and authority components. For C8,
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we observed a reduced fixation count per character and time spent per character on the
host component, which suggests participants perceived the host component as part
of the rest component. Visual evidence suggests participants misidentified the user
component as the host for URLs in C8. Of the unsafe URL categories, participants
scored worst on C8. Participants spent significantly more time per character on the
user component than the host component for C8, in support of H5.
We expect classification accuracies observed in this study are upper bounds on
what users achieve in practice without additional safeguards in place. Sophisticated
attacks that use URL features participants do not know about will likely be more
effective. We also expect that attacks that use obfuscation in the rest component—
or rather, what users perceive as the rest component—are more likely to succeed
given that participants spent less time on the rest component than the authority
component in our study.
5.6.2. Improving Security in Practice
The study suggests a sort of ceiling effect: as URL length increases, participants
spent more time vetting the URL until it capped out at around 100 characters. It
also provides visual evidence of user misperceptions regarding URL structure. These
insights into how users process and perceive URLs suggest concrete steps and best
practices for services to improve the perceived security—and, we argue, the actual
security—associated with the URLs they serve. For example, from a purely technical
standpoint, there is no intrinsic security benefit to serving a URL that is short, has
a domain name that begins with www , and has few special characters. But if those
URLs match users’ safety expectations, users would be better at classifying both safe
URLs served by the service and unsafe, obfuscated URLs served by adversaries.
Some unsafe URLs from our corpus were classified as safe because they exploited
uncommon URL features that users rarely encounter in practice with legitimate ser-
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vices. Ironically, this makes such URLs easy for a computer to classify as risky.
Surprisingly, we found that some web browsers offer no user protection against such
URLs, even though simple-to-write parsers could easily detect them. This provides
an opportunity to improve security at minimal cost.
Last, our findings can improve the quality of security awareness training programs.
Our study identifies various misperceptions held by users. It also provides concrete
evidence of where users look as they process URLs. This study’s methods and data
may help in assessing, comparing, and improving training modules that aim to help
users correctly identify URLs.
Section 5.7
Limitations
Several considerations may have affected study generalizability: Participants were
predominantly male college students pursuing electrical engineering degrees. To en-
sure the eye tracker accurately picked up on AOIs, we used a large font and displayed
URLs over multiple lines. URLs were presented in isolation; contextual factors (e.g.,
the device on which a URL is displayed, the application on which a URL is viewed, or
beliefs regarding who sent it) may affect visual behaviors and responses. Also, repeat-
edly asking participants whether URLs were safe likely sensitized them to phishing
attacks.
However, we took precautions to minimize unintended effects. We conducted
pilot runs to ensure the interface was clear and user fatigue was minimized. We used
the post-experiment questionnaire to evaluate experimental validity. And we used a
neutral-mood-inducing video to reduce variability in mood.
The available indicators provide some evidence of the study’s validity. The aver-
age participant score of 63% is within the ballpark of similar studies, e.g., [52, 173].
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Post-task survey responses indicate most participants took the task seriously, exer-
cised equal or only slightly more caution than they would in practice, and were not
fatigued. Although no data we collected suggests a significant bias, we expect that
the artificiality of the experimental context, wherein users classified URLs in series,
would have had some effect on the the classifications and visual processes. That said,
we believe any bias would be in the direction of more caution and would be unlikely
to invalidate our security recommendations as problems during the classification task
would continue to be problems in the real world. We also note that applications and
interfaces in the wild may vary regarding font properties so there is no one-size-fits-all
approach for conducting such studies.
Last, the URLs may have had features we could not identify that affected par-
ticipants’ visual behaviors and responses. We attempted to mitigate these concerns
by including eight URLs per category, but further work is needed. Also, we only
considered a few flavors of URL-based attacks. Notably, no attacks made use of the
rest component, which may have affected participants’ visual behaviors.
Section 5.8
Conclusion and Future work
Eye tracking is a lens through which we can keenly understand user security behavior.
The work presented in this chapter is a first step toward developing a model that
captures how users visually process, derive meaning from, and operationalize URL
security information to gauge URL safety. We conducted a user study in which
participants saw URLs and then classified them while wearing an eye tracker. The
findings suggest that participants relied on poor security indicators such as presence
of www to gauge URL legitimacy, that they spent more time and cognitive resources
to vet longer URLs but only up to a point, and that, for the unsafe, user@host URLs,
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participants perceived the user component to be the host component. In future
work, we plan to study other contextual factors such as mood, additional flavors of
URL obfuscation, and the effectiveness of training the user.
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Chapter 6
An MTurk Study Examining How
Users Evaluate URLs
In the previous chapter, we used eye tracking to explore the visual behaviors of users
while they parsed and classified URLs. Here, we run a complementary, large-scale
study with two primary aims: to determine the unsafe URL structures to which
users are most susceptible and to examine how factors, including URL features and
font, affect users’ assessments of URL safety. We recruit participants over Amazon
Mechanical Turk to take part in the study, which, again, involves classifying URLs;
we record user responses and the time taken to classify each URL. Although this
approach does not provide data on how users visually process URLs, the reach of
MTurk allows us to study a much larger population of users. This means we can
achieve the requisite sample size to detect smaller phenomena, that we can use a





How users perceive the security information presented to them impacts their security
behaviors and, in turn, the state of security at both the individual level and the orga-
nizational level. Thus, it is paramount that we have a clear conception of how users
interpret security information. In the previous chapter, we sought to learn how users
process URLs from a visual standpoint. Participants classified URLs while wearing
an eye tracker, which provided reliable, ground-truth information on the visual pro-
cesses employed during URL processing. Additionally, the link between pupil dilation
and cognitive load allowed us to draw strong inferences about underlying cognitive
processes. However, the shortcoming of such studies is that they require a lab with
sophisticated equipment. This requirement, coupled with the other requirement of a
significant time investment on both the part of researchers and participants, severely
limits the number of participants one can have and, therefore, the types and number
of research questions that can be pursued.
The work presented in this chapter complements our eye-tracking work. We con-
duct a large-scale study to understand how people classify URLs using the platform
Amazon Mechanical Turk. While we do not get the fine-grained visual data that tells
us where people look as they process URLs, what parts they pay attention to, and
where they struggle, this study has the benefit of a significantly larger population
of users. This, in turn, enables us to examine many different classes of URLs, test
hypotheses corresponding to relatively subtle phenomena, and explore a variety of





In this section, we discuss related work and present the requisite terminology to
understand our work.
6.2.1. Related Work
In the interest of avoiding excruciating redundancy in this thesis, the related work
presented here is relatively compact. We only cover the papers which are most closely
aligned with the work in this chapter. The related work presented in Section 5.2
surveys the broader phishing literature. Similarly, we assume the reader is familiar
with URLs and URL structure. If not, we suggest they consult Section 5.2.5 of this
thesis and/or relevant specifications and standards [25, 26, 198].
Many different types of studies have been conducted to understand different as-
pects of URL security. Researchers have used machine learning to automatically
classify URLs, e.g., [187]. Training systems and assistive technologies to aid users
have also been developed. For example, Althobaiti et al. [9] reported on results from
a study on the efficacy of a Slack chat bot designed to assist users in assessing URL
safety. For another pair of examples, Conva et al. [43] and Sheng et al. [172] devel-
oped games to train users to not fall for phishing URLs. A variety of studies have
examined phishing and URL obfuscation attacks as they pertain to emails and web-
sites, e.g., [52, 79, 173]. However, there are some key differences between our study
and many of these phishing studies. As far as we can tell, in comparison to many
of these earlier studies, the project described in this chapter is wider in scope with
regard to the number of URLs studied. And we examine URL classification with-
out the presence of accompanying context, which has trade-offs. Notably, additional
contextual information does weigh into users’ security evaluations; however, it also
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introduces additional factors which make it hard to tease out what role the URL itself
had on the classification. Some work examines the impact of emotion on phishing
susceptibility, e.g., [186]. In our study we examine the impact that the valences
(positive/neutral/negative) of words that make up the fully qualified domain name
of URLs have on how users perceive those URLs.
Quinkert et al. [149] conducted a large-scale study on Amazon Mechanical Turk
where participants classified URLs and also constructed mock phishing URLs for
others to classify; they found this process was effective in training users to detect
malicious URLs, but it also produced false negatives in instances where legitimate
URLs had features that were similar to illegitimate ones. Albakry et al. [6] also
conducted a large-scale study on Amazon Mechanical Turk, which sought to examine
whether people could identify where a URL would take them, as well as whether
they felt URLs would be safe to visit. The paper has many similarities to our work.
Indeed, it is the most closely related work that we saw. However, it also has many
key differences. Our aims are slightly different: Whereas the study by Alkabry et al.
focused more on determining whether users could identify where URLs would take
them, we solely focus on understanding whether users think a URL is safe to visit
(user notions of safety and the labels we assign to URLs will be discussed soon!).
Our URL corpus is significantly different from theirs in size and the URL structures
studied, though there are some overlaps. We also examine the impact that the font
makes on responses. Additionally, we look into the duration of time taken to classify
a URL.
6.2.2. Some Basics
This study examines user susceptibility to many URL structures. While we shall
define URL features when we present our corpus, we present some key terminology
and ideas that will help in understanding the discussions motivating how we went
126
6.2 Background
about constructing our corpus, as well as the URL features themselves:
• URL redirection is a technique that lets a service automatically redirect the
user who visits a URL X under the service’s control to some other URL Y ,
either with or without user interaction after visiting X. [203] URL redirec-
tion has legitimate uses, but it also can be abused. Many legitimate services
embed the URL to be directed to (Y ) within the redirector URL itself (X)
and then employ a vetting process to ensure that the URL to be redirected
to (Y ) is safe, for some definition of safe, before a seamless transition takes
place; in the event that the URL to be directed to (Y ) is determined to be un-
safe, the service may warn the user that a redirection is about to take place as a
safety precaution, and they may require user consent before the redirection takes
places. However, some services do not provide such a check or that check can
be bypassed by craftily constructing URLs. URLs susceptible to these attacks
are called open redirectors. Open redirectors are often exploited to conduct
phishing or other attacks. (E.g., https: // business. facebook. com/ ads/
creativehub/ select/ ?redirect_ uri= https% 3A% 2F% 2Fbit. ly/ p5wv65V )
• URL shorteners [212] are one interesting class of URL redirectors. URL short-
ening services allow users to construct short URLs that redirect to longer ones.
However, this usually means that users cannot glean much information about
the shortened URL by simply looking at it. (E.g., https: // bit. ly/ 0B3GQ1 )
• When we talk about gatekeeper URLs, we are talking about URLs created by
gatekeeper security services such as Microsoft Office 365 APT Safelinks [118]
and Proofpoint URLDefense [148]. These gatekeeper services act as an in-
termediary, rewriting URLs sent by email so that the recipient is presented
not with the URL that the sender sent, but rather the rewritten URL. The
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rewritten URL redirects to the actual URL that the sender sent if it sat-
isfies the vetting process that the gatekeeper service has in place. We also
note that the actual URL to which a service is being redirected to is embed-
ded in the gatekeeper URL. However, even with significant interaction with
gatekeeper services, it is unlikely users can correctly interpret the embedded
URL information, if it exists at all. Indeed, this is a topic of exploration in
our study. (E.g., https: // nam01. safelinks. protection. outlook. com/
?url= https% 3A% 2F% 2Fwww. youtube. com& dat . . . )
• Homograph attacks exploit user perceptions of where a URL goes by substituting
a character string for another one that looks awfully similar. While there are
more sophisticated IDN homograph attacks, we study user susceptibility to the
more basic ASCII variant, as well as how font affects susceptibility. [206] (E.g.,
https: // www. zilIow. com )
• We compare two fonts in this study: a regular font that is representative of
the font style users are shown in the wild when assessing URL safety and a
monospaced font [208] for which every character is the same width. We compare
these fonts as the choice of font may affect user susceptibility to homograph
attacks.
• The valence of a word or phrase is a measure of how positive/negative a word
is. [121] We examine the impact of the valence of the words contained within
the fully qualified domain name of a URL on user classification for a subcorpus
of relatively short URLs. (E.g., https: // www. farm-living. com , https:
// www. datageek. com , https: // www. furydemolition. com )
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Section 6.3
Our Aims and Contributions
We aim to discover how users process security information, specifically the information
embedded in URLs. We seek to learn which URL structures are most effective at
deceiving users and to discover what factors affect the safety decisions users ultimately
make. The end goal of this research thrust is to deliver data that improves aggregate
security in practice, e.g., by suggesting techniques that improve security training or
by providing tools that can be incorporated into existing software to improve users’
mental models of URL safety.
More specifically, we seek to deliver—and we believe we do deliver—the following
contributions:
• We examine user susceptibility to some newer URL structures and attacks,
including gatekeeper URLs [118, 148] and URL shorteners. Both have been
looked at by Althobaiti et al. [9]; however, that study’s focus was more on
assessing the quality of a defense mechanism than how users respond to specific
URLs, only one URL was studied per category and only 20 participants belonged
to a condition. To the best of our knowledge, user perceptions of gatekeeper
URLs have not been examined before in usability studies. We note that Albakry
et al. [6] has examined how users evaluate URL shorteners. We additionally
examine the impact that the valence [121] of the words in the domain name
have on phishing susceptibility.
• We examine the impact of font style on user susceptibility to phishing attacks.
In particular, we compare how users respond to unsafe homograph attacks using
a regular font and a monospaced font.
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• Previous studies have examined a variety of URL obfuscation attacks and this
study re-examines some of them. Re-evaluating old findings is critical in sci-
ence but it is especially necessary when those findings pertain to technology
and usability as the way users interaction and understand technology is con-
stantly evolving. Over the years, both the kinds of URLs that people interact
with and the ways that users interact with them have changed. For just one
example, a decade ago, many popular services did not use HTTPS, whereas the
vast majority of services support it today. Many URL obfuscation techniques
and features we examine in this work have been studied before in the literature.
However, we study URLs in isolation, as opposed to other studies where URLs
are studied in relation to, say, an email. While studying URLs in emails provide
contextual factors that do occur in practice, they often add confounding vari-
ables in presentation that are hard to account for. In addition to the general
value as a replicability study, we study a relatively large subpopulation of users
and four URLs per URL class instead of just one, enabling us to get a better




Our full hypotheses will explore two measures: the URL classifications themselves
and the time taken to make those classifications. The rationale for studying the
former measure is obvious. The rationale for studying the latter measure is that it
tells us something about how a user processes a URL. We expect the duration of time
associated with URL classification to positively correlate with the amount of time
users spend fixating on parts of the URL. As we mentioned in the previous chapter,
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users extract information when they fixate on text. A long fixation duration indicates
a high cognitive load [90, 204]. If we have a long URL and a short classification time,
for example, this may suggest that participants are only scanning, not reading, parts
of the URL and that they struggle to derive meaning from the URL, resulting in
them giving up on the classification process early. Of course, to get a clear picture
of what is going on, it’s useful to have more information. But time taken to classify
URLs is, nonetheless, a useful indicator of what kinds of URLs people feel they can
interpret and whether they expend the effort to try to interpret them. That said,
we are only presenting preliminary results here and do not examine any hypotheses
related to time taken to classify URLs. We have defined the other hypotheses before
we conducted this experiment, and we will report on them in other published work.
However, they are not discussed here.
H1 : Participants are better at classifying safe short URLs than they are at classifying
long URLs.
H2 : Participants respond to safe and unsafe gatekeeper URLs differently.
H3 : Participants classify unsafe positive-valence URLs as safe more than they do
unsafe negative-valence URLs.
H4 : Participants more accurately identify unsafe URLs in monospaced font than
they do unsafe URLs in a regular font.
Section 6.5
Corpus
We designed our URL corpus and method in pursuit of testing our hypotheses. We
then iteratively revised the corpus and hypotheses until we felt satisfied that testing
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the hypotheses would provide a valuable contribution to the field and that the corpus
we created would allow us to test those hypotheses. We also reflected on and revised
the experimental method during this process.
In this section we explain and justify how we applied the safe and unsafe labels
to URLs, we discuss how we went about creating the URL corpus, and we enumerate
the URL categories we ultimately selected.
6.5.1. What is a Safe URL?
This study has two notions of safety associated with URLs. The first is what users
think of as safe URLs. This corresponds to the responses participants give us when
we ask them whether a URL is safe. The second, which we discuss in this subsection,
corresponds to the safe and unsafe labels that we assign to URLs for the purpose of
analysis. This sets the baseline for what is a correct or incorrect user classification,
which we use to test our hypotheses. In this subsection, we discuss how we apply
those labels, and we provide the rationale for the labeling.
We label a URL as safe if either (1) its domain name belongs to a legitimate service
and it does not involve redirection or (2) its domain name belongs to a legitimate
service that redirects to a safe URL. Of course, this raises the question of what
it means for a domain name to belong to a legitimate service. We mean that the
domain name is either routinely visited by a large fraction of the general population
for the purpose of receiving a service (e.g., news, banking, social networking) or it is
a subdomain of such a domain.
Admittedly, this definition is imperfect. Given the ambiguity and subjectivity
inherent in notions of safety, any strict rule-based definition will have flaws. Below,
we present some critiques of our definition and respond to them with the intent of
communicating the rationale for our definition.
• Some may argue that it is illogical to assign safety to a URL based solely on
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its character string. After all, what about URL hijacking, man-in-the-middle
attacks, and the reality that the domain registry changes? We agree that such
considerations are necessary in assessing any absolute notion of safety. How-
ever, important security information is also conveyed through the URL string
itself. Moreover, in many cases, for many people, the URL is the only security
information they are presented with before they make a decision of whether
or not to visit a website. It is imperative that we get a handle on how these
decisions are made.
• Another concern is that safety is not a binary attribute and some individuals
do not perceive it as binary. It is true that in some circumstances, some users
may be unsure of the safety of a URL and take additional precautionary steps
to vet the URL. However, given the sheer number of URLs that users are rou-
tinely presented with, our findings from the eye-tracking study presented in the
previous chapter, and the reality that even in situations where users take pre-
cautionary steps, there is still a binary decision of whether to immediately click
on the URL or not. Thus, it seems appropriate to present users with a binary
choice.
• Last, the definition is somewhat imprecise. While true, this definition serves as
a guiding notion that drives us toward a more concrete URL selection approach
we shall soon explain.
Above, we explained what we consider to be a safe URL. We label a URL as
unsafe if any of the following applied at the time of URL corpus construction:
• The URL was eligible for purchase.
• We could not find a DNS record corresponding to the URL.
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• The URL was a spoof of a legitimate URL not claimed by the target service
(we note that one such URL corresponded to a legitimate service that claimed
the URL of another legitimate service to demonstrate what a homograph attack
looks; it’s exceedingly unlikely participants knew this a priori).
• The URL redirected to an unsafe URL. We also used open redirectors from the
recent past that were no longer valid at time of corpus construction.
Although visiting some URLs labeled as unsafe may not pose a security risk in
practice, these extra allowances allow us to construct URLs in a more structured
fashion, which in turn allows us to obtain a better understanding of how users process
URLs. Additionally, we do not believe the user would have the requisite information
to come to the determination that such URLs are safe in the experiment by just
seeing them; that is; it is exceedingly unlikely that users would have visited such
URLs before. Thus, users truly should be classifying them as unsafe.
Some URLs, importantly unpopular and only moderately URLs that correspond
to legitimate services, do not fall under either the safe or unsafe categories mentioned
above. This is intentional. Notably, for safe URLs, we wanted only to explore those
URLs that corresponded to services that most people would have interacted with.
While a user who has not interacted with a URL offered by a legitimate service may
classify it as unsafe, we believe such a user would be making the correct choice.
6.5.2. Constructing the URL Corpus
With the notions of safety we outlined in the previous subsection, we now present
how we went about creating the URL corpus.
To create the subcorpus of safe URLs, we relied on the “The top 500 sites on
the web” provided by Alexa on March 14, 2020 for USA, which ranks site popularity
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based on web traffic.1 We used a subset of these websites with the intent of creating
different classes of safe URLs where the average rank of the URLs in each class are
roughly the same. We also tried to stick to websites that we believe many users will
have heard of and that we believe are only visited intentionally by users. We created
URLs by using the domain names from the list prepended by https:// and by find-
ing URLs that were only a couple of clicks from these main pages, which we expect
users to visit and share, that share the same top-level domain and second-level do-
main as the main site. Additionally, we used gatekeeper services and URL-shortening
services to create URLs based on these domains. To generate gatekeeper URLs, we
learned the structure of the URLs provided by the gatekeeper service, substituted
query values with random strings chosen from what we believe are similar distribu-
tions of query values for legitimate URLs, used an embedded URL representation
of the site we were redirecting to, chose a randomized embedded email address of
form FirstName.LastName.FiveDigits@gmail.com using DuckDuckGo’s randomiza-
tion functions if needed, and embedded the redirected URL in its appropriate spot,
modified in the ways the gatekeeper services would. The shortened URLs were created
by choosing random characters for the strings at the end of these URLs.
To create the subcorpus of unsafe URLs, we first created a draft of URL classes by
consulting corpora of existing malicious and phishing URLs and domains [137, 113,
162, 169]. To create the corpus itself, we used a mixture of real phishing websites
from those phishing corpora [137, 113, 162, 169], URLs used in recent phishing attacks
from blog posts and bug bounty writeups [195, 3, 126, 192], and URLs we created
that were eligible for purchase or did not have a DNS record associated with them.
While one can argue that some of these URLs may not be unsafe even though they




and, therefore, they should be classified as unsafe by the user. We reiterate that the
purpose of not solely using existing phishing attacks is that it enables us to have
greater control over the structure and properties of different URL classes, facilitating
a more reliable analysis.
6.5.3. URL Features
We discuss the URL features. For some of the features, we only considered their
applicability within a small subcorpus of URLs, but ignored them outside of that
subcorpus. Thus, we do not list all the features that apply to each URL class, only
those that were applicable for analysis.
Dummy:. The dummy feature corresponds to those URLs which were simply placed
at the beginning of the URL classification task to address early learning effects that
participants experienced as they became accustomed to the interface. No data about
these URLs was used in analysis.
Canary:. The canary feature is associated with canary URLs that we used to re-
move outliers. These corresponded to extremely popular services, specifically those
in the top 4 of the Alexa rankings, corresponding to the services Google, YouTube,
Facebook, and Amazon. If a user classified a canary URL as unsafe, we discarded all
data from that participant for the purpose of analysis.
Safety:. As discussed earlier, we assign the labels of safe and unsafe to URLs.
Additionally, we used the unknown label for URL shortener URLs.
URL Length:. We considered the following features, which capture the number of
characters within the URL:
• short : ≤ 32 characters
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• medium: 33-64 characters
• long : 65-96 characters
• very long : 97-128 characters
• extremely long : >128 characters
Top-level domain is com :. The com feature is applied to URLs that have a top-
level domain of com , i.e., the domain name ends in com . The non-com feature is
applied to those that do not.
Bottom-level domain is www :. The www feature is applied to URLs that have a
bottom-level domain of www , i.e., the domain name begins with www . The non-www
feature is applied to those that do not.
Existence of Path:. The path feature is applied to URLs that have an explicit
path following the fully qualified domain name, which is not just / . The non-path
feature is applied to those URLs that end with the full qualified domain name and
perhaps one / character thereafter.
Font:. The two fonts are regular which corresponds to the font Arial and monospaced
which corresponds to the font Go Mono.
Gatekeeper:. Within our study, we considered gatekeeper URLs, which had the
gatekeeper feature applied to them; they corresponded to both safe and unsafe URLs.
We wanted to see how much effort users expend in parsing these URLs. We exam-




Levels of Fully Qualified Domain:. For short, safe, non-www, non-path URLs,
we looked at the impact of the level of domains in the fully qualified domain name.
Those with two levels had the two domain levels tag applied; those with three had
the three domain levels tag applied.
Valence:. The valence of the URL is derived from the valences of the constituent
words in the fully qualified domain name in accordance with NRC VAD Lexicon [121].
We only explore features related to valence for a small subcorpus of URLs of similar
form to determine the impact of valence on phishing susceptibility of unsafe URLs.
The relevant features are:
• positive: The fully qualified domain name comprises two words, possibly hy-
phenated, each of valence ≥ 0.8.
• neutral : The fully qualified domain name comprises two words, possibly hy-
phenated, each of valence within the range 0.4− 0.6.
• negative: The fully qualified domain name comprises two words, possibly hy-
phenated, each of valence ≤ 0.2.
Attack Techniques:. In addition to the valence features, we considered a number
of attack techniques for unsafe URLs:
• homograph: This feature is applied to URLs that use the ASCII homograph [206]
attack technique. Two of the URLs used an uppercase i in place of a lowercase
l ; two used rn in place of m . (E.g., https: // www. zillow. com → https:
// www. zilIow. com )
• combosquatting : This feature is applied to URLs that start with a substring of
the domain that is legitimate but then add text within one domain level. (E.g.,
https: // www. adobe. com → https: // www. adobe-update. com )
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• infix domain: This feature is applied to URLs where we add a domain label in
the middle of the fully qualified domain name. (E.g., https: // www. youtube.
com → https: // www. youtube. yt-red. com )
• wrong TLD : This feature is applied to URLs that take the form of a legitimate
URL but with the top-level domain swapped with something else. (E.g., https:
// www. spotify. com → https: // www. spotify. vg/ )
• domain-in-domain: This feature corresponds to URLs that have a fully quali-
fied domain name that contains an unaltered safe fully qualified domain name,
followed by more domain levels that make it unsafe. (E.g., https: // www.
att. com → https: // www. att. com. att-wl. com )
• redirector : This feature corresponds to open redirectors. The domain corre-
sponds to a legitimate service, but the URL suffers from an open redirect vul-
nerability that has been exploited in the past (see: [195, 3, 126, 192]). Many,
perhaps all, of these attacks no longer work. However, they have been used in
the recent past.
• hex obfuscation: Characters within a URL can be represented using hexadec-
imal notation, e.g., %2E maps to the . character. This feature was applied
to obfuscate the destination of the URL. (E.g., https: // www. imdb. com →
https: // www. imdb. com@ imdb-go% 2E% 63% 6F% 6D )
URL Shorteners:. Last, we considered URLs served by URL shortening ser-





Our URL corpus comprised 116 URLs in total. While there are many ways to cut our
corpus into classes depending on what hypothesis is being explored, we present the
partition of classes we used the most in Table 6.1. Each of these classes comprised 4
URLs.
Some quick notes:
• In some cases, a class feature varied across class members. We either used
mixed for the feature to indicate this or we used a special tag to indicate what
subset of features were applied. We use short-very long to indicate that the class
contains one instance each of a short URL, medium URL, long URL, and very
long URL. We use medium-very long to indicate that the class contains URLs
that have lengths between medium and very long. Similarly, we use long-very
long to indicate that the class contains URLs that have lengths between long
and very long, respectively.
• For every URL represented by these classes, we technically had two URL images,
one corresponding to the regular and monospaced font features. However, in
the interest of not having a table of twice the size, we leave out this feature. In
the results and analysis, the font we are using in comparisons should be clear.
Section 6.7
Method
In this section, we provide an overview of the experiment, explain the task in fur-
ther detail, state how we selected the participants, and finally, we explain what we
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Class safety length com path other
C1 mixed mixed mixed mixed dummy
C2 safe short com non-path canary
C3 safe short com non-path www
C4 safe short com path www
C5 safe short com non-path non-www, two domain levels
C6 safe short com non-path non-www, three domain levels
C7 safe medium com path
C8 safe long com path
C9 safe very long com path
C10 safe extremely long com path
C11 safe medium non-com non-path
C12 safe long non-com path
C13 safe very long non-com path
C14 safe extremely long non-com path
C15 safe extremely long com mixed gatekeeper
C16 unsafe short-very long com mixed homograph
C17 unsafe short-very long com mixed combosquatting
C18 unsafe short-very long com mixed infix domain
C19 unsafe short-very long non-com mixed wrong TLD
C20 unsafe short-very long com mixed domain-in-domain
C21 unsafe medium-very long com mixed domain-in-domain, hex obfuscation
C22 unsafe short-very long com mixed user@host
C23 unsafe medium-very long com mixed user@host, hex obfuscation
C24 unsafe short com non-path www, positive
C25 unsafe short com non-path www, neutral
C26 unsafe short com non-path www, negative
C27 unsafe long-very long com path redirector
C28 unsafe extremely long com path gatekeeper
C29 unknown short com path url shortener
Table 6.1: A summary of the 29 URL classes.
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measured and how we did the analysis.
6.7.1. Overview
Participants were recruited over Amazon Mechanical Turk between March 15, 2020
and March 16, 2020 to take part in a Human Intelligence Task (HIT)—a (usually
short) task or job to be performed on Amazon Mechanical Turk for payment. The
URL classification task involved classifying URLs and filling in a post-task question-
naire. We received an IRB exemption under Title 45, Subtitle A, Subchapter A, Part
46, Section 104, Category 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations.2 After accepting
the task on Amazon Mechanical Turk, the participant was directed to the platform
Qualtrics [209] to perform the task. Upon completing the task on Qualtrics they were
given a unique code to enter onto Amazon Mechanical Turk as proof of completion.
6.7.2. HIT Details
The HIT could conceptually be divided into two parts: a URL classification task and a
post-task questionnaire. Technically, the whole task was part of a single questionnaire
broken up into different blocks on Qualtrics. The questionnaire included the following
components in the order presented:
• First, participants were shown an informed consent sheet that provided a very
brief summary of the experimental aims, the data we were collecting, how we
planned to use the data, the expected time for completion, and other things one
would expect on such a sheet. Participants knew they were taking part in a task
that involved classifying URLs and they knew the task contained a post-task
questionnaire. Beyond that, they were not privy to experimental details such
as the group they were randomly being assigned to.




• Participants were then presented with brief instructions to set the context and
warn users not to visit any URLs. These instructions read as follows:
“On the following screens you will be presented with a series of both
safe and unsafe links. Imagine that you receive each link in an email
message. For each link, indicate whether or not you believe it is safe
to visit.
Please do not visit any URLs yourself as they may be un-
safe.”
• Next, the participants saw a series of 62 pages, each containing a URL image
and the following question: “Is this URL safe to visit?” They responded by
either clicking a “Yes” button or a “No” button. Figures 6.2 and 6.1 show the
user interface. Qualtrics recorded both the classification for each URL, as well
as the time taken to respond to each URL.
• Finally, the participant was presented with additional questions, which make
up what we call the post-task questionnaire. These additional questions were
designed to collect general demographic information about the participant, to
assess the participant’s security attitudes, to assess the participant’s security
knowledge, to glean insights into the participant’s perceptions regarding URLs
and what they deem reliable indicators of URL security, and to help evaluate
experimental validity. In these preliminary results, we do not analyze responses
to the post-task questionnaire.
We took precautions to improve data reliability. We ran a pilot on 20 users to
gauge whether there were significant order effects. There was a prominent learning
effect in the beginning so we added two additional questions to account for this.
Otherwise, we did not notice order effects in the pilot. For the full experiment, we
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Figure 6.1: An image of the URL classification interface for the Arial font condition
corresponding to URL 3 (URL class C1).
randomized the presentation order of URLs to minimize any order effects that may
have taken place. While we didn’t see an indication of user fatigue toward the end
of the questionnaire, we simplified the wording and removed questions with free-text
answers that would have been interesting to ask but were non-essential, just in case.
We also asked questions to assess internal validity. Last, as noted earlier, we used
canary URLs (C2) to detect unreliable responses.
6.7.3. Participants: Selection Criteria, Payment, Group Assignments, Out-
liers
We recruited participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk. We first ran a pilot on 20
participants to identify any experimental flaws; we do not use any of the data from
the pilot in our results or analysis. In the full experiment we began by selecting only
participants who were from the USA, who had a 99% HIT approval rate or higher,
and who had completed 500 or more HITs. However, we didn’t seem to be getting
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Figure 6.2: An image of the URL classification interface for the Go Mono font
condition corresponding to URL 3 (URL class C1).
many responses. After the twenty-ninth participant, we changed the requirement of
a 99% HIT approval rate to 96%. We obtained 240 participants over the course of
two days, April 15–16, 2020. We paid all participants, but we did not use the data
for 24 of the 240 participants during analysis as they classified one or more canary
URLs (C2) incorrectly.
We told participants it would take approximately 10 minutes to complete the
task. This time was calculated based on the results of a pilot run. We used the
effective minimum wage of $11.80 [207] as a basis for setting the payment amount of
$2.00; Amazon charged a $0.80 overhead for each HIT. In the interest of sharing what
we’ve learned after we began performing this experiment, we note that, although we
used Amazon Mechanical Turk for our study, there exist alternatives, including ones
designed with research in mind. For example, Profilic claims they are a more ethical




Participants were assigned to one of four groups. Each group was shown 62 images
of URLs with equal representation of URLs from each class. Each group was shown
all four URLs from class C1 (dummy URLs), all four URLs from class C2 (canary
URLs), and two of the four URLs from each of the remaining 27 classes. The average
length of URLs were approximately the same between the groups.
The first two groups were shown URL images that used the regular font (Arial).
Web browsers use the sans-serif font for displaying text in address bars and status
bars. We picked Arial since it has been used as a default sans-serif font on Firefox,
Chrome, and Edge on Windows. [69] Mac OS X has used Helvetica as the default
sans-serif font on their browsers and Ubuntu has used the font called sans-serif. While
browser fonts change over time, as far as we can tell, many browsers still use these
fonts or fonts that are visually similar to them. The weakness of all these fonts is that
they present URLs in a fashion that makes users susceptible to ASCII homograph
attacks. Namely, the lowercase version of l and uppercase version of i look extremely
similar—and the rn character string looks similar to m . As many users interact
with web browsers and check their email using web-based email services, it seemed
appropriate to use Arial for our study.
The third group and fourth group were presented with URL images that used the
monospaced font (Go Mono). Monospaced fonts have a fixed width. While the two
fonts are dissimilar, the most notable difference is that the the character strings used
in the ASCII homograph attacks we mentioned earlier are likely easier to detect with
the monospaced font.
6.7.5. Measures and Analysis
To do statistics, we measures three things:
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• The first measure, classification correctness, represents whether a URL is clas-
sified correctly by a participant; it takes a value of 1 if the participant classified
the URL correctly and 0 otherwise.
• The second measure, the time spent to classify the URL, is the number of
seconds that elapsed between the URL’s presentation and when the user first
clicked the safe or unsafe button.
• The third measure, the time spent per character to classify the URL, is simply
the time spent to classify the URL divided by the number of characters in the
URL.
While we did not do so in this preliminary analysis, in the full work, we will check
for and remove outliers regarding temporal data. During some URL classifications,
participants may have been distracted by a crying child, stepped away to take a call
or get a glass of water, and so forth, translating to an extremely long classification
time. While the data does not suggest such instances happened often, such instances
would have had a large impact on any aggregate statistics we did if we did not account
for them.
Analysis was done in R. We applied Pearson’s chi-squared test with R’s version
of Yates’ continuity correction using the chisq.test function.
Section 6.8
Results
Figures 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 show key findings as a function of the URL class with the
regular font and monospaced font differences shown with separate bars.
First, we calculated the median length of safe URLs, excluding safe gatekeeper
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Figure 6.5: Median time taken to classify per character vs. class condition.
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comparing classification correctness of URLs shorter than the median length with
correctness of URLs longer than the median length. We found that there was a
significant difference between the classifications (χ2 = 53.13, p = 3.121∗10−13). Using
the same approach for unsafe URLs, again excluding gatekeeper URLs (C16–C27),
we also saw a significant difference (χ2 = 46.598, p = 38.716 ∗ 10−12).
We compared the responses for positive unsafe URLs (C24) with negative unsafe
URLs (C26). We found a statistically significant difference between the two (χ2 =
33.364, p = 7.643 ∗ 10−9).
We compared the responses for safe gatekeeper URLs (C15) with the responses
for unsafe gatekeeper URLs (C26). We found no statistically significant difference
between the two (χ2 = 0.06065, p = 0.8055).
We also compared responses between monospaced and regular fonts for unsafe
homograph URLs (C16) and found that there was a statistically significant difference
between the two (χ2 = 20.849, 4.969 ∗ 10−6).
Section 6.9
Analysis
Our results support hypotheses H1, H3, and H4, but we do not have evidence to
support hypothesis H2, as seen in Table 6.2. The Pearson’s chi-squared test showed
no significant difference between the safe gatekeeper URLs and unsafe gatekeeper
URLs with regard to responses. However, not all users knew of the gatekeeper services
and this requires further inquiry. We note that the time taken to parse gatekeeper
URLs was also extremely low; this may suggest that people give up on trying to
classify gatekeeper URLs fairly quickly due to the sheer amount of complexity involved
in parsing them.




H1 : Participants are better at classifying safe short URLs than they
are at classifying long URLs..
True
H2 : Participants respond to safe and unsafe gatekeeper URLs differ-
ently.
False
H3 : Participants classify unsafe positive-valence URLs as safe more
than they do unsafe negative-valence URLs.
True
H4 : Participants more accurately identify unsafe URLs in monospaced
font than they do unsafe URLs in a regular font.
True
Table 6.2: Results of our hypotheses. This table explains which hypotheses we
found evidence to support.
tion in time taken per character as URL length increases. This, again, may suggest
that complex URLs make people give up prematurely. However, from Figure 6.4, the
preliminary results do not suggest a peak in time taken to classify URLs, as we had
seen with long, complex URLs in the eye-tracking study from the previous chapter.
That said, this is only preliminary analysis; we have not fully removed outliers related
to classification time.
We were surprised to see that participants performed worst on short URLs with
positive, neutral, and negative valence (C14, C15, C16) given that these URLs do not
involve some sophisticated URL obfuscation technique.
Section 6.10
Limitations
As with any study of this kind, there are a number of limitations. Below, We state
these limitations and what steps we have taken to address them below.
We have only presented preliminary analysis. Most notably, the temporal results
and analysis are quite rough and require further removal of outliers.
We included four dummy URLs at the beginning of our study that were not
used for analysis. These URLs were just meant to acclimatize the participant to
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the interface and reduce learning effects. All participants saw the exact same 4
dummy URLs. So, there is the risk that exposure to those URLs may have impacted
users’ classifications for URLs that appeared later in the experiment, as well as the
time taken to classify those URLs. Based on the pilot runs, however, we did not see
significant order effects other than those associated with simply learning the interface.
So, we felt the inclusion of dummy URLs is a net benefit with regard to experimental
validity.
Ignoring the results of anyone who incorrectly classified a URL in class C2 may
have biased our results. Some users may have legitimately felt the URLs should be
classified as unsafe. Overall, we felt it was best to remove data associated with these
participants as there was a higher risk of the data being unreliable if we had included
them.
Any notion of URL safety will have flaws. We discuss and justify our notions of
safety at length in Subsection 6.5.1.
URLs were displayed in images and many spanned multiple lines, which may have
affected the way users parsed them. In practice, URLs are displayed across either
one or more lines depending on the application domain. This may limit the external
validity.
There may have been order effects. However, we did not observe order effects in
the pilot, aside from the initial learning phase. And we randomized the order as a
precautionary measure.
Research has shown the demographics of MTurk workers are not representative
of the general population, e.g., [53]. For example, there is a skew toward people who
make less money, who are male, and who are younger. We do not claim that the
subpopulation of users we looked at is fully representative of all users, but we do feel
it’s a reasonable approximation.
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There is the concern that workers may not have taken the task seriously. However,
we took precautions by using selection criteria that required participants to have
completed 500 or more tasks with a HIT rate of above 96%. We also used canary
URLs in class C2 to detect and remove participant data that seemed unreliable.
Additionally, we note that there is a strong incentive for MTurk workers to take the
task seriously as their performance on each HIT is, in general, tied to their likelihood
of getting work on the platform in the future.
Participants may behave differently in the real world. We tried to ensure that
the context was clear and that the phrasing was easy to understand. We also asked
questions to get respondents’ perceptions of their performance relative to their per-
formance in the real world. Participants generally said that they performed the
experimental task as they would outside of the experimental context. That said, sur-
vey data is not always reliable, and we do expect people likely erred on the side of
caution in our study. This sort of limitation is common to studies of this kind.
The phishing attacks did not perfectly resemble attacks in the wild. While we did
consult phishing corpora and other studies to get an idea of the range of attacks used
in practice, we created many URLs ourselves with the aim of understanding how users
perceive and respond to URLs. Our focus was not on understanding exactly how sus-
ceptible users are to existing URL obfuscation URLs, but rather their susceptibility
to URL obfuscation techniques in general and how various features affect susceptibil-
ity. With this aim in mind, we felt it was better to construct URLs of a certain form
instead of just using URLs from, say, Phishtank [137]. This is a common approach
used in other studies, e.g., [6]. We discuss this topic further in Subsection 6.5.1.
Once a user selected a response to a URL, the response was locked in and they
had no opportunity to revise their response. Though the dummy URLs should have
helped in acclimatizing the user to the interface, there will be a small fraction of
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incorrect classifications due to this decision. Overall, we felt that the benefits of
reducing user fatigue and reducing unintended order effects justified our approach.
Additionally, given that only a small fraction of users misclassified canary URLs for
any reason, we do not believe this decision produced many misclassifications. Also,




In this chapter, we presented our preliminary results from an ongoing study on how
users assess URLs. Based on the initial results, it does not seem like participants
treated gatekeeper that had safe URLs embedded in them as a redirect link signif-
icantly differently than gatekeeper URLs that had unsafe URLs embedded in them
as a redirect link. Participants classified simple URLs containing a domain name
that comprised two English words, possibly hyphenated, as safe much higher than
we were expecting; and the valence of the words seemed to have an impact on how
participants classified the URL, as we did expect. As one might expect, monospaced
fonts had a large impact on users’ ability to detect homograph attacks; however, it
was not as large of a difference as we expected.
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A Logic for Mismorphisms
Security problems often stem from differential representations of reality wherein some-
thing that holds in one representation fails to hold in another. Our team chose the
term mismorphisms to express these disconnects. This thesis is very much a study of
mismorphisms; we have sought to learn why they occur, to study their ramifications,
and to develop solutions that may help eliminate them or at least mitigate their ef-
fects. In this chapter, we focus on our recent work on mismorphisms. First, we briefly
review a semiotic model we used earlier to represent mismorphisms, primarily to cap-
ture circumvention scenarios. We then motivate and discuss our more recent work
on building a logical representation of mismorphisms. Finally, we demonstrate how
this logical representation can be used to classify the underlying causes of a variety
of real-world security issues.
Section 7.1
Introduction
Security problems often arise from one or more mismatches between what people
believe about something, the representation of that thing within, say, a system or
document, and the reality regarding that thing: A security practitioner may choose
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a password composition policy because they think it will promote the creation of
strong passwords, overlooking the frustration it will cause users in practice and how
that frustration may induce circumvention. A user’s interpretation of security infor-
mation may diverge from how a security practitioner expects the user to interpret
that information. A security vulnerability in code may reflect a disconnect between
implementors’ and designers’ assumptions. A system may assume data that is input
into the system is expressed using a given type or unit of measurement, but depend-
ing on local context, that it may differ. If we dive deep enough, security problems
almost always come down to one or more mismatches or, more precisely, what we call
mismorphisms—“mappings that fail to preserve structure” [180].
If mismorphisms indeed lie at the heart of security issues, then understanding
mismorphisms, developing a suitable model to express them, and then cataloging
them may help in eliminating them or at least dealing with the problems stemming
from them. In this chapter, we seek to build a simple, flexible, and usable model for
expressing the underlying causes of security issues. We begin by reviewing our earlier
work on mismorphisms, which utilized semiotic triads to model circumvention scenar-
ios. We then explain our thought process for extending this work to create a logical
model of mismorphisms, and we present this logical model. We then demonstrate
how this logical model is capable of capturing the underlying causes of a variety of
security problems, discuss directions for future work, and conclude.
Section 7.2
A Brief Background on Semiotics
Semiotics is the study of signs, processes that involve signs, and how meaning is
conveyed through signs [210]. A sign may be a sound, an image, a smell, or anything
else from which a sentient being extracts meaning. For a simple example, a person
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may see a stop sign while driving and know that means they should slow down and
come to a stop. Semiotic models aim to explain these and other phenomena. Two of
the most prevalent semiotic models are: the dyadic model proposed by Ferdinand de
Saussure, which includes a signifier and a signified; and the triadic model proposed
by Charles Sanders Peirce, which includes a sign, an object, and an interpretant. [44].
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [131] provides a primer on Peirce’s work.
Ogden and Richards presented the semiotic triad [132, 202] to capture the rela-
tionship between three nodes: the referent (the thing being referred to), the thought
or reference (the object evoked by the referent), and the symbol (the object used to
represent the thought), as seen in Figure 7.1. When a writer writes, the referent—
the thing the writer is trying to express—induces a thought based on the writer’s
knowledge of language, who the writer thinks the reader will be and how they might
interpret it, the writer’s state of mind, and so forth. The thought evokes a symbol
that is supposed to express the referent. Similarly, when a reader reads a word, the
word or symbol evokes a thought based on the reader’s general knowledge, their un-
derstanding of the context in which the word is used, and so forth. The thought is
then internalized as a referent. A causal relation is established between the word (the
symbol) and the thought (the reference). And a relation is also established between
the thought (the reference) and the the referent. However, there is no direct relation
between the symbol and the referent. Instead, there is an imputed relation estab-
lished through the two sides of the triangle, not the base. Thus, we have the semiotic
triad.
Before discussing our earlier work in building a semiotic triad for mismorphisms,
we review some related work at the intersection of semiotics and HCI. Weir [194]
discusses the need for semiotic approaches to understanding man-machine communi-
cation. Souze et al. [51] outline desired properties when designing software, advocate
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Figure 7.1: The semiotic triad. This public domain image is taken from [202] and
appears on page 11 of the original 1923 publication of Ogden and Richards’s The
Meaning of Meaning [132].
for using semiotic engineering for HCI, and outline one approach. Ferreira et al. [60]
look at how semiotics can be used to understand redesigns of user interfaces. They
analyze three instances of redesign of a sign that is part of a user interface, and they
briefly look at the contributing factors and propose that such examinations can lead
to better user interface design. Andersen [12] enumerates a number of challenges
semiotics-based HCI design can help address, including: “making HCI more coher-
ent”, “exploiting insights from older media,” “defining the characteristic properties
of the computer medium,” and “situating the HCI-systems in a broader context.”
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Section 7.3
A Semiotic Representation of Mismorphisms
In this section, we (very) briefly review our earlier work on mismorphisms [180]. 1
The usage of mismorphism in this section is slightly different from the usage in the
logical representation we later discuss. However, the essence of the two are the same;
in both sections, we seek to capture how security problems arise.
As noted earlier, our semiotic model of mismorphisms is based on Ogden and
Richard’s semiotic triad that we covered in the previous section. This model is built
with the intent of expressing circumvention scenarios. We replace the referent with a
reality, the thought with a mental model, and the symbol with an IT representation
as seen in Figure 7.2. In this representation,
• The reality corresponds to some truth in the real world, e.g., what actions a
user may actually perform.
• The mental model corresponds to a party’s beliefs regarding what the reality
should be, e.g., what an admin thinks a user’s permissions should be.
• The IT system representation expresses the reality as expressed in the IT sys-
tem, e.g., what permissions are given to a user.
Unlike Ogden and Richards’s semiotic triad, each side of the triangle now exists
and links two nodes. However, this linkage is unidirectional and expresses a single
mapping between representations: The reality informs the mental model. A change
in the mental model may drive a party to change the IT system itself. And a change
to the IT system generates a new reality. For example, a security administrator
1Please note that we are not treating this work [180] not as a primary thesis contribution, but as
essential related work.
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Symbol Referent
Thought
IT System Representation Reality
Mental Model
Figure 7.2: A triad for capturing circumvention scenarios.
may observe a reality in which users leave a machine unattended. This observation
leads the security practitioner to the belief that there should be automatic timeouts.
Thus, the security administrator may implement a policy within the IT system that
automatically logs the user out if the IT system detects the user is away. And this, in
turn, creates a new reality. Now, the user may become dissatisfied with this reality,
e.g., because it gets in the way of delivering patient care. This reality will then drive
the user to think of a way to circumvent the system. The user may then modify the IT
system by, say, by attaching a mouse jiggler to the computer, which in turn generates
a new reality. (In our original paper [180], there was a unidirectional relation from
the mental model to the IT system representation. However, in practice, this may be
bidirectional. That is, the IT system representation may inform one’s mental model.
This can be an important source of security vulnerabilities if security personnel rely
not on the reality but the IT system representation of the reality to make future
decisions.)
In semiotics, there is interest in morphisms, instances where predicates hold the
same truth value across representations. However, as highlighted in the example we
just discussed, what is of interest to us are instances where predicates take on different
truth values across nodes of the triad. We call these mismorphisms. The remainder
of the paper focused on exploring different classes of mismorphisms and cataloging
them using the semiotic model we had developed. We found the model extremely
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effective in classifying circumvention scenarios.
Section 7.4
Beyond the Semiotic Triad Model of
Mismorphisms
At the beginning of this chapter we posited that a notion of mismorphisms is powerful
enough to capture the underlying causes of several security issues. In this section,
we present the justification for a slightly different notion of mismorphisms using an
alternative model that is grounded not in semiotic triads but in logic.
The semiotic model from the previous section is perfect for modeling the security
circumvention scenarios we examined. However, it also somewhat constrained in
representing other scenarios. Our rationale for developing an alternative model rooted
in logic is as follows:
• Semiotic triads are effective in modeling scenarios where a human is interacting
with a single system. The human sees the reality, thinks, and creates or modifies
the system accordingly. However, things get messy when, for example, we
consider multiple systems, some of which the user does not directly interact
with. [180]
• Some more complicated security phenomena may require more machinery to
represent. In particular, it may be useful to add a temporal dimension and
to consider the effects of chaining together mismorphisms, e.g., to capture the
propagation of a local security issue upward. Visually, this can become difficult
to represent.
• In our semiotic representation of mismorphisms, we used mathematical logic to
express the underlying predicates. Extending the notion of mismorphisms to
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a purely logical model while retaining the spirit of the semiotic representation
seems natural.
These beliefs led us to construct the logical representation of mismorphisms pre-
sented in the next section.
Section 7.5
A Logical Representation of Mismorphisms
We now discuss our recent work on building a logical representation for mismorphisms.
This representation blends temporal logic with the idea of multiple interpreters. Fol-
lowing this section, we demonstrate how this logical model can be used to classify
underlying causes of a diverse set of security issues.
For the rest of this chapter, we will refer to a mismorphism as a difference in in-
terpretation of a predicate between two or more interpreters. That is, we can think of
different interpreters (e.g., a person, a system, a document, code) interpreting propo-
sitions or predicates about the world. In general, it is good when the interpretations
agree and are in accordance with reality. However, when a predicate takes different
truth values across different interpretations, we have a mismorphism, which may be
a cause for concern.
We use the words predicate and interpretation in similar—albeit, not identical—
manners to the common formal-logic meanings, e.g., as presented by Aho and Ull-
man [5]. However, instead of a binary logic, we use a ternary logic similar to Kleene’s
ternary logic [93, 62]. 2 We refer to a predicate as a function of zero or more variables
whose codomain is {T, F, U} where T is true, F is false, and U is uncertain/unknown.
We refer to an interpretation of a predicate as an assignment of values (which may
include U) to variables, which results in the predicate being interpreted as T , F , or
2We do not specify a specific ternary logic system for evaluating predicates in this chapter.
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U . A predicate is interpreted as T if after substituting all variables for their truth
values, the predicate is determined to be T ; it is interpreted as F if after substituting
all variables for their truth values, the predicate is determined to be F ; if we are
unable to determine whether the predicate is T or F , the predicate is interpreted as
U .
The interpretation must be done by someone (or perhaps something) and that
entity is called the interpreter. In our model, we have a special interpreter, the oracle
O, who interprets the predicate as it is in reality (in instances where there is some
ground truth). Some interpreters may not have adequate information to assign values
to the variables that result in the predicate being interpreted as T or F . It is is in
these instances that the predicate may be interpreted as U . We use P |A to denote
the interpretation of predicate P by interpreter A.
To represent mismorphisms we need a way to express scenarios where two or or
more interpreters diverge in their interpretations of a predicate. That is we must
define relations on the interpreters’ interpretations of a predicate. Ergo, we introduce
the notion of an interpretation relation.
Predicate (Interpretation Relation) Interpreters
Each interpretation relation is a k-ary relation where k >= 2 denotes the number
of interpreters involved—and the k-ary relation is over the interpretations of the pred-
icate by the k interpreters. The three classes of interpretation relations we are con-
cerned with in this chapter are: the interpretation-equivalence relations ( =
interp
), the
interpretation-uncertainty relations ( ?=
interp
), and the interpretation-inequivalence
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relations ( ×=
interp
).3 The interpretation relations4 we examine are defined as follows,
where each P represents a predicate and each Ai represents an interpreter:
• P =
interp
A1, A2, . . . Ak if and only if P , as interpreted by each Ai, has a truth




A1, A2, . . . Ak if and only if P takes on the value U when interpreted
by at least one Ai.
• P ×=
interp
A1, A2, . . . Ak if and only if P interpreted by Ai is T and P interpreted
by Aj is F for some i 6= j.
There are a few important observations to note. One is that the oracle O always
holds the correct truth value for the predicate by definition. Another is that if we
only know the ?=
interp
relation applies, we won’t know which interpreter is uncertain
about the predicate or even how many interpreters are uncertain unless k = 2 and
one interpreter is the oracle. Similarly, if we only know that the ×=
interp
relation
applies, we do not know where the mismatch lies unless k = 2. That said, knowledge
that the oracle O always holds the correct interpretation, where we are dealing with
facts, combined with other information can help specify where the uncertainty or
inequivalence stems from. Of course, the formalism could also be changed to allow a
bit more flexibility here, but we didn’t see the need. Last, the =
interp
relation will




interpretations are true; however, P ?=
interp




A1, . . . Ak may simulatenously be true.
3Note that for k = 2, if we confine ourselves to predicates that take on only T or F values, the
relation =
interp.
is an equivalence relation in the mathematical sense, as one might expect, i.e., it obeys
reflexivity, commutativity, and transitivity.
4Technically, they are classes of interpretation relations, but this will get tedious for me to write
and you to read.
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The purpose of this model is to to capture mismorphisms. Mismorphisms corre-
spond to instances where either the interpretation-uncertainty relation or interpretation-
inequivalence relation apply.
It may be valuable to consider some natural extensions to this logical formalism.
In select cases, we may want to consider multiple interpreters of the same role. In
these instances, we could assign subscripts to distinguish roles, e.g., D, I1, I2, O. Also,
there are temporal aspects that may be relevant. Predicates can be functions of time
and so can the interpretations. While we use the vt-style notation to represent a
variable as a function of time within a predicate, we may also consider the interpreter
as a function of time, e.g., I t34 means the interpretation is done by implementor I4 at
time t = t3. We do not use all of these extensions in this presentation, but if we were
to create a larger catalog, they would serve useful.
Section 7.6
A Catalog of Mismorphisms
In this section, we discuss numerous examples of mismorphisms, classified by their
general form. First, some remarks:
• The categories are not disjoint; some mismorphisms may be placed in two or
more categories. We chose the one that seemed most appropriate.
• Some mismorphisms may be linked. For example, one mismorphism may lie
at the heart of another or perhaps two mismorphisms contribute to a single
security issue. This makes sense as many security issues have multiple layers of
complexity. We discuss this issue more in the following section.
• We also note that there are multiple ways to do this classification. For exam-
ple, another natural approach may be to choose the categories based on their
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application domain or security and privacy context.
• Our focus here is on applying mismorphisms to a number of new security and
privacy issues in different domains.
7.6.1. Breakdown of Implication
In certain circumstances, an interpreter may believe a conditional statement that fails
to hold in practice—or vice versa, they may not believe a conditional statement holds
when it does hold in practice. That is, we may have something of form:
(X =⇒ Y ) ×=
interp
A,O
Consider the following examples:
• A prevailing belief is that users are privacy pragmatists who willingly make an
informed decision to give up their privacy in exchange for services. [56] This
argument, in other words, assumes that the decision to use a service implies
the user is making an informed choice. Work by Draper [56], as well as by
others [74, 97, 135, 189, 190] call this view into question. Draper argues that
many users feel their privacy is gone and so they resign to giving up control
over their data privacy.
• Turow et al [189] found that 65% of respondents to a survey believed that the
existence of a privacy policy on a site meant the site would not share their
information unless they gave explicit permission.
• It is often assumed that adding a privacy option on a service will only improve
users’ privacy. However, the user’s determination of a privacy option may,
itself, leak information. For example, Lewis et al. note that both options not to
share or share information correlate with other demographic information. [112].
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(This point provides further justification for an opt-in approach to privacy over
an opt-out one, especially in situations where most users stick with defaults.)
Alternatively, the implication operation could be correct, but X may not hold,
meaning nothing can be inferred about Y . (Or perhaps, we may observe the opposite
direction where both the relation and X hold in practice but not within someone’s
mental model.)








• A security practitioner may assume that any user of a service who wishes to
change their privacy settings will be able to do so if they know about them—and
the security practitioner may further assume the user knows about the existence
of those settings. In some cases, even if the former holds, the latter does not.
7.6.2. Temporal Effects
Time may influence how predicates are evaluated. An individual may lack the fore-
sight to identify these temporal effects.




• As an employee changes roles, their permissions may accumulate, whereas a
security practitioner might expect the permissions to be adjusted according to
the role. [175]
• Time-of-check–time-of-use (toctou) bugs [211] occur when there is a delay be-
tween when something is checked and when it is used. The delay means that
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operations may be performed on input that used to satisfy certain properties,
but no longer does so. It reflects an oversight on the part of the developer.
• Shotgun parsing [39] involves scattering the parser code—the code responsible
for vetting the input to a program—across a program, which results in code
being executed before it is recognized. Vulnerabilities that exist in code that
are attributable the shotgun parser anti-pattern can be classified under this
class of mismorphisms.
• An analog of time-of-check–time-of-use for the privacy domain is time-of-configure–
time-of-use: The user may configure their privacy settings on a social network-
ing service once, when they begin using a service. However, over time, people
may join or leave the service, leaving their privacy choices outdated. Available
privacy options may also change over time.
• Gaw and Felten argue that the user may choose to reuse a password for an
account—i.e., select a weak password before that account is associated with
sensitive information—and, by the time that account has accrued information,
“they’re locked into their reused password.” [65].
• A similar phenomenon may be true with privacy settings. Namely, the user may
choose privacy settings before sensitive information is tied to their account. By
the time sensitive information is tied to their account, the user may no longer
think about privacy. Moreover, in instances where the user does contemplate
reconfiguring privacy settings, there’s a possibility that the data in question
may be perceived to already be lost and, therefore, not worth protecting.
• On the other hand, some users may have already invested significant time or
effort in selecting a piece of software, downloading it, and installing it before
they configure their privacy settings, compelling them to continue using the
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service even if it does not meet their privacy needs. That is, they may fall
victim to the sunk cost fallacy [15]. Had they known of the invasive privacy
settings beforehand, they may have chosen to go with a competitor.
7.6.3. A Knowledge Gap
In certain circumstances, an actor’s lack of knowledge about how to interpret in-
formation may contribute to a security issue. Here, P may be a statement about,
say, a system, and the interpreter may be ill-equipped to evaluate the truth of that




• Users may lack the requisite information to make informed decisions, often
because that information is simply not available. It is not always clear how
services safeguard user data, nor the intricacies of how that data is used in
practice. Privacy policies exist, but may be exorbitantly time-consuming to
read and difficult to digest [130, 115]. Moreover, they are often vague and
usually subject to change. A pessimist might argue that in practice many
existing interfaces and privacy policies ensure users remain uninformed while
presenting the veneer of informed consent, thereby persuading their users and
other actors that user data is in good hands. Another concern is that primary
services or third-party services may violate privacy policies, terms of service,
or users’ privacy expectations. This may even be compounded by a delay in
reporting violations. Collectively, these and other factors support the argument
that most users do not— and, at least in the current privacy landscape cannot—
have a concrete understanding of how their data is used.
• A user may lack the capability to come to a determination regarding the safety of
a URL (e.g., shortened URLs, gatekeeper URLs), the legitimacy of an email, or
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the meaning of certificate information. While some users may seek information
that informs their mental model, others may fall back on insecure behavior
because it’s less effort and potentially a lower perceived cost than alternatives.
Even if a user seeks out information, it is possible that they may consult a
resource that provides inaccurate information.
7.6.4. Projections
An interpreter A’s interpretation of how interpreter B would interpret a predicate P




We recognize that there is a slight abuse of notation here. To resolve this, we can
simply substitute P |B with “B’s interpretation of P ,” to avoid the double-meaning of
P |B—or we could create a wrapper. Recall the oracle is always correct and so their
interpretation of P |B align with what P |B actually is. In any case, here is an example
of such a mismorphism:
• Actual and perceived time and effort to configure privacy settings may influence
whether the user begins configuring them and whether they finish. For exam-
ple, the user may be dissuaded from using an interface that appears illogical,
complex, or hard to navigate. Or, as we mentioned earlier, they may simply
lack the requisite knowledge to make meaningful decisions that align with their
intentions. The security practitioner or others may perceive users’ effort to con-
figure their privacy settings to be minimal or ignore them all together and view
the option of configuration as a binary choice.
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Section 7.7
Peeling the Layers of Mismorphisms
In the previous section, we presented a (simplified) catalog of mismorphisms that are
responsible for a variety of security problems. However, the power of mismorphisms
as an explanatory model comes from the ability to both break down a mismorphism
and study its ramifications. Identifying these causal relations allows us deconstruct
and learn from existing security problems.
For example, why might a user wrongly classify an unsafe URL as safe? Well, one
reason may be that their mental model of where the URL goes is flawed [6]. This can
be captured as a mismorphism between security properties of the URL in the system
representation and the security properties of the URL within the user’s mental repre-
sentation. But why does that mismorphism exist? It may be a purely visual problem,
due to a poor choice of font, which can be expressed as a mismorphism between the
user’s mental representation and the information shown in the real-world and/or a
mismorphism between the system representation and the information shown in the
real-world, depending on where the problem lies. Or perhaps the user correctly in-
terprets what characters are on the screen, but fails to extract the correct security
information from those characters; this again can be represented as a mismorphism
between the URL specification (or, more precisely, the layers of systems involved in
resolving the URL and delivering content to the user) and the user’s mental represen-
tation. But we could again ask: why is there a mismorphism between a user’s mental
model of URL structure and the way users are resolved in practice? And so on.
Ultimately, it is this process of recursive deconstruction of mismorphisms that re-
veals why a security problem truly exists. Understanding mismorphisms and the links
between them is essential in addressing many of the security problems faced today.
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One way to logically represent this is to consider mismorphisms as an expression and
define relations and operators on mismorphisms, notably the incorporation of causal
relations.
The addition of causal relations bring us one step closer to being able to represent
the semiotic-triad-based model, though it contains no explicit actions. Approaches
such as supplementing the notion of mismorphisms discussed here with, say, events,
may provide this additional flexibility. But this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Section 7.8
Conclusion
Recognizing the mismorphisms that produce the intent-outcome mismatches is crit-
ical in addressing those mismatches. In this chapter, we pursued a logical model of
mismorphisms to complement our earlier work on representing mismorphisms using
semiotic triads. We reviewed the earlier semiotic triad representation, provided ratio-
nale for developing a new model, introduced our logical representation, cataloged a
variety of mismorphisms, and discussed how security problems could be represented




In this concluding chapter, we very briefly review the aims of this thesis, discuss our
contributions, and highlight key themes and takeaways that emerged over the course
of our work. Last, we give our final thoughts.
Section 8.1
Chapter Contributions
The purpose of this thesis was to better understand why intent-outcome mismatches
exist, to model them, and to develop solutions that help address them. The thesis
covered six primary chapters, each corresponding to a project that makes a bit of
headway toward this grand objective:
Chapter 2 Contributions We examined Amazon reviews for password logbooks;
these reviews illustrate how well-intentioned password policies can prompt user
circumvention and potentially undermine security objectives. They also shed
light on the struggles regular users have in managing passwords, the perceptions
and misperceptions they hold, and the failures of some existing security solu-
tions. This work demonstrates the sheer amount of user insights we can get by
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scraping freely available data supplied by and about users. There’s also a strong
argument to be made that such reviews are voluntary and provided with little
or no provocation, leading to more genuine responses than, say, a questionnaire
may produce; on the flip side, they are less structured and the subpopulation
of people reviewers may be skewed. While we did not adopt sophisticated au-
tomated techniques to process the data, doing so would further improve this
approach. The data gathered through such studies can be extremely valuable
in informing security decisions.
Chapter 3 Contributions We developed an agent-based password simulation to
model password behavior and help choose a password composition policy within
an organization. In response to password composition policies over different
services, agents manage their passwords by memorizing them. They also write
them down and reuse them to cope with the burden of complying with the
policies of the many services with which they interact. These sorts of simulations
serve as a pathway for decision-makers to reason about security policies and
make sound decisions that achieve their intentions. They reveal how certain
security decisions affect user and organizational objectives and provide a way
to compare security solutions. They may even highlight instances where a
system is unusable or indicate user inclination to circumvent even when specific
circumventive techniques are unknown.
Chapter 4 Contributions We introduced the notion of human-computability bound-
aries to complement existing work in the field of language-theoretic security
(LangSec). LangSec delivers a process for security design and development of
parsers and protocols. However, the security of this process still very much
depends on humans. We discussed ways that people fail in practice, posited
that incorporating human-computability boundaries into the LangSec method-
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ology could provide a more complete solution, and suggested threads for future
work. This exploration lays the foundation for future research threads that can
help system designers and implementors build systems that achieve the security
properties they desire.
Chapter 5 Contributions We conducted a study where participants were tasked
with classifying a series of URLs while wearing an eye tracker. The eye-tracking
data we collected tells us about how users visually process URLs. Additionally,
as task-invoked pupillary response reflects an increased cognitive load, the data
also tell us something about users’ cognitive processes. Our findings could be
used to improve security awareness training, to inform how organizations choose
URLs so as to improve users’ security perceptions of them, and to improve
security defenses. Our findings essentially tell us how to bridge the gap between
what URLs users think is safe and what actually is safe.
Chapter 6 Contributions To complement our eye-tracking study, we also con-
ducted a large-scale study over MTurk to get a better handle on various factors
that influence URL processing, specifically location, language, and font. We
also examined which flavors of URL attacks are most effective. Similarly to the
eye-tracking study, this study provides valuable insights into how users perceive
URLs, which can be used to improve security.
Chapter 7 Contributions Finally, we used a logical representation to express mis-
morphisms. This representation serves as a natural way to express intent-
outcome mismatches, which are the focus of this thesis. Mismorphisms often
manifest as security problems, e.g., as undesirable user behavior or vulnera-
bilities in code. We demonstrated the value of our logical representation in





While each chapter provided its own contributions, there are also a number of impor-
tant recurring themes that emerged in our collective pursuit that warrant discussion.
And so, we discuss them here.
8.2.1. Unusable Security Decisions Often Induce User Circumvention
Time and time again, we observe that unusable security solutions are ineffective.
Sure, unusable and stringent security solutions may “work” in the short-term, but
that is usually at the cost of driving up user frustration, getting in the way of user
workflow, impeding progress toward other organizational objectives, and reducing
user tolerance for complying with future demands. Often, in addition to the afore-
mentioned problems that unusable security solutions create, the solution is actually
no solution at all; users become so frustrated that they circumvent and defeat the se-
curity policy or mechanism altogether. In some circumstances, the circumvention not
only negates any expected security gains but it actually reduces aggregate security
because the previously deployed solution was at least somewhat effective. Or perhaps
the circumvention is so good that it fools security practitioners into thinking all is
well, preventing them from implementing more usable solutions, ones that may have
initially had lower expected security gains but would have resulted in higher actual
gains.
8.2.2. Unusable Security Solutions May Create New Security Problems
In some cases, we not only find that security solutions worsen aggregate security
but that the circumvention strategies that users develop create wholly new security
problems. It’s important to recognize that such problems do not just spontaneously
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appear. And they are not usually due to evil users. [4] They are the consequences
of unusable security policies or mechanisms, ineffective communication between secu-
rity personnel and users, and myopia. Various techniques, including those presented
throughout this thesis, can help address these problems.
8.2.3. Implicit Training
Users’ mental models and security behaviors are informed by their previous interac-
tions with services. Services have significant control over how these interactions play
out. Services determine the password policies users must satisfy, which affects the
actual and perceived cognitive burden associated with remembering passwords and
also affects user notions of what constitutes a safe password. Services supply users
with the URLs that inform users’ mental models regarding what constitutes a safe
URL. Services send emails that inform users’ mental models of what constitutes a
safe email. Services that heavily use Javascript or otherwise require browser secu-
rity settings to be lowered for proper functionality mean users have to either jump
through hoops to stay safe on the service or opt for the most lax security settings.
That is, services—in choosing what password policies to apply, what URLs to
serve, which email addresses to send emails from, whether to use attachments in
emails, which security settings they require users to disable, whether to require users
to share information to access things, and so forth—are implicitly training users.
These kinds of interactions shape user notions of what information is acceptable to
share, what security precautions should be heeded, when to ignore security warnings,
who to trust, and so forth.
For the most part, security research is divorced from this implicit training. Secu-
rity problems are often attributed to user ignorance, frustration, laziness, or misbehavior—
or perhaps the practice of the single service on which the problem arose. However,
much of users’ beliefs and behaviors are inculcated through routine interactions with
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the many services they use. An interesting, under-explored research question that
has emerged over the course of this work is: how can we identify and improve this
implicit training?
8.2.4. The Security Dependency
As mentioned in our previous work on mismorphisms [180], the security practices of
one service can have a notable impact on the aggregate security of another organi-
zation. That is, we mustn’t only take an organization-centric view of security. It
is critical to acknowledge and account for both the implicit and overt training users
have received from other services and the user data available to other services or
elsewhere. A commonly used phrase by security researchers and practitioners alike
is “users are the weakest link.” But a commonly overlooked question is: “what led
them to become the weakest link?” This thesis attempted to unravel some of the
interdependencies between services with regard to security. However, more must be
done.
8.2.5. Collective Action
Some of the worst security problems faced today cannot be handled by a single organi-
zation. This is because, as we discussed, the security posture of an organization is not
based solely on its own decisions but also those of other organizations. While the deci-
sions of powerful entities may, in certain circumstances improve aggregate security—
e.g., Google “strongly advocating that sites adopt HTTPS encryption” [168] 1—this
type of approach is not always feasible. Many problems created by collective decisions
call for a collective response. One such example of a response is Let’s Encrypt [72], a
free-certificate authority, which came out of a collaboration between Mozilla, Cisco,
1Of course, there are still some services that use http, e.g., see https://whynohttps.com. [81]
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EFF, and others, whose emergence catalyzed wider adoption of HTTPS. 2
We believe collective action by organizations has a role more broadly. And it can
be especially important for improving the implicit training that users receive. For ex-
ample, what if we standardized the format of URLs among leading services? Or what
if we standardized certain aspects of the URL, e.g., the query field associated with
URL redirection? Doing so could reduce the variability in the URLs served to users,
improve implicit training, and ultimately lead users to have a more accurate repre-
sentation of how a URL is structured and where legitimate services place redirection
URLs. When a URL doesn’t fit into this model, the user would be better equipped
to reject it without fear of false negatives, in contrast to their current inability driven
by faulty models constructed from interactions with services that use a hodgepodge
of URL structures.
8.2.6. Beyond a Single Objective
We mustn’t think about security objectives in isolation. A security decision may waste
user time, result in user error, or cause other issues. It is important to identify the
trade-offs and to make an informed and holistic decision that considers the decision
outcomes for all objectives, not just security. That is, if we are serious about achieving
a given security objective, we must think about that objective in relation to other
objectives—or perhaps as a single component of a grand objective. Even if a security
solution achieves a security objective in the short term, it may be rolled back once
there is a broader understanding of its ramifications. Thus, even if one is solely
considered about security outcomes, the broader objectives of the organization must
be taken into account to optimize decision-making.
There are also a number of often-overlooked costs and considerations of security
2We note that various concerns have been expressed over Let’s Encrypt, e.g., Scott Helme explains
a common criticism of Let’s Encrpyt, and then provides a defense. [77]
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decisions. Does the security decision erode the trust that users place in security
personnel? How will the decision affect users’ mental models? How do we evaluate
whether the security objective is actually working—and are we using the right measure
to do this evaluation? And is the measure reliable? Simply thinking about these sorts
of questions early in the design process can help in achieving the intended outcomes.
Section 8.3
Future Work
We discuss research threads that could be spun off the work presented in this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we collected and analyzed Amazon reviews of password logbooks.
We believe reviews are an underutilized resource for usable security information; they
provide a large, freely accessible data set comprising records of users’ security beliefs,
security behaviors, and security woes. It would be interesting to examine other prod-
ucts and their reviews. In particular, we think it would be enlightening to analyze
reviews of mouse jigglers, USB sticks and contraptions used to emulate mouse move-
ments to defeat auto-logout systems. Additionally, there exist plenty of other services
besides Amazon from which we can learn about users. Users share their thoughts on
blogs, news aggregator sites, forums, and various other platforms. Harnessing such
data responsibly can reveal, at scale, information that is often inaccessible or hard to
get via other means.
In Chapter 3, we discussed our work on building an agent-based simulation to
simulate users’ password behaviors and assist security practitioners in choosing and
assessing password policies. Agent-based modeling can be an extremely effective tool
for modeling the ramifications of security decisions if it accurately captures users’
cognitive processes, behaviors, and defects—e.g., short attention spans, heuristics,
and finite memories. Moreover, the growing availability of security data only broad-
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ens the scope of what can be studied. With regard to our password simulation, it
would be interesting to examine and model more modern struggles that users face
with managing passwords by incorporating two-factor authentication and password
managers into the simulation. Password managers are usually considered among se-
curity practitioners to be an ideal solution. However, as we discovered in our study
on password logbooks, users have concerns, with varying legitimacy, about password
managers; they are concerned about the safety of password managers, whether they
can share passwords with relatives, and whether processes exist to pass on passwords
to relatives after death. Additionally, there is the question of how users should navi-
gate the various options available and select a password manager. Another topic that
may be interesting to pursue is modeling the effects of implicit training, which we
discussed in the previous section. For one example, it may be useful to use simulation
to study the impact that organizational decisions have on how users assess the safety
of emails and URLs, especially given the growing availability of data on these topics.
The ideas presented in Chapter 4 lay the foundation for future work on how to
discover and account for human-computability boundaries. This area of research
certainly requires more exploration. There has been much progress in building ap-
proaches to secure code but they often rely on humans behaving according to some
ideal; in practice, human behavior diverges from this ideal. Identifying precisely what
properties humans must have to achieve the envisioned security objectives, identify-
ing what properties they do have, and developing ways to achieve those properties in
practice are natural next steps.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with two studies on how users classify URLs. The first study
involved having participants classify URLs in a lab while wearing an eye tracker; in
the second study, we had workers classify URLs as we recorded their responses and
time taken to respond. Both studies could benefit from exploration of additional
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conditions associated with inducing different moods, introspection, a sense of urgency,
and cognitive load. Both studies presented the user with URLs images wherein the
URL may span more than one line; in many applications, however, users see URLs
on just one line. It would be interesting to examine what impact this makes and how
only being able to partially view a URL affects safety evaluations. The eye-tracking
study used fairly coarse areas of interest; smaller boxes, e.g., one for each domain label
in the fully qualified domain name, could help us better understand how users parse
URLs. We plan to continue the Amazon Mechanical Turk study to explore the impact
that country of residence (USA vs. India) and language (English vs. Hindi) have on
how URLs are classified. However, we also see other directions for future work. We
explored valence in the MTurk study, but other factors, like arousal as used in the
VAD model [121] may have also had an impact on URL classification. Our Amazon
Mechanical Turk study was fairly broad in scope; it would now be nice to focus in
on a few areas to explore the more subtle phenomena that cannot be detected with
our sample size. Last, we used a fixed corpus of 116 URLs in the MTurk study. It
would be interesting to conduct a new study where each participant is presented with
its own, entirely unique set of URLs. This would provide more generalizable results
and likely allow for the study of more phenomena. For example, we could more easily
disentangle URL simplicitly from shortness. Such an approach could also assist in
providing valuable data to feed into a machine learning algorithm to simulate how
users process URLs, which in turn could be used within an agent-based simulation to
assess the impacts of implicit training.
Chapter 7 discusses our work on building a logical model for mismorphisms and
creating a catalog of mismorphisms. This catalog can be expanded. Additionally, it
may benefit from more machinery to express actions associated with mismorphisms.
Ultimately, we would like to see a collaborative tool built atop this model for identifi-
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cation and classification of mismorphisms. We believe this would be extremely useful
in understanding and addressing security problems in practice.
Section 8.4
Final Thoughts
In this thesis, we pursued the problem of bridging the gap between intent and out-
come. Each chapter made progress toward this end goal. Many chapters also show-
cased a broadly applicable technique using a specific problem scenario. In Chapter 2,
we demonstrated the value of applying grounded theory to a large corpus of freely
available data to gather insights into users’ beliefs, behaviors, and struggles; we used
this technique to learn why users resort to password logbooks as a password manage-
ment device, to identify user misperceptions, and to learn what security practitioners
might be missing with regard to usable security and password management. In Chap-
ter 3, we demonstrated the utility of using agent-based simulation to assess security
solutions and identify circumvention behaviors by exploring the question of how best
to set password policies. In Chapter 4, we argued that approaches used in language-
theoretic security could be strengthened by also considering human-computability
boundaries. In Chapter 5, we demonstrated how eye tracking can deliver valuable
ground-truth data about how users visually process security information by looking
at how they parse URLs. In Chapter 6, we did a complementary study, informed by
our eye-tracking study, to examine other phenomena associated with how users parse
URLs, the factors at play, and URL features that affect processing. Both these ap-
proaches have limitations, but by applying them together, many of the limitations can
be at least partially addressed. Last, in Chapter 7, we explored a logical model to ex-
press mismorphisms based on our earlier semiotic work on mismorphisms; we believe
this logical representation for mismorphisms—perhaps with some refinements—can
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serve as a unifying model to express the underlying causes of a vast array of security
problems.
The contribution of each chapter bring us one step closer to ensuring that the
security and privacy intentions of individuals—security practitioners, coders, users,
etc.—and also collectives, such as organizations, are realized in practice. However,
as communicated in the previous section, there is a lot of interesting work left to be
done, including: harnessing the continually growing, freely accessible data sets con-
taining valuable, untapped security information; applying agent-based simulations to
new scenarios with new data and insights; identifying and accounting for human-
computability boundaries; using eye tracking to study URLs at a finer level of gran-
ularity and also to explore other use cases; utilizing the reach of Amazon Mechanical
Turk to explore conditions that are hard to explore via other means (e.g., impact
of first language on URL classification); and building on our logical representation
of mismorphisms. We are particularly interested in seeing the mismorphism model
extended to a usable, collaborative tool to identify and catalog mismorphisms. We
believe the most effective way to tackle security issues is to address the mismorphisms
that contribute to them—and this is precisely what such a tool could achieve.
In closing, we believe we have delivered vital contributions that help to bridge the
gap between decision-maker intent and the outcomes of decisions driven by said in-
tent. While we in no way claim to have fully solved this problem, the work presented
in this thesis does lay a path forward. By deconstructing the overarching problem of
addressing the intent-outcome mismatch into smaller, more tractable subproblems,
we provided concrete findings, demonstrated broadly applicable techniques, and pro-
duced tools and models for security-minded decision-making. Of course, given the
sheer scope of the challenge, there is more to do. However, we believe this the-
sis provides a foundation upon which future researchers can build, just as previous
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researchers laid a foundation for us.
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URL Corpus Used in Chapter 6
We list the URLs used in our URL corpus. Each class contains 4 URLs. For each
class, we list the class name and the features associated with the class, preceded by a
“#” symbol, followed by the 4 URLs that belong to the class (with the URL ids we
used included). The features groups, in order, correspond to the safety of the URLs,
the length of the URLs, the top-level domain of the URLs, whether the URL contains
a path, and other features.
# Form of c l a s s e s i s as f o l l o w s :
# c l a s s : (un ) sa f e , length , ( non−)com , ( non−)path , other
# C1 : mixed , mixed , mixed , mixed , dummy
1 https : //www. theverge . com/2020/4/3/21206400/ apple−tax−amazon
−tv−prime−30−percent−deve l ope r s
2 https : //www. nylon−l lama . com
3 https : //www. mayoc l in i c . org / pat i ent−care−and−health−
i n fo rmat ion
4 http ://www. nat ionalcupcakeday . ca/ spayneuter . on ta r i o spca . ca/
cg i−bin /GodSo/GodSo/ g o o g l e d r i v e e e s s s /nD/
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# C2 : sa f e , short , com , non−path , www, canary
5 https : //www. youtube . com
6 https : //www. goog le . com
7 https : //www. amazon . com
8 https : //www. facebook . com
# C3 : sa f e , short , com , non−path , www,
9 https : //www. instagram . com
10 https : //www. kayak . com
11 https : //www. cvs . com
12 https : //www. s p r i n t . com
# C4 : sa f e , short , com , www, path , www
13 https : //www. hulu . com/welcome
14 https : //www. nike . com/ a i r−max
15 https : //www. vox . com/ recode
16 https : //www. s tarbucks . com/ g i f t
# C5 : sa f e , short , com , non−path , non−www, 2− l e v e l domain
17 https : // t w i t t e r . com
18 https : // s l a c k . com
19 https : // time . com
20 https : // gizmodo . com
# C6 : sa f e , short , com , non−path , non−www, 3− l e v e l domain
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21 https : // p o s t c a l c . usps . com
22 https : // about . i kea . com
23 https : // s t a t s . nba . com
24 https : // shop . nordstrom . com
# C7 : sa f e , medium , com , path
25 https : //www. e t sy . com/c/ art−and−c o l l e c t i b l e s ? r e f=catnav−66
26 https : //www. de l t a . com/ f l i g h t−s t a t u s / schedu le /STL/AUS
/2020−03−24
27 https : //www8. hp . com/us/en/home . html
28 https : // apnews . com/6202 bebc5b0f5fa80904d06e50b8429f
# C8 : sa f e , long , com , path
29 https : //www. ye lp . com/ search ? c f l t=r e s t a u r a n t s&f i n d l o c=San
%20Franc i sco%2C%20CA
30 https : //www. p o l i t i c o . com/news /2020/03/24/ congress−
coronav i rus−emergency−package−146066
31 https : //www. t−mobile . com/ c e l l−phone/samsung−galaxy−s20−5g?
sku =610214663405
32 https : //www. dominos . com/en/ pages / order /#!/ l o c a t i o n s / search
/? type=De l ive ry
# C9 : sa f e , very long , com , path
33 https : //www. espn . com/ n f l / s to ry / / id /28871296/2020− n f l−f r e e
−agency−trade−grades−b i l l −barnwel l−t racks−every−big−
s i gn ing−move
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34 https : //www. bloomberg . com/news/ a r t i c l e s /2020−03−24/youtube
−to−l im i t−video−qua l i ty−around−the−world−f o r−a−month? srnd=
premium
35 https : // us . norton . com/ products /norton−360−an t i v i ru s−plus ?
i n i d=nortoncom nav norton−360−an t i v i ru s−plus homepage : home
36 https : //www. bedbathandbeyond . com/ s t o r e / product / br i ta−reg−
soho−5−cup−water−f i l t r a t i o n −p i t c h e r /3328522? category Id
=12119
# C10 : sa f e , extremely long , com , path
37 https : //www. washingtonpost . com/ p o l i t i c s / i r s−to−begin−
i s su ing −1200−coronav i rus−payments−a p r i l−9−but−some−
americans−wont−r e c e i v e−checks−unt i l−september−agency−plan−
says /2020/04/02/8 e0c fc84 −751e−11ea−85cb−8670579 b863d story
. html? t i d=pm pop&i t i d=pm pop
38 https : //www. amer icanexpress . com/us/customer−s e r v i c e /
d i g i t a l /amex−mobile−app . html? i n t l i n k=us−en−hp−hero−cta−a l l
−AmexAppJan2020−16032020
39 https : //www. h i l t onhonor s . com/en US /20200106 2011 / land ing /?
c id=OM,MB, MO2011 53ee0 .18 f f f . f f f f f f f f f 0 5 5 d d 1 4 .32795 f f 4 A l l
,MULTIPR, In t e rac t , Multipage , S ing l eL ink
40 https : //www. wired . com/ s to ry / coronav i rus−in te rv i ew−l a r ry−
b r i l l i a n t −smallpox−e p i d e m i o l o g i s t/#i n t c i d=
recommendat ions default−popular ede7315b−73cb−4c2d−a56e−4
be6572b5f68 popular4−1
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# C11 : sa f e , short , non−com , non−path
41 https : //www. nih . gov
42 https : //www. i r s . gov
43 https : //www. harvard . edu
44 https : //www. cour s e ra . org
# C12 : sa f e , medium , non−com , path
45 https : // nh . c r a i g s l i s t . org /d/ garage−moving−s a l e s / search /gms
46 https : //www. npr . org /programs/ f r e sh−a i r /
47 https : //www2. ed . gov/ fund/ grants−c o l l e g e . html? s r c=image
48 https : //www. c o r n e l l . edu/about/ miss ion . cfm
# C13 : sa f e , long , non−com , path
49 https : //www. cdc . gov/ coronav i rus /2019−ncov/symptoms−t e s t i n g
/symptoms . html
50 https : //www. khanacademy . org / s c i e n c e / phys i c s / f o r c e s−newtons
−laws#newtons−laws−of−motion
51 https : //www. pbs . org / video /amazon−empire−the−r i s e−and−re ign
−of−j e f f −bezos−xpco5j /
52 https : // news . s t an fo rd . edu /2020/03/18/ c l imate−change−means−
extreme−weather−pred i c t ed /
# C14 : sa f e , very long , non−com , path
53 https : // en . w ik iped ia . org / wik i / Mart in Luther King Jr .#
Selma vot ing r ights movement and ”Bloody Sunday ” , 1965
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54 https : //www. who . i n t /news−room/ d e t a i l /03−03−2020− shortage−
of−persona l−pro t e c t i v e−equipment−endangering−health−
workers−worldwide
55 https : // addons . moz i l l a . org /en−US/ f i r e f o x /? utm source=www.
moz i l l a . org&utm medium=r e f e r r a l&utm campaign=nav&
utm content=f i r e f o x
56 https : //www. nasa . gov/ press−r e l e a s e /nasa−spacex−i n v i t e−
media−to−f i r s t −crew−launch−to−s ta t i on−from−america−s ince
−2011
# C15 : sa f e , extremely long , com , www, path , gatekeeper
57 https : // u r l d e f e n s e . p roo fpo in t . com/v2/ u r l ?u=https−3A www .









59 https : // nam01 . s a f e l i n k s . p r o t e c t i o n . out look . com/? u r l=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww. amazon . com&data=02%7C01%7Cnett i e . dan i e l s on
.83411%40 gmail . com%7Cba4509dc2eac227bae927c1be39a5bf1%7
C2e f e2a f7675e9 f555d f1ee f 400b f5e69%7C0%7C0%7
C905766577259738989&sdata=1
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bU9GNY5ArebQJeTc3DyZ023ftmd6mbmYfu36X9znDI%3D&res e rved=0
60 https : // nam01 . s a f e l i n k s . p r o t e c t i o n . out look . com/? u r l=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww. youtube . com&data=02%7C01%7Cdorothy . ca rducc i
.63288%40 gmail . com%7C7666a6108d9d53a002baa1c825b9972d%7
Cb9b1424d7082cb1c503d114b00fdc77d%7C0%7C0%7
C891102336761180193&sdata=
GvYNkcXzZzhdkZwRzEF7YAbA5GSefTaLs6l1Ey0Ro06%3D&re s e rved=0
# C16 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , ASCII homograph
( l−>I , m−>rn )
61 https : //www. z i l I o w . com
62 https : //www. hornedepot . com/c/ d i y p r o j e c t s a n d i d e a s
63 https : //www. yeIp . com/ search ? f i n d d e s c=De l ive ry&f i n d l o c=
Ph i l ade lph ia%2C%20PA
64 https : //www. a r n e r i c a n e x p r e s s . com/us/ c r ed i t−cards / category /
t rave l−rewards /? inav=menu cards pc t rave l r ewardscards
# C17 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , combosquatting
( https : // x1 . x2 . x3 . . . xk . com i s l e g i t i m a t e ; s u b s t i t u t e xk
f o r xk ’= r ( xk ’ ) s )
65 https : //www. adobe−update . com
66 https : //www. app l e id . r e s e t−apple−id . com/password/ v e r i f y /
app l e id
67 https : //www. w e l l s f a r g o−accounts . com/ check ing /compare−
checking−accounts /? l inkLoc=fn
193
URL Corpus Used in Chapter 6
68 https : //www. nytimes−g l o b a l . com/ i n t e r a c t i v e /2020/ us/
coronav i rus−us−ca s e s . html? ac t i on=c l i c k&module=S p o t l i g h t&
pgtype=Homepage
# C18 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , i n f i x domain
l a b e l ( e . g . , https : // ebay . errorpayments . com)
69 https : //www. youtube . yt−red . com
70 https : // n e t f l i x . new−customer−promos . com/one−month−f r e e /
71 https : //www. paypal . smart−help . com/us/ smarthelp / a r t i c l e /can
−i−cance l−a−paypal−payment−faq637
72 https : // pages . ebay . sc−help−pages . com/az/en−us/ s e l l e r −
c en te r / s e r v i c e−and−payments/managed−payments−on−ebay . html#
new−payment−exp
# C19 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , wrong top−l e v e l
domain
73 https : //www. s p o t i f y . vg/
74 https : //www. walmart . tk /m/ dea l s /home−sav ings /home
75 https : //www. bankofamerica . name/ c r ed i t−cards / products /cash−
back−c r ed i t−card /
76 https : //www. t r i p a d v i s o r . i o / Attract ion Review−g35805−
d2485153−Reviews−Adagio Teas−C h i c a g o I l l i n o i s . html
# C20 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , domain−in−
domain ( goog l e . com . e v i l . com)
77 https : //www. at t . com . att−wl . com
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78 https : //www. dropbox . com . dropbox−bas i c . com/ l o g i n
79 https : //www. l i n k e d i n . com . l i nked in−j o i n . com/? trk=
guest homepage−bas ic nav−header−l ogo
80 https : //www. airbnb . com . homes−sydney−a u s t r a l i a . com/ s / Par i s /
homes? re f inement paths%5B%5D=%2Fhomes&sea r ch type=
s e c t i o n n a v i g a t i o n
# C21 : unsafe , medium − very long , com , mixed , domain−in−
domain with hex ob fu s ca t i on ( goog l e . com . e v i l . com)
81 https : //www. at t . com%2Eatt−wl%2E%63%6F%6D
82 https : //www. dropbox . com%2Edropbox−bas i c%2E%63%6F%6D/ l o g i n
83 https : //www. l i n k e d i n . com%2El inkedin−j o i n%2E%63%6F%6D/? trk=
guest homepage−bas ic nav−header−l ogo
84 https : //www. airbnb . com%2Ehomes−sydney−a u s t r a l i a%2E%63%6F%6
D/ s / Par i s /homes? re f inement paths%5B%5D=%2Fhomes&
sea r ch type=s e c t i o n n a v i g a t i o n
# C22 : unsafe , shor t − very long , com , mixed , user@host
85 https : //www. imdb . com@imdb−go . com
86 https : //www. mic ro so f t . com@en . us−microso f t −365.com? r t c=1
87 https : // medium . com@kiarajoshi12 . de lh i−baking . com/bakery−
courses−in−de lh i−9b4fe65e484c
88 https : //www. theguardian . com@world . id0518492538 . com/2020/
mar/31/how−w i l l−the−world−emerge−from−the−coronav i rus−
c r i s i s
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# C23 : unsafe , medium − very long , com , mixed , user@host with
hex ob fu s ca t i on
89 https : //www. imdb . com@imdb−go%2E%63%6F%6D
90 https : //www. mic ro so f t . com@en%2Eus−microso f t −365%2E%63%6F%6
D? r t c=1
91 https : // medium . com@kiarajoshi12%2Edelhi−baking%2E%63%6F%6D
/bakery−courses−in−de lh i−9b4fe65e484c
92 https : //www. theguardian . com@world%2Eid0518492538%2E%63%6F
%6D/2020/mar/31/how−w i l l−the−world−emerge−from−the−
coronav i rus−c r i s i s
# C24 : unsafe , short , com , non−path , p o s i t i v e va l ence
93 https : //www. farm−l i v i n g . com
94 https : //www. ca rn iva lpa rk . com
95 https : //www. sweetest−pets . com
96 https : //www. joybakery . com
# C25 : unsafe , short , com , non−path , neu t ra l va l ence
97 https : //www. datageek . com
98 https : //www. saber−footwork . com
99 https : //www. z i p p y t r a n s i t . com
100 https : //www. tomahawk−gear . com
# C26 : unsafe , short , com , non−path , negat ive va l ence
101 https : //www. fu rydemo l i t i on . com
102 https : //www. in f e rno−garbage . com
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103 https : //www. pain−i n s e c t i c i d e . com
104 https : //www. predator−torpedo . com
# C27 : unsafe , long and very long , com , path , URL r e d i r e c t i o n
105 https : // t−i n f o . mail . adobe . com/ r /? id=hc43f43t4a , afd67070 ,
a f f c 7349&p1=https : // b i t . l y /6qfGDB0
106 https : // bus ine s s . facebook . com/ads/ creat ivehub / s e l e c t /?
r e d i r e c t u r i=https%3A%2F%2Fbit . l y /p5wv65V
107 https : // facebook . com+l o g i n o a g e&amp ; welcome to facebook=
true&amp ; timestamp =42837643 @bit . l y /g7Sxl9F
108 https : //www. goog l e . com/ u r l ? sa=D&q=https : // appengine .
goog l e . com/ ah / logout%3Fcontinue%3Dhttps : // b i t . l y /6qfGDB0
# C28 : unsafe , extremely long , com , path , Sa feL inks /
URLDefense





110 https : // u r l d e f e n s e . p roo fpo in t . com/v2/ u r l ?u=https−3A www .
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111 https : // nam01 . s a f e l i n k s . p r o t e c t i o n . out look . com/? u r l=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww. bu l l e t−torque . com&data=02%7C01%7Caida . wisener
.29460%40 gmail . com%7Ca52a2dea9aefd5b559dd4ca86af47ae6%7
C0102c3231815fe6e6457b782e2f2e f09%7C0%7C0%7
C443255411014997303&sdata=
nfqslHeNlVhwcsvJrpfC9autuaccdyc9i8oJjt3l8kN%3D&re s e rved=0
112 https : // nam01 . s a f e l i n k s . p r o t e c t i o n . out look . com/? u r l=https
%3A%2F%2www. lancerarmor . com&data=02%7C01%7Cyael . luke




# C29 : unknown sa f e ty , short , mixed , path , shortened URLs
113 https : // t . co/n7oywunJ9K
114 https : // goo . g l / b l 3 i x r
115 https : // b i t . l y /0B3GQ1g
116 https : // t i n y u r l . com/4XkHbrw
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